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Abstract 
A closed-end fund, known as an investment trust in the UK and closed-end fund in the 
US, is a collective investment company that invests in shares of other companies. This 
study attempts to describe and explain the persistence of the excess discount return on 
UK investment trusts and US closed-end funds. The ability to identify which factors 
best capture return variation is central to applications of multifactor pricing models. 
So the main purpose of this thesis is the application of a multifactor risk model that 
will explain the-existence of the excess discount return. Hence, the title of the thesis: 
"A Multifactor Model of Investment Trust Discounts. A Comparative Study of UK 
Investment Trusts and US Closed-End Funds" 
First, the time-series properties of the closed-end funds' net asset values (NAVs) and 
discounts are investigated. In terms of normality, we find that the UK and US excess 
NAV returns and discounts are approximately normally distributed. In addition, 
through Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, we find that the UK and US discounts are 
non-stationary, but the excess discount returns and the excess NAV returns are 
stationary. In terms of multicollinearity, we find that the independent variables 
included in our models are not closely correlated, so we do not have problems in 
using them in the regression models in Chapters 7 and 8. Finally, there are no 
significant differences in the discount during the month of January and other months. 
In Chapter 7, we study the importance of management performance in terms of excess 
NAV returns and discount persistence. We use three approaches: Fama and French's 
(1993) three-factor model, an extended Fama and French model which incorporates a 
V 
market timing variable, and a performance persistence model used by Carhart (1997) 
and Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001). 
On average, the six-factor model developed in the thesis can explain 67% of the 
variation in the excess discount return in the UK market by taking into consideration 
the market effect, size, the book-to-market effect, momentum, sentiment and 
expenses. In contrast, Fama and French's (1993) three-factor and Carhart's (1997) 
four-factor models explain only 42% of the variation of the excess discount return. 
Similarly, the six-factor model can explain 66% of the variation in the excess discount 
return in the US market by taking into consideration the same six independent 
variables. In contrast, Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model explains 59% of 
the excess discount return variation and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model explains 
65% of the variation. 
Keyword: investment trusts, closed-end funds, discount, multifactor model, 
performance persistence. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background, motivation and aims for the study 
An investment trust is a company that invests in the shares of other companies. 
The first investment trust was launched by Foreign and Colonial in 1868. Since 
then the UK investment trust industry has grown considerably. The sector has 
grown from a market capitalisation of £5.8 billion in 1980 to £61.9 billion in 
2005. Like other listed companies, investment trusts issue shares that are publicly 
traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Investment trusts pool investors' 
money and employ professional fund managers to invest in the shares of a wider 
range of companies than most people could practically invest in themselves. In 
this way, even people with small amounts of money can gain exposure to a 
diversified and professionally run portfolio of shares and spread the risk of stock 
market investment. According to the Association of Investment Trust Companies 
(AITC), there were 263 conventional trusts with total assets of £55.6 billion in 
2005 in the UK. 
On the other hand, a closed-end fund in the US is a publicly traded investment 
company in the stock market registered under the Securities Exchange Companies 
Act of 1940. The market value of the shares of a closed-end fund is determined by 
market demand. Like mutual funds, closed-end funds may be purchased through 
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brokers, or retirement plan accounts. A closed-end fund has a board of directors 
elected by the shareholders. The board appoints an investment advisor or portfolio 
manager. Specifically, according to the Closed-End Fund Association (CEFA), 
there were more than 500 closed-end funds invested in a variety of sectors in 2005 
in the US. In addition, the total market capitalisation of all closed-end funds was 
approximately $135 billion in 2003. The largest category of closed-end funds in 
terms of assets under management is municipal bond funds which occupy around 
42% of total assets. There were 286 municipal funds ($57 billion) out of a 
universe of 571 closed-end funds with almost $135 billion under management. 
These funds invest in bonds issued by state and local government and agencies. 
This category is out of the scope of our research as we focus on equity funds. 
Thus, other categories by sector breakdown are International Equity which 
occupies 6%, Equity Income 14% and Domestic Equity 11 %. 
Investment trusts or closed-end funds have several benefits for investors. 
According to AITC, they allow investors to pool their money, to spread their risk, 
to use a professional manager's expertise and allow investors to invest small 
amounts. In more detail, when you purchase shares in an investment trust you 
invest your money with all the other investors' money, providing potential 
economies of scale. Each investment trust owns shares in a range of companies so 
this spreads your risk. Each investment trust uses professional fund manager 
expertise. A key role of an investment trust's independent board of directors is to 
make sure that the fund's internal expenses are not high. 
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Furthermore, investment trusts or closed-end funds are known for the discount 
problem that arises within a few months. Specifically, closed-end fund shares are 
issued at up to a 10 per cent premium to net asset value (NAV). This premium 
represents the underwriting fees and start-up costs. Within a matter of months, the 
shares normally trade at a discount, which persists and fluctuates. Upon 
termination of the fund, the share price rises and the discount disappears. 
This study focuses on the world's largest markets for investment trusts, the UK 
and US stock markets. It reviews the literature and draws a comparison between 
the behaviour of the discount in the US and the UK markets. Many theories 
suggest reasons for the existence of the discount, but since none solve all parts of 
the problem, researchers have found it necessary to focus on models of 
investor irrationality. 
Moreover, the large amounts of effort invested to conduct research on these 
models have created additional pressures for researchers to discuss, develop and 
test these theories. The empirical research in this thesis has two main objectives. 
The first one is to investigate managerial performance persistence in the UK 
investment trust market and the US closed-end fund market. The second objective 
is to test, modify and extend Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model to 
explain the excess discount return in the UK investment trust market and the US 
closed-end fund market. 
I 
1.2 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis is primarily concerned with one of the main problems in finance, the 
existence and persistence of the discount on closed-end funds. The fact that the 
discount is non-stationary, but stationary at its first difference, and the models that 
we deal with are concerned with returns, motivates us to try to explain the excess 
discount return. Unique data sets for both the UK and US markets are collected 
from Datastream, Wiesenberger and other databases which allow us to explore the 
factors that affect the monthly changes in the discount. 
Our sample of funds avoids survivorship bias for the UK market as it contains 
both defunct and surviving funds (but data on defunct funds were not available for 
the US market). Survivorship may be expected to bias the discount and 
performance measures upwards especially when we get averages for the whole 
sector or for industries within specific sectors (see Grinblatt and Titman, 1988, 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross, 1992, Brown and Goetzmann, 1995 and 
Malkiel, 1995). 
This thesis will give valuable information to investors, practitioners and 
academics. In more detail, the world of investment opportunities has changed 
dramatically. Investors are faced with a wide variety of fund styles (such as value, 
growth, small capitalisation, balanced, income, global, etc) which makes it 
difficult for them to choose the best one. In addition, the persistence of the 
discount in most closed-end funds or investment trusts and the poor performance 
benchmarks make the choice even more difficult. 
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On the other hand, professionals working within the investment trust sector and 
academics in finance face the continuous challenge of which methodology and 
factors to use that will minimize the error to explain the existence and persistence 
of the discount to NAV. Since every statistic has shortcomings, prudent risk 
management calls for the use of more than one statistic in portfolio risk analysis. 
So as well as the mean, median and standard deviation which give complementary 
information about the shape of the distribution, we also need statistics to help us 
capture the interaction between multivariable risk factors. This is the first study 
that compares so many approaches from a statistical and econometric point of 
view and is based on two markets, the UK and US. 
Practitioners face the problem that the discount on closed-end funds cannot be 
explained solely by the beta, or tendency to move with the market as a whole. 
Multifactor extensions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will facilitate 
the description, performance, and explanation of these anomalies. Multifactor 
models focus on additional risk factors as well as movements in the market as a 
whole. 
According to Weiss (1989), shares in US funds are issued at a premium to NAV 
of up to 10 per cent, while UK funds are issued at a premium amounting to at 
least 5 per cent. This premium represents the underwriting fees and start-up costs. 
Within a matter of months, the shares trade at a discount. Weiss (1989) found that 
within 24 weeks of trading, equity funds in the US trade at an average discount of 
10 per cent. Levis and Thomas (1995) find that after 200 trading days equity 
funds in the UK fall in value by 5 per cent. Upon termination of the fund, share 
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prices rise and discounts disappear (Brauer, 1984, and Brickley and Schallheim, 
1985). This phenomenon seems to contradict the well-known Efficient Market 
Hypothesis in terms of semi-strong and strong efficiency as the persistence of the 
discount implies that publicly available information is not incorporated into the 
price of shares. Closed-end funds provide apparent evidence of market 
inefficiency and violations of standard asset pricing models. 
In more detail, according to Figure 1 (which shows monthly fluctuations in the 
discount on UK investment trusts since 1990), the discount fluctuated around 15 
per cent during the period 1990 to 1993. By the mid 1990s and specifically from 
1994 to 1996, the monthly discount had narrowed to some 5-10 per cent, though 
in recent years it has reverted to around 10 to 15 per cent. 
On the other hand, according to Figure 2 (which displays monthly fluctuations in 
the discount on US closed-end funds since 1990), the discount fluctuated around 
12 to 13 per cent during the period 1990 to 1992. During the period 1992 to 1995, 
the discount fluctuated from 3 to 6 per cent, though in recent years it has reverted 
to around 10 to 14 per cent. 
It is obvious from Figures 1 and 2 that the discount persists over a long period of 
time and during the last seven years it has reverted to around 10-15 per cent. This 
phenomenon contradicts the well known Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
Ic 
Figure 1 
Monthly fluctuations of the discount of UK trusts 
Source: calculated by the author 
Figure 2 
Monthly fluctuations of the discount of US funds 
Source: calculated by the author 
Several theories attempt to make sense of the closed-end fund discounts within a 
rational framework, but none can explain totally why this happens. A theory that 
explains parts of this problem is the limited rationality model of Lee, Shleifer and 
Thaler (1991). They suggest the existence of two kinds of investors, the rational 
and the irrational (noise) traders. The former make rational decisions, whereas the 
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latter make systematic forecasting errors. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler argue that 
changes in the discount on closed-end funds reflect changes in investor sentiment. 
The more specific contributions of the thesis may be summarised as follows., 
" It provides an up-to-date review of different approaches and methods to 
the chosen topic. It examines the excess discount return on UK and US 
funds. It gives valuable information to investors, practitioners, and finance 
scholars. However, many data modelling exercises in finance, economics 
and other fields are characterized by two difficulties: the absence of a 
complete a priori model of the data generation process and a limited 
quantity of data. When a complete a priori model for the data generation 
process does not exist, one must adopt a non-parametric modelling 
approach. Fortunately, in our case all the data were supplied from 
Datastream and Wisenberger Thomson Financial. 
" It provides an improvement of our understanding of the economic and 
behavioural reasons that drive this phenomenon. This thesis adds to the 
existing literature some of the missing factors that could explain the 
existence and persistence of the excess discount return by extending the 
traditional three-factor model of Fama and French's (1993), along similar 
lines to those employed by Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001,2002). The 
extensive search of the literature gives a clear understanding of potential 
weaknesses and allows us to draw some important conclusions and to 
confirm some hypotheses on the variables that directly or indirectly affect 
the discount phenomenon. 
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" It provides answers to the problem of measuring the performance of 
managed portfolios. This has been the subject of research for more than 20 
years. Traditional measures use unconditional expected returns. However, 
if expected returns and risks vary over time, this may cause common time- 
variation in fund risk. In this way, traditional methods can show abnormal 
performance to an investment strategy which is not the case. We measure 
the manager's quality after adjusting for various anomalies documented in 
the finance literature. Three approaches are followed. Fama and French's 
(1993) three-factor model, an extended Fama and French model which 
incorporates a market timing variable, and Carhart's (1997) and Dimson 
and Minio-Kozerski (2001) performance persistence model. As we find 
some weak evidence of managerial persistence in these models, 
management performance is used later as an explanatory variable in our 
model designed to explain changes in the excess discount return. 
1.3 Overview of the thesis 
In this section we provide a brief overview of the thesis. Chapter 1 has discussed 
the background, motivation and aims of the study. In addition, we have 
underlined the major contribution of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2, an introduction and explanation of a closed-end fund is given. In 
this section we identify the different types of closed-end funds and their 
characteristics. In addition, we outline issues concerning capital structure, taxation 
and ownership. 
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Chapter 3 gives an in-depth explanation and analysis of the literature review of 
multifactor risk modelling. In particular, different economic models and theories 
are analysed. These include modern portfolio theory, the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), arbitrage pricing theory (APT), the three-factor model and the 
four-factor model. In addition, this chapter refers to the important contributions 
made by different researchers in the area of multifactor risk models. Empirical 
tests and studies conducted by various researchers are presented and their 
conclusions form the basis for the derivation of a better model to explain the 
existence and persistence of the excess discount return. 
Chapter 4 is a review of the literature on closed-end fund discounts and a 
comparison of the behaviour of the discount in the US and UK markets. Many 
theories as well as empirical studies are presented for the existence of the 
discount, but since none solve all parts of the problem, we focus on models of 
investor irrationality. 
In Chapter 5, the research design for the study is explained, which includes a 
framework about information acquisition, methodological and measurement 
issues. It describes some measurement issues relevant to the definition of the 
discount and to the average discount for a category. We also define measures of 
total returns for share prices, indexes and NAVs. The chapter also reviews the 
databases available for analysing the discount of the UK and US investment trust 
industries. 
1n 
Chapter 6 analyses the time-series properties of the excess NAV and excess 
discount return in terms of autocorrelation, stationarity, normality and seasonality. 
Excess NAV returns are not autocorrelated and discounts are highly 
autocorrelated in their levels but not in their first differences. Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) tests also show that the excess NAV and excess discount return on 
UK investment trusts and US closed-end funds are stationary. We also find that 
the UK and the US excess NAV and excess discount returns are approximately 
normally distributed. On the other hand, in terms of seasonality there are no 
significant differences in the discount during the month of January and other 
months. 
Chapter 7 has four objectives. The first one is to investigate whether 
management performance persistence is related to anomalies documented in the 
finance literature, such as size or the book-to-market effect. The second objective 
is to test if fund managers have market timing ability or can predict the movement 
of the market. The third objective is to test performance and discount persistence 
by using the method employed by Carhart (1997) and Dimson and Minio- 
Kozerski (2001). The fourth objective is to assess the performance of UK `dead' 
funds. The argument that NAV reflects the quality of the management has 
been investigated in the past but the results were mixed. However, in these 
studies NAV is measured as the raw return on the fund's NAV (Grinblatt and 
Titman, 1992, Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavka, 1993, and Elton, Gruber, and 
Blake, 1996a). Possible sources of persistence in raw return figures include 
differences in risk exposures, size, the book-to-market ratio and fund manager 
skills. 
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In Chapter 8, we attempt to extend Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model 
in order to explain the fluctuations of the excess discount return. Based on the 
Fama and French model, we first take into account market risk, small firm risk, 
and book-to-market risk. An attempt is made to explain at least part of the 
movements in the discount by introducing additional factors. In particular, we 
investigate the importance of managerial performance, noise-trader sentiment 
theory (by taking into consideration retail flows and an investor sentiment index) 
and expenses. 
In Chapter 9, opportunities for future research are discussed and the conclusion 
of the study is presented. 
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Chapter 2 
Background of the industry 
2.1 Introduction to investment trusts 
This chapter provides an overview of the closed-end fund industry. We outline the 
differences and similarities between closed-end and open-end funds. In addition, 
different categories of UK investment trusts and US closed-end funds are 
described and used later in the research. 
Investment trusts are closed-end limited companies quoted on the London and US 
Stock Exchanges. Investment trusts can be tailored to the investor's individual 
needs as they cover a diverse range of sectors and countries, allowing investors to 
choose the level of risk that is required. Investors can choose from the Far East 
and Emerging Markets sectors, through to the more solid UK and Global Growth 
sectors. For example, in the Global Growth Fund, the investment trust companies 
objectives are to produce a total return to shareholders from capital growth. They 
will also have less than 80% of their assets in any one geographical area with at 
least 20% in UK registered companies. In contrast, in UK Growth, the investment 
trust companies' objective is to produce a total return to shareholders from capital 
and/or dividend income growth, using as a benchmark the FTSE All-Share Index. 
They also have at least 80% of their assets in UK registered companies. 
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2.2 Types of mutual funds 
Mutual funds can be classified into 
9 Closed-end funds 
9 Open-end funds. 
Closed-end funds are professionally managed investment companies, whose 
shares are listed on stock exchanges. They are bought and sold in the open 
market. Daily trading allows investors to purchase and sell shares of closed-end 
funds just like the shares of other publicly traded securities. In addition, when 
shares of closed-end funds trade at prices below their NAV, investors have the 
opportunity to enhance the return on their investment. 
The key distinction between a closed-end fund and an open-end fund is their share 
structure: a closed-end fund has a relatively fixed share structure. So unlike 
mutual fund managers who must worry about constant inflows and outflows of 
cash, investment trust managers are responsible for a fixed share structure. This is 
particularly beneficial when markets are volatile because fund managers are not 
forced to sell securities in a falling market to meet redemptions. They are thus 
able to plan for the longer term and make more careful long-term investment 
decisions. It also makes the investment trust structure more attractive for investing 
in specialized areas, such as less liquid securities. 
In contrast, open-end funds or unit trusts expand or decrease in size continually 
according to the wish of investors, which means that fund managers cannot plan 
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ahead with the same certainty. If a number of investors decided to sell their units 
for various reasons at a certain point in time, the fund manager may be forced to 
sell some of the trust's most valuable assets. This can badly affect investment 
performance, especially over the long term. 
In order to better understand the above two types of investment vehicles, consider 
their similarities and differences. 
Similarities 
9 Both are diversified portfolios of securities. 
" They may be structured in different categories of funds. 
" They are professionally managed. 
" Both types of funds must distribute most of the income earned or realized 
capital gains in a given year. 
Differences 
" Limited Number of Shares. Closed-end funds have a limited number of shares. 
On the contrary, the number of shares of open-end funds changes constantly 
as units are bought and redeemed. 
9 Trading. Because the number of shares of a closed-end fund is limited, this 
type of fund trades on an exchange. Open-end funds do not. Consequently, the 
price of a closed-end fund may trade above the fund's NAV (i. e. at a 
premium), or below its NAV (i. e. at a discount). If the NAV is $8, and the 
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price is $9, then the fund is trading at a 12.5% premium. If the price is $7.00, 
then the fund is trading at a 12.5 % discount. 
" Inefficient Market. Information on closed-end funds is not always easily 
available. According to the Financial Services Authority (2002), a number of 
splits have invested a portion of their portfolios in the shares of other splits. 
Some have also borrowed funds from banks to leverage or to gear the fund. 
This creates pricing inefficiencies among closed-end funds. A split is an 
investment trust with more than one type of shares. 
9 Higher Volatility. Closed-end funds tend to be more volatile. The price 
volatility of a closed-end fund tends to be higher as its discount or premium 
narrows or widens. 
" Leverage. A closed-end fund can borrow money at a lower rate than that at 
which it can invest its assets. The purpose of leveraging a closed-end fund's 
assets is to increase its performance. This additional performance will come at 
the expense of higher volatility. In other words, a leveraged fund should 
outperform a non-leveraged fund in a rising market. In contrast, it 
underperforms a non-leveraged fund in a declining market. 
2 .3 Categories of 
UK investment trusts according to AITC 
Global Growth: These are investment trust companies whose objective is to 
produce a total return to shareholders from capital growth. They will also have 
less than 80% of their assets in any one geographical area with at least 20% in UK 
registered companies. This category contains some of the oldest and 
largest 
companies in the investment trust sector. In terms of seeking a trust to suit a 
long 
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term buy and hold strategy, this sector is the ideal place to start for the less 
sophisticated investor, as the fund managers will take care of both geographic and 
sector allocation. Total assets of the sector were £ 14,953 million in 2005. 
Global Growth and Income: These are investment trust companies whose 
objective is to produce a total return to shareholders from capital and dividend 
income growth. They will also have less than 80% of their assets in any one 
geographical area with at least 20% in UK registered companies. Total assets of 
the sector were £1,460 million in 2005. 
Global Smaller Companies: These are investment trust companies which have 
less than 80% of their assets in any one geographical area with at least 20% in UK 
registered companies, whose policy is to invest at least 80% of their assets in 
smaller companies. Total assets of the sector were £318 million in 2005. 
UK Growth: These are investment trust companies whose objective is to produce 
a total return to shareholders from capital growth and which use as a benchmark 
the FTSE All-Share Index. They also have at least 80% of their assets in UK 
companies. Total assets of the sector were £4,647 million in 2005. 
UK Growth and Income: These are investment trust companies whose objective 
is to produce a total return to shareholders from capital or dividend income 
growth and which use a benchmark of FTSE All-Share Index. They also have at 
least 80% of their assets in UK registered companies. Total assets of the sector 
were £4,424 million in 2005. 
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UK Smaller Companies: These are investment trust companies which have at 
least 80% of their assets invested in the shares of smaller UK registered 
companies. Total assets of the sector were £3,437 million in 2005. 
North America: These are investment trust companies which have at least 80% 
of their assets in North America. Total assets of the sector were £592 million in 
2005. 
North America Smaller Companies: These are investment trust companies 
which have at least 80% of their assets invested in the shares of North American 
smaller companies. Total assets of the sector were £437 million in 2005. 
Far East Including Japan: These are investment trust companies which have at 
least 80% of their assets in Far Eastern Securities, which include a Japanese 
content of 20%. Total assets of the sector were £326 million in 2005. 
Far East Excluding Japan: These are investment trusts which have at least 80% 
of their assets in Far Eastern securities, which include Japanese content of less 
than 20%. Total assets of the sector were £1,475 million in 2005. 
Japan: These are investment trust companies with at least 80% of their assets in 
Japan. Total assets of the sector were £1,084 million in 2005. 
Japanese Smaller Companies: These are investment trust companies which have 
at least 80% of their assets invested in the shares of Japanese smaller companies. 
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The performance of the Japanese Smaller Companies trusts has been 
disappointing with every company's share price declining by more than 30% in 
2001. This was due to their exposure to growth stocks and in particular 
technology shares. Total assets of the sector were £296 million in 2005. 
Country Specialist Far East: These are investment trust companies that have at 
least 80% of their assets in the Far East. The sector has a large number of very 
small and specialist trusts whose only real connection is that they concentrate on 
the same geographical region. Total assets of the sector were £278 million in 
2005. 
Europe: These are investment trusts which have at least 80% of their assets in 
Europe. Total assets of the sector were £2,421 million in 2005. 
European Smaller Companies: These are investment trusts which at least 80% 
of their assets have been invested in the shares of European smaller companies. 
Total assets of the sector were £784 million in 2005. 
Sector Specialist-Property: These are investment trusts whose policy is to invest 
in the shares and securities of property companies. TR Property is by far the 
largest trust in this small specialist sector. The share price discount in this sector 
is not very volatile and does not tend to move far from the 20% level. Property 
trusts have a place in private investors' investment portfolios providing another 
opportunity for asset diversification. Total assets of the sector were £3,252 
million in 2005. 
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2.4 Categories of US closed-end funds as defined by CEFA 
Equity-Income These closed-end funds seek growth and income by investing a 
minimum of 15% of their assets in income-producing equity securities. Total 
assets of the sector were $28,035 million in 2005. 
Growth and Income. These closed-end funds seek more capital appreciation by 
investing in equities with a level or rising dividend stream. Total assets of the 
sector were $23,461 million in 2005. 
Growth-Domestic. These closed-end funds seek long term capital appreciation 
by investing primarily in domestic equity securities of any market capitalization. 
Total assets of the sector were $10,946 million in 2005. 
Global Growth These closed-end funds seek capital appreciation by investing in 
equity securities of companies involved in worldwide activities. They invest 
primarily in domestic and foreign equity securities of any market capitalization. 
Total assets of the sector were $3,272 million in 2005. 
2.5 Structure and regulatory environment 
2.5.1 Ownership 
There is a difference in the ownership structure of UK investment trusts and US 
closed-end funds. In 1990, investment trusts were largely dominated by 
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institutional investors. The estimate by the AITC was that the proportion of shares 
of investment trusts held by institutional investors was 70 to 75 per cent by 1990. 
In 2003,77% of investment trust assets managed in the UK were owned by 
institutional investors, such as insurance, pension and investment trust companies. 
In 2003, individuals held 59.9 per cent of investment trusts shares. The figure is 
significantly higher than the 2002 figure of 37.7 per cent. In contrast, Lee et al 
(1991) report that US closed-end funds owned by institutional investors amounted 
to only 6.6 per cent (see Weiss, 1989 and Ammer, 1990). In 2003, institutional 
investors owned 30 per cent of all US closed-end funds and individual investors 
owned 70 per cent. 
2.5.2 Saving schemes and personal equity plans in the UK and the US 
Investment trusts saving schemes were introduced in the UK in 1984 as a method 
of buying investment trust shares without having to go through a stockbroker. 
Small private investors can use them to invest a regular amount each month or to 
invest a lump sum. Most investment shares are available through these schemes 
which are generally run by the management companies of the relevant investment 
trusts. The advantages of investing through savings scheme are flexibility, low 
minimum investment, low costs, simple administration and variety. Specifically, 
savers can invest monthly or make a lump sum investment or a combination of 
both. With minimum monthly payments starting from £30 in some schemes and 
lump sums or occasional top-ups from £250, investors can start to build their 
investments up from a low initial base. On the other hand, by pooling all the 
investors' money, the manager is able to negotiate a discount on the dealing costs. 
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Personal equity plans (PEPs) were introduced in the UK in 1986 to increase the 
interest of private investors to invest in shares of investment trusts. The main 
feature of PEPs was that all dividend income and capital gains were entirely free 
of tax. The maximum amount that could be invested in a general PEP was £6,000 
in each tax year. 
However, PEPs, were replaced by Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) in April 
1999. Exemption from income and capital tax is similar to PEPs but investors 
have more choices. Specifically, ISAs can include one or more components such 
as cash (bank and building society savings accounts, National Savings), life 
assurance (investment type life insurance policy), stocks and shares (investment 
trusts, unit trusts, shares, bonds and so on). There are strict rules regarding the 
maximum amount allowed for each component and the overall amount you can 
invest in any one tax year. Until April 2006 you can pay an overall total of £7000 
into ISAs each tax year. According to AITC, the benefits of investing within an 
ISA are the following: 
" Investors do not pay tax on any interest or dividends they receive from the 
investments within the ISA 
" ISAs can save time on administering investments since any money 
invested in an ISA does not have to be declared in self-assessment tax 
returns. 
" For higher rate taxpayers, dividends received from investments held 
within an ISA are not liable to the additional 25% tax levied on the net 
amount of dividends received from other investments. 
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On the other hand, there are no PEP or ISA plans for the US market. Most 
investors place their order with the assistance of a securities broker, or financial 
advisor, who transmits instructions to the exchange on which the closed-end fund 
trades. The broker also may offer guidance on how the fund fits into investors' 
overall planning. The most common sectors that we will cover in this thesis are 
growth funds which provide capital appreciation over the medium to long-term 
and equity income funds which aim to provide both growth and regular income. 
2.5.3 Capital structure 
As discussed previously, closed-end funds are characterized by a fixed 
capitalization. This structure makes it easier for the investment manager to make 
long-term commitments. Thus, according to the structure of investment trusts, 
they are divided into conventional and split capital investment trusts. 
Conventional investment trusts have just one class of share. On the other hand, 
Split capital investment trusts is the name given to investment trusts that offer two 
or more classes of shares, which can be used by investors to meet specific 
investment goals. At least one of the share classes is likely to have a limited life 
(usually between five and ten years), so there will be a fixed wind-up date when 
the company is terminated and the assets split between the various categories of 
shareholder. The main types of shares, as described below, are zero dividend 
preference shares, income shares, ordinary income shares and capital shares. 
" Zero dividend preference shares have a target redemption value that will 
be paid to investors on wind-up. This redemption value is not guaranteed 
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and investors may make less of a profit than expected or even lose part or 
all of their money. Zero dividend means that there is no income but also 
no income tax to pay so the profit is taxed as a capital gain and the 
investor can therefore offset this against the capital gains tax exemption, 
which is £8,200 for the 2004/05 tax year. 
" Income shares pay dividends after any interest or borrowing costs. There 
is no target level of return at redemption, as the rate will depend on 
investment performance. 
" Ordinary income shares are similar to income shares but also offer the 
prospect of capital growth. On wind-up, these shares are usually ranked 
last in the trust's repayment order, so if the trust has made big profits, 
ordinary income shareholders will do very well (but the reverse is also 
true). 
" With capital shares, the value depends on how much money is left after 
any borrowings are repaid and the zeros and income shares have been 
redeemed, so these shares are considered high risk. 
In this thesis, we focus only on conventional trusts that have just one class of 
shares, namely ordinary income shares or capital shares. 
2.5.4 Taxation 
Under the US tax system, closed-end funds are required to distribute to 
shareholders 90 per cent of realized capital gains in a given year to qualify 
for 
exemption from corporation tax. The dividend income is taxed as ordinary 
income 
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and the capital gain is taxed at the capital gains rate. In more detail, closed-end 
funds pay out their earnings to shareholders in two ways: 
" Fixed income closed-end funds typically pay out income dividends 
monthly or quarterly, while equity funds pay out income dividends 
quarterly, semi-annually or annually. Income dividends generally are 
taxable to shareholders as ordinary income. 
0 Capital gains distributions pass through to shareholders the "realized" 
capital gains of the fund, net of realized capital losses. Most closed-end 
funds make capital gains distributions once each year, toward the end of 
the calendar year. The portion of a capital gains distribution is taxed to 
shareholders at a maximum federal income tax rate of 15%, under current 
law. 
In contrast, UK investment trusts are not allowed to distribute capital gains, 
but must retain them for reinvestment. Capital gains tax on investment trusts 
was removed completely in 1980. Therefore, closed-end fund managers can 
turn over their portfolios without incurring any capital gains tax liability. Each 
individual has an annual exempt amount and the first £7,700 in the 2004/05 
tax year of total gains is tax-free. 
On the other hand, UK investment trusts cannot retain more than 15 per cent of 
dividends received. Each individual has a personal allowance and if all income 
falls within this, no income tax is payable. The allowance for the year 2004/05 
is 
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£4,615. This increases to £6,100 for those aged 65-74 and £6,370 for those aged 
75 and over. After deducting the personal allowance, the next band of income, 
regardless of its source, is taxed at the lower rate of 10%. In 2004/05, the first 
£1,920 above the personal allowance qualifies for this lower rate. However, the 
rate payable for a higher rate taxpayer is 32.5% on the total of the dividend. What 
this means in practice is that a higher rate taxpayer has to pay 25% of the dividend 
received. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the closed-end fund industry and outlines 
the differences and similarities between closed-end and open-end funds. The main 
similarities are that they are professionally managed and are structured in 
different categories of funds. On the other hand, the main differences are trading, 
limited number of shares, higher volatility and leverage. We also mentioned the 
different categories that will be used later for further statistical analysis. Finally, 
we briefly explained the structure and regulatory environment in both the UK and 
the US. 
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Chapter 3 
Single and multifactor risk models -A review of the literature 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the key issues facing an individual is how to allocate wealth among 
alternative assets. Risk measurement was first developed by Bernoulli (1738) who 
mentioned risk in relation to decision making. In other words, it is not sensible to 
talk about investment returns without talking about risk because investment 
decisions involve a trade-off between the two. Investors must constantly be aware 
of the risk they are taking, know what it can do to their investment decisions and 
be prepared for the consequences. 
There are many ways that risk can be defined and measured. Broadly, these 
definitions have concentrated on two types of risk: (1) specific risk, which is the 
riskiness of an asset held in relation to other assets, and (2) market risk, which is 
an asset's risk in relation to the market. No investment will be made unless the 
expected rate of return is high enough to compensate the investor for taking extra 
risks. In general, it is believed that the higher the perceived risk associated with an 
investment opportunity, the higher should be its expected return to persuade an 
investor to accept the investment opportunity. General theories of portfolio 
selection and asset pricing were formulated by Markowitz's (1959) theory of 
portfolio optimisation, which showed how risk and return must be related in 
optimal portfolio construction. 
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Tobin (1958), Treynor (1961) and Sharpe (1963) argued that since we would 
expect all investors to make this trade-off between risk and return, then high risk 
assets must compensate investors by offering higher returns. This gave rise to the 
capital asset pricing model, which has been the cornerstone of asset pricing. 
The CAPM provides a description of why average returns on some stock 
portfolios are higher than others. But the average returns of many investment 
opportunities cannot be explained by the CAPM beta alone and multifactor 
models have been derived to cover this problem. Similarly, the average returns on 
closed-end funds or investment trusts can be explained in part by the CAPM, but 
there are other factors that also need to be considered such as growth, style and 
size. 
In this chapter, we review multifactor asset pricing models. The excess discount 
on closed-end funds or investment trusts cannot be explained solely from their 
share price or their NAV. Multifactor models tend to measure the degree of 
variability between the discount and share price or NAV with additional risk 
factors in addition to movements in the market as a whole. Their distinguishing 
feature is that expected asset returns are determined by a linear combination of 
their covariances with variables representing the risk factors. 
In this thesis, we use the same factors that explain the excess return in CAPM- 
based multifactor models to explain the excess discount return for the following 
reasons. 
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The excess discount return (defined as the monthly change in the discount, less 
the risk-free rate) is used because changes in the discount can be interpreted as 
returns. Another explanation is that we use the excess discount return to verify 
arbitrage activity above the risk free rate. On the other hand, we want to test if 
firm-specific attributes such as the size effect, the book-to-market ratio and 
momentum are the causes of the fluctuations of the discount. These anomalies, 
documented in the finance literature, are influences on fund performance, which 
in turn helps to determine the discount or premium. Thus, there is a direct 
relationship between the discount and firm-specific factors. Since the market 
return cannot solely explain the fluctuations of the excess discount return (see 
chapter 8), we use multifactor risk models that include firm-specific attributes in 
addition to expenses and a measure of investor sentiment as explanatory variables. 
The discussion in this chapter attempts to shed light on recent studies that include 
the empirical factors advocated by Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model 
and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model. The following section of this chapter 
covers modern portfolio theory and the efficient frontier, the CAPM, empirical 
tests and critiques of CAPM, arbitrage pricing theory, and multifactor asset 
pricing models and their critiques. 
3.2 Modern Portfolio Theory 
In economics in general, and investment analysis in particular, the standard 
assumption is that investors are rational. Rational investors prefer certainty to 
uncertainty. It is easy to say that investors dislike risk, but more precisely, we 
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should say that investors are risk averse, namely that they want to reduce their 
risk through a diversified balanced portfolio. This leads us to modern portfolio 
theory, which was developed by Markowitz (1959). According to Markowitz, a 
good portfolio is more than a long list of good stocks and bonds. It is a way to 
provide the investor with protection and opportunities with respect to a wide 
range of contingencies. He argued that for any given level of risk, the rational 
investor would select the maximum expected return, and for any given level of 
expected return, the rational investor would select the minimum risk. By 
measuring risk, Markowitz laid down the cornerstones of modern portfolio theory 
(Freear, 1980). 
Furthermore, according to modem portfolio theory, an investor faces two types of 
risk, market risk and firm-specific risk. Market risk cannot be eliminated by 
diversification because it is associated with economic or market factors that 
systematically affect all or most firms (Weston, Besley and Brigham 1996). These 
factors can be inflation, recession, high interest rates, etc. and are non- 
diversifiable. 
On the other hand, firm-specific risk is the part of a security's risk associated with 
random outcomes generated by events or behaviours specific to the firm 
(Cuthbertson, 1996). These risks can be caused by factors such as strikes, 
successful and unsuccessful management, and failure to advertise the product 
properly. This type of risk, however, can be eliminated through diversification. 
Thus, an investor cannot avoid market risk because it derives from the 
uncertainties of the whole economy. In contrast, firm-specific risk, which 
is 
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related to a particular company or project, can be avoided by investing in several 
different kinds of shares (Franks and Broyles, 1979, Pilbeam, 1998, Rutterford, 
1993) 
In addition, an investor can diversify more than half of the total risks that he/she 
would bear by investing in different shares. Thus, a portfolio of shares can 
"average out" the firm-specific risks of the different shares. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Market and firm-specific risk 
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Source : Solnik (1974), pp 48-54 
According to Figure 3, Solnik (1974) finds that risk can only be eliminated in a 
reasonably well diversified portfolio, which is one containing up to 20 stocks 
(Copland and Weston, 1992). As the number of shares becomes very larg, the 
investor cannot diversify the risk anymore and he/she faces the market risk. 
11 
Finally, Markowitz (1952) demonstrated that the covariance between securities in 
a portfolio is the most important element in determining the overall risk of the 
portfolio. Ceteris paribus, the lower the covariance between the securities in the 
portfolio, the lower the standard deviation of the portfolio. It is thus important in 
selecting an asset for diversification purposes to establish the covariance of the 
asset with all other assets in the portfolio. 
Portfolio theory is concerned with the allocation of an individual's wealth among 
the various available assets. Therefore, the selection of a portfolio among those 
represented by the efficient frontier will depend upon the individual's utility 
function. Knowledge of the preference of the investor is normally required before 
we can choose between portfolios. Portfolio theory, therefore, makes several 
reasonable assumptions about preferences between risk and return. 
" If two portfolios have the same standard deviation and different expected 
returns, the one with the larger expected return is preferred. 
" If two portfolios have the same expected return and different standard 
deviations of return, the one with the smaller standard deviation is preferred. 
9 If one portfolio has a smaller standard deviation and a larger expected return 
than another, it is preferred. 
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In more detail, the efficient set is represented by the upper left-hand boundary of 
the points A and C, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Markowitz efficient frontier 
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According to Figure 4, the dashed rectangle area represents all attainable 
portfolios that are all the combinations of risk and expected return which may be 
achieved with the available securities. For example, consider the portfolios 
represented by points B and D. Portfolios B and D promise the same expected 
return E(RI) but the risk associated with B is S(RI), whereas that associated with 
D is S(R2). Investors therefore prefer portfolios on the efficient frontier rather 
than interior portfolios given the assumption of risk aversion. Obviously, point A 
on the frontier represents the portfolio with the least possible risk, while C 
represents the portfolio with the highest possible rate of return (Dobbins and Witt, 
1983, p. 31). In other words, the portfolio efficiency frontier consists of those 
portfolios with the maximum rate of return for a given level of risk, or 
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equivalently those portfolios with the minimum level of risk for a given rate of 
return (Pilbeam, 1998, p. 136). 
In addition, the investor has to select a portfolio among all those represented by 
the efficient frontier according to his risk-return preference. According to Figure 
4, this is shown by the utility curve. The investor therefore wishes to be on the 
highest possible indifference curve in order to obtain the maximum possible level 
of utility, and this is given by the point of tangency between an indifference curve 
and the efficient frontier, that is point B. This point therefore represents the 
optimal portfolio (Dobbins and Witt, 1983, p. 32). 
3.3 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Shortly after Treynor (1961) began his work on asset pricing, Sharpe set out to 
determine the relationship between the prices of assets and their risk attributes. 
Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin (1964) aimed to use the theory of portfolio selection 
to construct a market equilibrium theory of asset prices under conditions of risk. 
The CAPM divides equity risk into two components: 
9 Specific Risk 
9 Systematic risk 
Investors cannot diversify away about one-third of the total risk of a single 
security, no matter how many shares he/she holds (Myddelton, 1995). This 
represents the market risk to which all shares are subject. This leads us to the 
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Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which is basically derived from modern 
portfolio theory. Its foundation is based upon the fact that the portfolio is 
diversified, and the only variable that we have to calculate is market volatility. 
This model is based on the proposition that any stock's required rate of return is 
equal to the risk-free rate of return (e. g. the yield on treasury bills) plus a risk 
premium where risk reflects diversification. The equilibrium relationship between 
expected return and risk for individual securities is known as the security market 
line, and can be expressed accordingly: 
ýRý, 
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where (R11 -Rf 1) 
is the excess security rate of return, defined as the security rate 
of return less the one-month risk-free rate of return, 
(Rmj 
-Rf 1) 
is the excess 
market return and ß is the beta coefficient, which measures a stock's sensitivity to 
market fluctuations and is given by the following formula: 
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The CoVar;,,, is the covariance of returns on security i with those of the market 
portfolio m. The beta measures the responsiveness of a security's return to 
changes in the market. For example, it measures the degree to which a security's 
return rises or falls as the market rises or falls. In more detail, a beta of 1 means 
that the share is as risky as the market portfolio, whereas a beta of 0.5 implies that 
the share is half as risky as the market. The above security market line equation 
(1) is illustrated in Figure 5. 
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By referring to Figure 5, we can see why the CAPM is often called the 
equilibrium model of capital markets. If, at any given time, there were a financial 
asset with the combination of Return Ra and beta Ba, then this would immediately 
Figure 5: Security market line 
Expected 
Return % 
Ra 
Rm 
Rf = risk free 
Rb 
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Source: Drury (1992), p 400-401 
Security market 
line 
undervalued stock 
be recognised as overvalued. There would in theory be an excess demand for asset 
A and the price of A would increase until the expected return falls back to the 
security market line, thus in `equilibrium'. The process would work in exactly the 
opposite direction in the case of an undervalued asset such as B. In this sense, the 
security market line may be interpreted as an `equilibrium concept', enabling 
statements to be made as to whether a financial asset is over- or under-valued at 
any given time, and how prices should react to eliminate such anomalies. 
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3.3.1 Assumptions of the CAPM 
" All investors are risk averse and aim to maximize their expected utility of 
wealth and therefore are interested in two features of a security, its 
expected return and its standard deviation. 
" All investors have similar assessments of the probability distributions of 
returns expected from traded securities. 
0 There are no transaction costs entailed in trading securities. 
9 All securities are marketable 
With regard to investment trusts, it can be said that the first assumption seems 
reasonable based on the utility function and efficient frontier that we discussed 
above. Clearly, the next three assumptions are invalid. As we will see in Chapter 
5, there is a some difference in the mean and standard deviation by various 
categories of trusts. In addition, transaction costs are always incurred in trading 
securities and some categories of investment trusts hold securities that are illiquid. 
For example, venture and development investment trusts, private equity trusts, 
emerging market funds, hedge funds, and split capital trusts all hold securities that 
are illiquid. 
3.3.2 Empirical tests of CAPM 
A lot of empirical work has been conducted towards testing the CAPM's validity. 
Empirical studies such as those of Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Fama 
and McBeth (1973) support the CAPM. On the other hand, there are empirical 
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studies such as Fama and French (1992) and Banz (1981) that challenge the 
model's validity. 
3.3.3 The Black, Jensen, and Scholes empirical test 
Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) were the first to conduct empirical studies on 
the CAPM. The objective of their test was to show that a linear, positively sloped 
relationship exists between the betas and the expected rate of return. They found 
that the data were consistent with the predictions of the CAPM, given the fact that 
the CAPM is an approximation to reality just like any other model. 
Black, Jensen, and Scholes use all stocks of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) to form 10 portfolios with different historical beta estimates. They 
regressed average monthly excess returns on beta. By plotting the data on a scatter 
diagram, they were able to see that a relationship between beta and the average 
excess monthly return existed since most of the data could be fitted on a straight 
line. They used the 30-day treasury bill as the risk-free asset for these 10 
portfolios. The estimated slope for the resulting regression line was 1.08 per cent 
instead of 1.42 per cent as predicted by the CAPM. Despite the fact that the t- 
statistics indicated that the slope and the intercept of their regression line were 
different from their theoretical values, this does not necessarily mean that the 
findings did not support the CAPM. As Black (1993), points out, one possible 
explanation for these results concerns the measurement and model specification 
error that arises due to the use of a proxy instead of the actual market portfolio. 
This error biases the regression line's estimated intercept. Overall, we can say that 
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Black, Jensen, and Scholes' empirical tests give no evidence of non-linearity of 
the estimated security market line. Thus, there is a positive relationship between 
betas and expected rates of return. 
3.3.4 The Fama and French studies 
According to the CAPM, expected returns vary across assets only because the 
asset's betas are different. As a result, one way to examine whether the CAPM 
adequately captures all important aspects of reality is to test whether other asset- 
specific characteristics can explain the cross-sectional differences in average 
returns that are related to cross-sectional differences in beta. In empirical tests of 
CAPM, researchers want to know if beta is the only characteristic that matters. 
Fama and French (1992) estimated the relationship between betas and expected 
rates of return for the period from July 1963 to December 1990. They grouped 
stocks from firms listed on the New York Stock exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ 
(the National Association of Security dealers Automated Quotations) into 10 size 
classes and then into 10 beta classes, for a total of 100 portfolios. Their estimates 
indicated that, for a large collection of stocks, beta could not explain the cross- 
sectional variation in average returns, whereas size had substantial explanatory 
power. 
Fama and French (1992) reached the conclusion that for some periods, the 
relation between average return and beta is completely flat, evidence that is 
against the validity of CAPM. 
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On the other hand, Fama and MacBeth (1973) examined the relationship between 
rates of return and betas for portfolios. Through their research, it was found that a 
relationship exists between the monthly return and beta. Although, the monthly 
results varied over time, the overall results supported the CAPM. 
Furthermore, Tole (1981) extended the above studies that focused on the 
examination of relative stability and examined the standard deviation of the betas 
for portfolios with different sizes. He concluded that there was substantially 
greater stability in beta as the portfolio size increased and a direct relationship 
with excess returns. 
3.4 Critiques of CAPM 
Roll's critique of CAPM is not on the theoretical framework of the model itself 
but rather on the empirical tests of CAPM (Roll, 1977, p. 129-136). In general, 
Roll's critique can be divided into two main parts. In the first part, he claims that 
the empirical tests conducted by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) were 
tautological: that is, due to the design of the test, no matter how the stocks were 
priced during that period in relation to the real world, they would obtain the 
answer that they wanted. If this is true, the CAPM was never put through a real 
test. In the second part, he claims that since the only real prediction of CAPM is 
that the market portfolio is efficient, this prediction is the one that should be 
tested. However, the market portfolio should contain every asset that is available 
to the investors. It is impossible to determine whether such a portfolio exists. 
Even if such a portfolio does exist, it would be impossible to test the efficiency of 
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such a portfolio. This implies that CAPM can never be tested empirically. In the 
empirical test conducted by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), the portfolio of 
stocks traded on the NYSE were used as the proxy of the market portfolio. Firstly, 
the equity stocks traded on the NYSE does not represent all stocks that are traded 
in the international market. The stocks traded on the NYSE are only a fraction of 
those that are traded in the world market. Secondly, the market portfolio in 
CAPM can contain other types of assets besides equity stock. Therefore, stock 
represents only a fraction of all assets. For this reason, Roll claims that the market 
portfolio is not observable. He also claims that even if the index used by Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes (1972), is a good proxy of the market portfolio, the efficiency 
of the index will not guarantee the efficiency of the market portfolio. The reason 
behind this is that the index used is merely a fraction of the total assets. 
In more detail, the main critique of Roll (1977) on Black, Jensen, and Scholes' 
(1972) empirical tests is that these tests did not directly test the CAPM's single 
prediction: that is, the market portfolio is on the efficient set. Instead, the tests 
examined the properties of the security market line constructed using an equally 
weighted proxy for the market. Therefore, if it is true that the market portfolio is 
efficient, the relationship between beta and the expected return will be a perfect 
positive linear slope. However, this does not mean that a positive linear 
relationship between beta and the expected returns will imply that the market 
portfolio, or for that matter the proxy, is efficient. 
On the other hand, Banz (1981), in his empirical study of CAPM, wanted to check 
whether the size of the firms involved was able to explain the residual variation in 
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average returns across assets that is not explained by the CAPM's beta. Banz 
(1981) used a procedure that is similar to the portfolio grouping procedure that 
Black, Jensen, and Scholes used. Banz used firms from the NYSE and he firstly 
assigned the assets to one of five subgroups based on their historical betas. The 
stocks in each of the subgroups were then assigned to five further subgroups 
based on the market value of the firms' equity. Thus, 25 portfolios were finally 
produced, and these portfolios were updated at the end of each year. From his 
results he found that during 1936-75, the average returns to stocks of small firms 
(those with low values of market equity) were substantially higher than the 
average returns of large firms after adjusting for risk using CAPM. Consequently, 
a firm's relative size seemed to be able to explain a larger fraction of cross- 
sectional variation in average return than the CAPM's beta could. 
Even if CAPM is less than perfect, its broad approach seems to be well worth 
taking into account. This matches perfectly with what Levy and Sarnat (1986) 
have written about the value and usefulness of CAPM. In their book they ask the 
question: " if the CAPM is so bad... Why is it so popular in academic circles? " 
They provide an answer that points out that "a theory can only be replaced by a 
better... theory". Consequently, it can be said that CAPM can provide some 
insights into the risk/return trade-off relating to investments. CAPM helps us 
understand better the relationship between risk and expected return. Moreover, the 
coefficient ß can be seen as a useful tool for measuring a security's riskiness or 
even a portfolio's riskiness. 
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3.5 Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
An alternative model that could potentially overcome the CAPM problems while 
still retaining the underlying concept was the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) 
developed by Ross (1976). In more detail, CAPM's basis in mean variance 
analysis determines that it is optimal for the investor to choose investments on the 
basis of expected returns, standard deviations or mean-variance analysis. 
Furthermore CAPM considers a single factor, the market portfolio, to explain 
security returns, relating them to the security's beta coefficient. CAPM's failure to 
explain adequately differences in returns of the various assets using the beta 
terminology led to the development of other asset pricing models. 
On the other hand, APT is a more general approach to asset pricing because it 
allows for the possibility that many factors can be used to explain security returns. 
The APT can include any number of risk factors that could determine the required 
return. 
The logical development of APT is similar to that of CAPM: that is, that investors 
should get rewarded for accepting a non-diversifiable risk. Unlike CAPM, APT 
assumes that returns are generated by a factor model. Furthermore, although 
CAPM is based on strong assumptions about investors' preferences, APT makes 
no such assumptions. APT does not accept the idea that investors look at 
portfolios in terms of expected returns and standard deviations. 
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It is based on the law of one price: two identical items cannot sell at different 
prices in a perfect market. The description of equilibrium is more general than 
CAPM, implying that pricing can be affected by influences beyond means and 
variances. The assumption of investors utilizing a mean variance framework is 
replaced by an assumption of the process generating security returns. APT starts 
by stating that the returns on any stock are linearly related to a set of n systematic 
factors without specifying exactly what these are: 
ýR1, 
-Rfr)=AF,, +ß2F21 + .............. +ßnFnt +£i 
(3) 
where (R11 - R11) is the excess security rate of return, defined as the security rate 
of return less the one-month risk-free rate of return, A, 2  are the 
betas with 
respect to factors F2 and st is a random error or disturbance term. 
Equation 3 says that the return on a security is affected separately by all the n 
factors. These factors might include firm-specific characteristics, such as size, and 
the book-to-market effect. Equation 3 contrasts with equation 1 of the CAPM in 
that it has several beta coefficients rather than just one. In addition, the CAPM 
deals with market risk while the arbitrage pricing theory does not have market 
risk coefficients, the whole point of the model being that market risk is 
unidentifiable. The proponents of the APT argue that it has several advantages 
over the CAPM model: 
" The CAPM requires that the investors' utility function is based upon 
expected returns and the standard deviation of systematic risk. The 
APT 
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does not require standard deviations to be used as a measure of risk. 
" APT does not require an observed market index . 
9 It does not make assumptions about the empirical distribution of asset 
returns 
9 It does not make assumptions about individuals' utility functions 
" APT can easily be extended to a multi-period framework, according to 
Ross (1976) 
3.6 Empirical tests and critiques of APT 
On the other hand, the APT has its own defects. It does not say what the relevant 
factors are or even how many relevant factors there are. It can be argued that 
although the APT gets rid of the problem of an unobservable market index, it fails 
to provide a solution for choosing alternative factors. In an empirical study Chen, 
Roll and Ross (1986) found four statistically significant macroeconomic variables 
to be priced in the US stock market. These included changes in inflation, the 
spread between the yield on short-term and long-term government bonds, risk 
premia and industrial production. 
Burmeister and McElroy (1988) continue the attempt to differentiate between 
CAPM and APT. Their study differs from Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) in two 
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ways. They modify their definition of observable factors and assume that there are 
three observable factors rather than one. They then use three portfolios to 
represent these observable factors: the return of the S&P 500 index, the return on 
20 year corporate bonds and the return on 20 year government bonds. They 
conclude that at a 1% significance level, CAPM can be rejected and replaced by 
arbitrage pricing theory. The APT restrictions cannot be rejected at any 
significance level. Their work is the strongest evidence in favour of APT so far as 
a useful and successful explanation of expected return. 
APT is still questioned for its superiority over CAPM even though more 
interrelated factors tend to explain the expected returns on investments better. A 
test by Dhrymes, Friend and Gultekin (1984) finds that a multifactor APT model 
has better explanatory power than a one factor model like CAPM. This supports 
the hypothesis that more than one factor generates expected returns on assets. 
Chen (1983) found that CAPM's anomaly of size effect in the returns is largely 
eliminated by APT. The above studies seem to suggest the APT is an 
improvement over the CAPM, particularly when the returns include some 
anomaly when examined by CAPM. 
3.7 Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model 
The model of Fama and French (1993) was constructed and implemented on 
various portfolios of shares to explain various anomalies in financial markets in 
terms of size, book/market ratio etc. This led to the three-factor model. Their 
46 
model was an extension of asset-pricing tests in Fama and French (1992) in two 
ways. 
(a) They expanded the set of asset returns to include bond returns. Their tests 
included US government and corporate bonds as well as stocks. 
(b) They also expanded the set of independent variables used to explain 
returns. The size and book-to-market variables in Fama and French (1992) 
are directed at stocks. They added the term-structure variables that are 
likely to play a role in bond returns. 
Fama and French (1993) tested returns through estimation based on the following 
model: 
(R1, 
-Rft)=a+ßi(R7, t -Rf, t)+ß2(RS, t -Rb, t)+ß3(Rg, t -Rv, r)+£t (4) 
where (R11 - R) is the excess security rate of return, defined as the security rate 
of return less the one-month risk-free rate of return. 
(Rrnj 
- R) is the excess market return. 
(Rs 
,- 
Rh 
t) 
is the size factor (small minus big), i. e the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks. 
ýRý 
t-R,,,, 
) is the book-to-market factor (high minus low), i. e the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on 
a portfolio of low book-to- market stocks. sl is the disturbance term. 
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The first so-called anomaly in financial markets is the size effect, according to 
Banz (1981). On average, stocks of small companies (measured by their market 
value) tend to perform better than stocks of big companies. Figure 6 captures one 
of the first significant failures of the CAPM. The smallest firms (the far right 
portfolios represented by the two stars inside the rectangle) seem to earn an 
average return a few per cent too high given their betas. This is the celebrated 
small-firm effect (Banz 1981) and this deviation was found to be statistically 
significant. 
Figure 6: The size effect 
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Source: Cochrane (1999), p. 4 
Another observed anomaly in financial markets is called the "value effect". Value 
stocks are more risky than growth stocks. Value stocks are stocks with 
low 
valuations compared to their assets, measured by a low book-to-market ratio. 
Growth stocks on the other hand, have very high valuations relative to their 
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assets, measured by a high book-to-market ratio. They tend to be stocks of 
companies with very high earnings growth over the previous years. 
In Fama and French (1993), the observed anomalies are regarded as indications of 
the fact that there is not only one kind of risk. Besides the market risk, other 
factors like firm size and the book-to-market ratio must be taken into account. 
Fama and French's (1993) conclusion that size and book-to-market equity are the 
most significant factors in explaining stock returns for the US had implications for 
the CAPM. Like the cross-section regressions of Fama and French (1992), the 
time series regressions say that the size and book-to-market factors can explain 
the differences in average returns across stocks. For bonds, the portfolios for the 
term structure factor capture most of the variation in the returns on their 
government and corporate bond portfolios. Their results implied that the CAPM 
was mis-specified and more emphasis should be placed on size and book-to- 
market equity in any new model. 
Their major drawback is that not all risk factors have been identified and 
interpreted entirely. It is problematic to assume that investors have better 
information about the risks associated with stocks than researchers do. 
3.8 Carhart's (1997) four-factor model 
Carhart (1997) constructed his four-factor model using Fama and French's (1993) 
three-factor model plus an additional factor capturing Jegadeesh and Titman' s 
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(1993) one-year momentum anomaly. Momentum can be interpreted as the ability 
of fund managers to outperform the market over short horizons of one to twelve 
months. This was motivated by the three-factor model's inability to explain cross- 
sectional variation in momentum-sorted portfolio returns (Fama and French 
1993). Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) suggest that the momentum 
anomaly is market inefficiency due to slow reaction to information. However, the 
effect is robust to time periods (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, Asness, Liew, and 
Stevens, 1996). The four-factor model is consistent with a model of market 
equilibrium with four risk factors. According to Carhart, it may be interpreted as a 
performance model where the coefficients of the various factors are used to 
explain the proportion of the independent variables that can explain the variations 
of the dependent variable. 
Carhart assessed his four-factor model relative to the CAPM and three-factor 
model by estimating: 
ýR1, 
-Ri, 
) =a+ßi(Rm, r -Rf, t)+ßi(R,, t -Rb, t)+ß3(Rg, t - 
R, 1) +ß4MOM+C, 
(5) 
where (R11 -Rf ,) 
is the excess security rate of return, defined as the security rate 
of return less the one-month risk-free rate of return. 
(Rmi 
-Rf ,) 
is the excess market return. 
(Re, 
- Rh, 
) is the size factor (small minus big), i. e the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks. 
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(Rgt 
- RI is the book-to-market factor (high minus low), i. e the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on 
a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
MOMI is the momentum factor defined by Carhart (1997) as one-year 
momentum in stock returns. 
In more detail, according to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the momentum effect 
implies positive serial correlation of returns and appears primarily over short 
horizons of about one to twelve months. An economic interpretation is that the 
market only after some time incorporates news into asset prices. This is also 
called underreaction to news. An investor who knows that the asset price will only 
gradually adjust might want to profit from this phenomenon. He could follow the 
momentum strategy which implies buying stocks with a good performance in the 
past one to twelve months and adjusting this portfolio over time. Then on average 
the investor with his portfolio of past winners will earn superior returns because 
winners will continue to win and the losers will continue to lose. 
Carhart's results suggest that ". .. persistence 
in mutual fund performance does 
not reflect superior stock-picking skill rather common factors in stock returns and 
persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transactions costs. In addition, 
this analysis indicates that Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) one year momentum in 
stock returns accounts for Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser's (1993) hot hands 
effect in mutual fund performance. However, funds that earn higher one year 
returns do so not because fund managers successfully follow momentum 
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strategies, but because some mutual funds just happen by chance to hold 
relatively a larger position in last year's winning stocks". (Carhart, 1997, p. 57) 
Fund performance and load fees are strongly and negatively related probably due 
to higher total transaction costs for load funds. According to Carhart, holding 
expense ratios constant, load funds underperform no-loads funds by 
approximately 80 basis points per year. There is little evidence in his study to 
support the existence of mutual fund manager stock-picking skill. The funds that 
he tested showed alphas that are insignificantly different from zero. His study 
expands the existing literature by controlling for survivor bias, and by 
documenting common factor and cost based explanations for mutual fund 
persistence. His database covers diversified equity funds measured monthly from 
January 1962 to December 1993. In an average year, his sample includes 509 
funds with average total net assets of $218 million and average expenses of 1.14 
per cent per year. 
3.9 Empirical studies and critiques of multifactor risk models 
Tests by Fama and French (1993) confirmed patterns in average stock returns not 
explained by CAPM and therefore typically referred to as anomalies. They used a 
comprehensive sample of US data over a long period (1963-1992). Recently there 
have been attempts to replicate the results using longer run historical data, see for 
example (Davis, Fama and French, 2000, Daniel, Titman and Wei, 2001). On the 
other hand, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) argue that a substantial part of the 
deviations of the three-factor model is due to survivor bias. The data source for 
book equity contains a disproportionate number of high book-to-market firms that 
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survive distress, so the average return for high book-to-market firms is overstated. 
Another view is that the misspecifications of the model could be caused due to 
irrational investors. Over-reaction that leads to underpricing of distressed stocks 
and overpricing of growth stocks (Lakonishok, Sheifer, and Vishny, 1994 and 
Haugen, 1995). 
Another limitation of the three-factor model is that it cannot explain the 
continuation of short-term returns documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
As we indicated above, the momentum effect, as it is known, implies positive 
serial correlation of returns and appears primarily over short horizons of about 
one to twelve months. On the other hand, the four-factor model substantially 
improves on the average pricing errors of the CAPM and the three-factor model. 
The three-factor model improves on the average pricing errors from the CAPM, 
since it includes both size and book-to-market equity factors. In contrast, the four- 
factor model reduces the average pricing errors relative to the three-factor model 
indicating that it well describes the cross-sectional variation in average stock 
returns. Size and momentum factors account for most of the explanation. The 
returns on the top decile funds are strongly, positively correlated with the one- 
year momentum factor, while the returns in the bottom decile are strongly 
negatively correlated with the factor. Of the 67 basis point spread in mean 
monthly return between deciles 1 and 10, the momentum factor explains 31 basis 
point, or almost half. Carhart's results suggest that concerning momentum 
proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993), mutual funds do not follow the 
momentum strategy but are funds that accidentally end up holding last year's 
winners. He also concluded that transaction costs can only explain the anomalous 
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underperformance of the worst funds if these funds also have higher costs per 
transaction. 
In view of these omissions in the prior literature, this thesis overcomes the 
problem of survivorship bias in the three-factor model by using a long period 
sample. In addition, we use a different database from the one used in Fama and 
French and Carhart. They used the Chicago Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
database whereas we use Datastream that covers the entire population of 
investment trusts. In addition, they focused on security, bond returns and open- 
end funds whereas we focus on measuring the discount of closed-end funds or 
investment trusts. Furthermore, we try to find the importance of management 
performance and persistence of the excess discount return. The methodology 
applied is similar to Carhart and Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001). In addition, 
we overcome the misspecifications of the model of Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997) that could be due to irrational investors. We incorporate in our six 
factor model investor irrationality in terms of sentiment by using an investor 
sentiment index or retail flows. Also, we use expenses in our model to find out if 
it is statistically significant and affects the persistence of the excess discount 
return. 
3.10 Conclusion of literature review 
This chapter reviews the literature of linear single and multifactor risk models. 
We started our discussion with Markowitz's (1959) modern portfolio theory, 
which assumes that rational investors prefer certainty to uncertainty. They want to 
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reduce their risk through a diversified balanced portfolio. Furthermore, according 
to modern portfolio theory, an investor faces two types of risk, market risk and 
firm-specific risk. Market risk cannot be eliminated by diversification because it 
is associated with economic or market factors. This leads us to the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), which is basically derived from modem portfolio theory. 
Its foundation is based upon the fact that the portfolio is diversified, and the only 
variable that we have to calculate is market volatility. 
From the various tests of CAPM and from the empirical tests of Black, Jensen and 
Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) and the serious challenges of 
CAPM theory from Fama and French (1992), Roll (1977) and Banz (1981) it can 
be said that CAPM is not a perfect way to describe the relationship between risk 
and expected returns of securities in the real financial markets. Ross (1976) 
attempted to provide a better model by introducing the Arbitrage Pricing Theory. 
The drawback with this theory is that an asset's excess return depends on various 
factors but without specifying them clearly. 
An attempt to make the APT model more specific was introduced by Fama and 
French's (1993) three-factor model. They confirmed patterns in average stock 
returns not explained by the CAPM and therefore typically referred to as 
anomalies. One limitation of the three-factor model is that it cannot explain the 
continuation of short-term returns documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Carhart's (1997) four-factor model incorporated the momentum effect to test for 
short-term persistence. Later, we extend Carhart's model by incorporating 
investor irrationality in terms of sentiment proxied by retail flows and an investor 
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sentiment index to find out if it is a statistically significant influence on the excess 
discount return. We also add a second factor related to expenses to test if 
management fees can explain the excess discount return. 
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Chapter 4 
Economic and behavioural explanations of the discount 
4.1 Introduction 
UK investment trusts and US closed-end funds are characterised by a discount. 
Closed-end companies neither issue new shares nor redeem outstanding ones. 
Investors who wish to purchase or sell closed-end shares must do so on the open 
market at prices which do not reflect the NAVs of the companies but rather the 
supply of and demand for the shares. As we saw in Chapter 1, the shares of 
closed-end investment companies usually sell at discounts, and most of the time at 
substantial discounts, from the actual values of the portfolios of stocks they hold. 
The resulting discount or premium of the price at which they trade compared to 
the NAV has been the focus of much research. (see, for example, Bourdeaux, 
1973; Malkiel, 1977; Brickley and Schallheim, 1985; Brauer, 1984,1988; Weiss, 
1989; Kumar and Nornha, 1992; Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff, 1995; Dimson 
and Minio-Kozerski, 2001,2002). Specifically, for a sample of 64 closed-end 
funds, Weiss (1989) showed that within 24 weeks of trading, US closed-end funds 
traded at a significant average discount of 10 per cent. A theory that explains 
some aspects of the discount is the limited rationality model of Lee, Shleifer and 
Thaler (1991). 
This chapter has two main purposes. The first one is to make the reader aware of 
previous studies and to make clear that a lot of studies have been performed 
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regarding this issue. However, none of these studies has been able to fully explain 
the phenomenon of the discount on the NAV of closed-end funds. Secondly, our 
intentions are aimed at making the reader familiar with a range of complexities 
related to this topic. Specifically, we will look at the economic and behavioural 
explanations of the discount. 
4.2 Economic explanation of the discount 
4.2.1 Bias in net asset value 
The discount could be attributed to the argument that NAV may be overestimated. 
The NAV of a closed-end fund or investment trust, usually expressed on a `per 
share' basis, is the value of all its assets, less its liabilities divided by the number 
of shares. Thus, the formula for NAV is as follows: 
NAV = 
Total Assets - Liabilities (6) 
Number of shares 
According to Equation (6), the NAV of a trust with assets of £ 10 million, 
liabilities of £2 million and 16 million ordinary shares would be 50 pence per 
share. Malkiel (1977) investigates several possible explanations of the 
overestimation of NAV. His findings suggest that tax liabilities related to 
unrealised capital gains and restricted stocks are possible causes of this 
miscalculation. But he concludes that the effects of these factors explain only a 
small part of the discount. We consider each of these arguments in turn. 
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4.2.2 Unrealised capital appreciation via the tax treatment of closed-end 
funds 
In the US, closed-end funds are required to distribute realized capital gains, which 
are then subject to taxation at the shareholder's rate. Unrealized capital 
appreciation represents a potential tax liability, which is passed on to the next 
shareholder when closed-end fund shares are sold. Malkiel (1977) reported that 
unrealised capital gains explain some, but not all, of the cross sectional and time 
series variations in discounts. Burton and Corner (1970) describe a similar 
phenomenon for UK investment trusts. British closed-end funds were subject to 
capital gains tax from 1965 to 1980 but Burton and Corner made no attempt to 
measure its importance. 
Malkiel (1977) found evidence that up to 5 per cent of the discount could be 
explained by unrealised capital gains. The cross-sectional regression was run over 
an 8-year period from 1967 to 1974. The sample consisted of 24 major closed-end 
stock funds. In his regression he isolated restricted stocks from unrealized 
appreciation and distribution policy as the variables were inter-correlated and 
because of missing data. Unrealized appreciation tended to increase discounts on 
closed-end funds, although the coefficient was not always significant. The value 
of the coefficient had an average value of just under 0.2 over the six years. 
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4.2.3 Liquidity and restricted stocks 
Another factor that may influence the NAV figure is how different asset classes 
are valued. Malkiel (1977) pointed out the problem related to how fund managers 
value investments in restricted stocks. This kind of investment includes stocks 
where the closed-end fund commits itself to keep the asset for a pre-specified 
period. The fund that buys letter stock is required to sign an "investment letter" 
pledging that the stock has been bought for investment purposes. One must expect 
the NAV of the closed-end fund to be overestimated in terms of liquidation. 
Funds with large amounts of letter stock may, therefore, sell at relatively large 
discounts. 
Malkiel used a cross-sectional regression to measure how letter stocks affect the 
discounts. However, the measurement of the letter stocks variable presented 
problems. A fund, for example, with all of its assets in letter stock might sell at 
quite different discounts under the following three circumstances: (a) The fund 
values the letter stock at 50 per cent of the market value of the registered stock of 
the same company (b) The fund values the letter stock at 100 per cent of the 
market value of the registered stock of the same company (c) There is no market 
whatsoever for the company's securities and the fund assigns an arbitrary value to 
its holdings. The funds in his sample did not respond with sufficiently detailed 
information to make such a detailed analysis of restricted stock. Therefore, it must 
be emphasized that the letter stock variable was obviously measured with 
substantial error. 
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On the other hand, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) found that most of the US 
closed-end funds only have a small portion of their investments dedicated to 
restricted stocks. Nevertheless they still sell at a discount. Seltzer (1989) suggests 
that these securities are likely to be worth more than their values because of the 
difficulty of determining their fair market value. 
4.3 Agency costs 
Agency costs have also been used in the attempt to explain the discount on 
closed-end funds. Various management groups hold large percentage blocks of 
shares in some closed-end funds in order to acquire private benefits. Funds with 
blockholders who are consuming private benefits trade at discounts because these 
blockholders have an incentive to resist open-ending proposals. On the other 
hand, a blockholder and associates can extract private benefits from a closed-end 
fund by taking large salaries and generating large brokerage commissions. Thus, 
these direct pecuniary benefits should show up in the fund's expenses. A possible 
explanation for the discount is that, as managers try to protect their private 
benefits, expenses increase over the long term and have a statistically significant 
effect on the discount. From this point of view, the discount may reflect excessive 
management fees or inadequate management performance. Chay (1992) and Chay 
and Trzcinka (1999), calculated managerial performance net of expenses by 
subtracting NAV fund performance from the specific sector's NAV performance. 
They showed that funds selling at a discount underperform funds selling at a 
premium. There are, however, some problems with this approach. The theory can 
neither explain cross-sectional nor periodic fluctuations in the discount. An 
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additional drawback is that the theory cannot explain why rational investors buy 
into closed-end funds that are issued at a premium, since they are aware of the 
likelihood of the fund subsequently trading at a discount. 
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) question the above reasoning of management 
performance being related to the discount. They point out that new closed-end 
funds are normally started at a premium, but are traded at a discount just a few 
months later. The contradiction therefore lies in the fact that the investors must 
expect superior returns when the new funds are issued, but then quickly change 
their minds and predict returns to be below normal performance. Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler (1990) conclude that both predictions cannot be accepted as rational at 
the same time. 
Kumar and Noronha (1992) re-examine the role of expenses by developing a 
present value model that emphasizes expenses relative to dividend income. Using 
a larger sample and their alternative specification of the expense variable from the 
one used by Malkiel (1977), Kumar and Noronha find that discounts are related to 
expenses. Malkiel (1977) defined management expenses (excluding brokerage 
costs and interest payments) as a percentage of fund assets. The expense variable 
was calculated for each year by dividing the expenses for the year by the NAV at 
the end of that year. In contrast, Kumar and Noronha (1992) measure expenses by 
dividing expenses by the sum of expenses and dividends paid including dividends 
that are reinvested by shareholders. The sum of expenses and dividends represents 
gross investment income. The ratio of expenses to this sum represents that portion 
of investment income that was consumed as expenses and not paid out to 
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shareholders. The problem with their approach was related to measurement issues 
of dividends reinvested by shareholders. The differences between Malkiel's 
(1977) results and their results could be due to different periods examined. 
Finally, Malkiel's sample appears to have a greater proportion of funds with 
predominantly foreign holdings compared to the earlier years of the sample in 
their study. 
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Gemmill and Thomas (2002) found that discounts exist in the long-term because 
of management expenses, while discounts fluctuate in the shorter-term because of 
changes in investor sentiment. Our findings reported in Chapter 8 support the 
view that investor sentiment is a cause of the discount in the long term and that 
expenses do not affect it. 
4.4 Agency problems 
Agency problems may also be used to explain the existence of the discount. On 
the other hand, the discount can be eliminated by unitising or liquidating the fund. 
If managers owned a large part of share ownership of the fund, they would not 
benefit appreciably from the elimination of the discount, but would probably lose 
their jobs if the fund was opened. Consequently, managers resist open-ending 
proposals and the discounts persist. 
Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1995) found a relationship between discounts 
and managerial stock ownership in their sample between 1979 and 1989. They 
excluded municipal-bond funds, foreign funds, and funds that were scheduled to 
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be opened. Their final sample consisted of 111 funds in 1989,41 funds in 1984, 
and 48 funds in 1979. They found that there is a stable and significant cross- 
sectional relationship between discounts and the concentration of ownership. At 
this point it is worth distinguishing between two types of blockholders. According 
to Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1995), there are friendly and hostile 
blockholders. One motive for holding a large-percentage block in a closed-end 
fund is to acquire private benefits which are closely related to management and 
because they hold their blocks for long periods they resist to open-ending 
proposals. These are classified as friendly blockholders towards management. On 
the other hand, other blockholders accumulate their shares as part of an attempt to 
open the fund, with the objective of gaining the difference between the purchase 
price of their shares and NAV. These are classified as hostile blockholders 
towards management. Barclay et al identified such blocks by searching the Dow 
Jones News Retrieval Service and The Wall Street Journal Index. The greater the 
managerial stock ownership in the closed-end fund, the larger the discounts to 
NAV. The average discount for funds with blockholders was found to be 14.2 per 
cent, whereas the average discount for funds without blockholders was found to 
be only 4.1 per cent. 
The idea is that blockholders receive private benefits that do not accrue to other 
shareholders and, therefore, tend to preserve these benefits by resisting open- 
ending proposals which will eliminate the discount. Consistent with Barclay, 
Holderness, and Pontiff's argument, Clarke and Shastri (2002) used a sample of 
266 domestic equity, bond, and international equity closed-end funds to examine 
the magnitude and the cross-sectional determinants of the bid-ask spread. They 
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found no relation between the spread and the expense ratio or portfolio turnover. 
However, they found a strong positive relation between aggregate holdings and 
the spread. They argued that uncertainty in the market about private benefits 
being paid to blockholders in closed-end funds leads to greater levels of 
information asymmetry which creates large discounts. They found that the 
information asymmetry component of the spread is between 10 and 20 per cent. 
This finding complements the work of Sarin and Shastri (2000) and Heflin and 
Shaw (2000) who showed that ownership structure can have a substantial impact 
on market quality. 
Dann, Del Guercio, and Partch (2000) argued that fund expense ratios are an 
important factor of the board's effectiveness in executing their duties. They 
analyzed board size, director compensation and ownership structure in 476 
closed-end funds. They found that boards with a greater degree of effective 
independence are associated with lower expense ratios. 
4.5 Segmented markets 
Pratt (1966) pointed out that local market segmentation in terms of selling closed- 
end funds in comparison with unit trusts influences the size of the discount. He 
argued that the main reason for the discount was that too little effort was made to 
sell closed-end funds to the general public and that brokers preferred to sell 
securities other than closed-end fund shares because of lower commissions. In 
more detail, according to Pratt (1966, p. 80) "if an investor puts $ 1,000 into a load- 
type open-end fund, the broker makes about $45. If an investor puts $ 1,000 into a 
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closed-end company, the total commission comes to about $25 and the salesman 
gets to keep about 30 per cent of the total, or $7.50. Since investors are unlikely to 
trade from one closed-end company to another as they might with ordinary stock, 
brokers know their commission is likely to be a one off. It is clear why brokers 
are unlikely to be enthusiastic of the shares of closed-end companies. " 
Nowadays, due to the increased number of funds and use of information 
technology, expense ratios of US funds are lower and range from 0.20% to 
0.30%. On the other hand, according to AITC, annual management charges/staff 
costs have been more accessible in terms of commissions. These vary depending 
on the fund but investors are expected to pay between 0.25% and 1% a year for 
the management of investment trusts. The staff costs will be at the low end and 
may even be as low as 0.15% per annum. 
4.6 Behavioural explanations for the discount 
The research based on economic theory can partly explain the level of the 
discount, but fails to give a good explanation for the persistence of the discount. 
Due to this, more recent research mostly relies on behavioural explanations. 
Investors' individual behavioural patterns and sentiments are important in order to 
explain the discount in relation to NAV. 
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4.6.1 Investor sentiment model 
One possible explanation for the discount was presented by Lee, Shleifer, and 
Thaler (199 1). The model investigated was first developed by De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldmann (1989), and is based on two categories of investors. The 
first category includes rational investors, who make rational decisions in 
accordance to their preferences. That is, their investment decisions are based on 
rational expectations about future asset returns, and the investors act within the 
efficient market hypothesis. On the other hand, there is a second group of 
investors, the so-called noise traders. These investors do not act fully rationally, 
and their investment decisions are considered as unpredictable. In some periods, 
they overestimate expected returns, relative to the rational expectations, and in 
other periods they underestimate them. Therefore, the prices of securities are a 
function of both types of investors. As a cause of the unpredictability in the 
changing expectations of returns, fluctuations in the discounts arise. Two 
important assumptions are made: rational investors are risk averse and have finite 
horizons. This implies that noise traders add risk, which it is not possible to 
diversify away and hence, like fundamental risk, must be priced in order to attract 
rational investors. This additional priced risk is represented by the discount. 
Pontiff (1995) provides weak evidence supporting the hypothesis that funds with 
larger discounts are exposed to greater investor sentiment risk. 
In Gemmill and Thomas (2002), the authors conclude that consistent with the 
noise trading model, changes in the discount for closed-end funds are a function 
of time-varying noise trader proxied by retail investor flows. They state that the 
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investor sentiment not only affects the discount in the short-term but may also 
influence its level over periods of several years. 
The most recent research tries to respond to critiques of earlier studies about other 
agents that lead to the discount. Arora, Ju and Ou-Yang (2002) present a model 
that leads to a potential explanation of the closed-end fund premium (or discount) 
in the presence of other informed investors. Their model not only relies on the 
fact that the manager is bound by rules and regulations but on the fact that he is 
the only one of the many informed traders in the market. The problem with their 
model is that due to asymmetric information it is not clear if the managers are the 
only source of informed agents. They conclude that the manager's compensation 
will remove any misaligru-nent between the manager's interests and the investor's 
interests and therefore the funds will be traded at a premium. The question that 
arises is if by imposing extra rules and regulations on the manager this will 
eliminate the discount. 
In line with Arora, Ju and Ou-Yang (2002), Berk and Stanton (2003) also 
conclude that a rational investor model can explain the discount phenomenon. 
They conclude that a simple model can generate a discount that exhibits discount 
behaviour, which contradicts the beliefs of investor irrationality. They base their 
model on an assumed form of labour contract where the managers sign long-term 
contracts guaranteeing them a fee each year equal to a fixed fraction of assets 
under management. Furthermore, they can leave to earn more money elsewhere if 
they turn out to be successful. The labour contract affects the behaviour of the 
asset manager and consequently also the performance of the fund. The authors 
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link the performance and the costs to the asset manager. They argue that it is 
unlikely that a fund manager generates a premium in terms of high performance 
and low compensation in the long-term. Either he or she will quit the fund for a 
job with better compensation or he will be given a pay increase. It is rather more 
likely that a fund manager with worse performance will be paid a too high 
compensation, which generates a NAV discount. 
We can conclude that extensive research has been done on closed-end funds but 
there is still only a limited picture of discount persistence. There are explanations 
based on rational investors as well as on irrational ones, but no explanation is 
completely accepted. 
4.6.2 Price reaction to open-endinga, announcements 
Brauer (1984) tested informational efficiency in the US by examining 'open- 
ending' events. The paper reports that most of the abnormal returns associated 
with open-ending are exhausted by the end of the announcement month. 
This suggests, with respect to open-ending, that the behaviour of closed-end fund 
participants is generally rational which, according to the findings reported in 
chapter 8 is not true. 
Datar and Dubofsky (1999) examined the impact of stock split and stock dividend 
announcements made by closed-end funds. They found that closed-end funds 
react no differently than other firms to stock distribution announcements. There is 
no reason to believe that closed-end fund managers possess inside infon-nation 
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about their firms' value. Every week, the values of their assets' NAV are publicly 
disseminated in the financial press, and prices and bid-ask quotes are reported 
continuously during the trading day. They used a t-test to test the null hypothesis 
that the mean event period return for closed-end fund stock distribution 
announcements equals that of announcements made by other firms. Since they 
argue that the signalling and private information hypotheses are invalid for 
closed-end funds, they attribute their reactions to other factors. They tested 
trading volume and average percentage share turnover. Trading volume is 
frequently used as a measureý of liquidity in many investigations of stock 
distributions. They tested the hypothesis that trading volume does not change 
radically after the ex date. The post-distribution volume, in shares traded, is 
adjusted for the size of the distribution. They found that average daily volume 
increases for the closed end fund sample from 7,017 shares/day before the ex- 
distribution day to 8,806 shares/day adjusted for the split factor after the ex day. 
The mean difference of 1,789 shares is statistically insignificant, as indicated by 
the t-statistic of 0.71. They also examined average percentage share turnover, 
defined as the mean of daily shares traded / shares outstanding, before and after 
the ex date. They concluded that stock distribution announcements are not the 
reasons for the discount having no liquidity impact on closed-end funds. 
4.7 Multifactor models of the closed-end fund discount 
Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2002) used multifactor models to explain changes 
in the discount to net asset value. Initially, they used the three factors from Fama 
and French (1993). They found that the book-to-market effect did not have 
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explanatory power so it was excluded from their model. They then constructed a 
seven-factor model, which included a market effect and a size effect, and five 
other factors,, which they refer to as sector, seasoning, mean-reversion, manager 
and perfonnance factors. Their 'sector' factor is an index of changes in the 
discount for all funds in the sector, except the fund of interest. Their 'seasoning' 
factor takes account of the age of the fund, while their 'mean-reversion' factor is 
the difference between the mean discount for the sector and the fund's discount. 
Their 'manager' factor is an index of changes in the discount of all funds in the 
management group, except the fund of interest, and the 'performance' factor is 
defined as the difference between the fund's NAV return and the sector's average 
NAV return. 
Their sample comprised 202 closed-end funds during the period 1981-1996. Their 
seven-factor model explained on average 34 per cent of monthly changes in the 
discount. In contrast, our sample consists of 120 funds for the UK and 30 funds 
for the US market for the period 1990 to 2003. In addition, we define our factors 
differently from their study. For example, in Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001), 
the performance of the equity market is measured by the difference between the 
return on the FTSE 100 index and the risk-free rate. In our case, we use the excess 
market return of the FTSE All Share index for the UK and the excess return of the 
S&P 500 Composite for the US. In their study, the size effect was measured as the 
difference between the Extended Hoare Govett Smaller Companies index and the 
return on the large cap FTSE 100 index. In our case, the UK size effect is 
measured as the difference between the return on the FTSE Smaller Companies 
Index and the return on the FTSE 100 index. The US size effect is measured as 
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the difference between the return on S&P Small Cap and the return on the S&P 
500 composite. 
4.8 Conclusion 
An extensive review of the possible economic explanations for the closed-end 
fund discount has been reviewed. The first justification for the existence of the 
discount is that it might reflect overestimated net asset values. The literature tends 
to suggest- that part of the level of the discount could be accounted for by biases in 
the NAV. 
As discussed extensively in this section, several economic explanations have been 
proposed but none can explain totally the persistence of the discount. The failure 
to explain the discount within a rational framework has resulted in the 
development of behavioural hypothesis. The investor sentiment hypothesis 
provides an interesting explanation of the closed-end fund discount. 
In the following chapters, we focus on methodological and measurement issues 
concerning the calculation of the discount, average discount by sector, price 
returns, NAV returns, sample sizes and various databases. In chapter 6, we 
analyse the time-series properties of the UK and US NAV and discount in terms 
of autocorrelation, stationarity, normality, and seasonality. Then in chapter 7 we 
focus on performance persistence. In chapter 8, we extend Fama and French's 
(1993) three-factor model to add new factors that will explain the excess discount 
return. We compare the findings with the ones mentioned in the literature. 
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Chapter 5 
Methodolollical, measurement and samplinll issues 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology of the research and discusses 
measurement issues relevant to the definition and calculation of the discount, the 
average discount by sector, total returns in tenns of the share price return, NAV 
returns and index returns, which include size and value effects. We surnmarise the 
models that will be used in the following chapters. We then review the databases 
available for analysing the discount, NAV and independent variables for the UK 
investment trust industry and US closed-end funds. Finally, we explain the sample 
sizes and present a set of descriptive statistics. 
5.2 Methodoloaical issues 
The main methodological approach that will be used is quantitative. It aims to 
provide a clearer understanding of a phenomenon that is difficult to explain, by 
making inferences through hypothesis testing. 
The principal research framework is based on the development of theoretical 
models, which are assessed by testing hypotheses. So in this thesis, the research 
paradigm or research process reflects the post-positivist deductive scientific 
method. This method involves the formulation of testable hypotheses from 'a 
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priori' theories or the extant literature, followed by the collection and analysis of 
numerical data and the application of appropriate statistical tests. To the best of 
my knowledge, the secondary data used in the thesis are collected from trustful 
databases, such as Datastrearn and Thomson Financial Investment View 
Wiesenberger. Another important aspect of the post-positivist paradigm is high 
reliability. Hypotheses are proposed based on reason, logic and arguments 
presented in the extant literature. Relationships are suggested based on currently 
accepted theory. These relationships are tested using empirical data. However, a 
number of associated concepts have to be considered, such as measurement error 
when dealing with the potential problems of multiple regression analysis. 
Econometric criteria are used to determine whether the assumptions of the models 
used are satisfied. Only if these assumptions are satisfied will the estimated 
coefficients have the desirable properties of unbiasedness, consistency and 
efficiency. Since relationships in economics and finance are stochastic, rather than 
detenninistic, regression equations must be modified to include a random 
disturbance,, error or stochastic term. The most common problems related to 
multiple regressions using time-series data are autocorrelation, non-stationarity 
and multicollinearity which are diagnosed in the subsequent chapters. 
Autocorrelation 
One of the assumptions of multiple regression analysis is that the value that the 
error term assumes in one period is uncorrelated to its value in any other period. 
This ensures that the average value of the dependent variable depends only on the 
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independent variables and not on the error term. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests 
for first-order autocorrelation. When the error term in one period is positively 
correlated with the error term in the previous time period, we face the problem of 
positive first-order autocorrelation. This is common in time-series analysis and 
leads to downwardly biased standard errors and thus to incorrect statistical tests 
and confidence intervals. The presence of autocorrelation is tested by utilizing the 
tabulated value of the Durbin-Watson statistic (see Chapters 7 and 8) at the 5% or 
1% levels of significance. 
Non-stationarity 
Non-stationary series have stochastic trends and/or non-constant variances and 
will often show spurious high correlation and high R2 values. This will create a 
problem in regression models as it suggests a significant relationship between 
variables when in reality there is none. Non-stationary series in the finance 
literature can be tested by means of autocorrelation analysis and unit root tests. 
Multicollinearity 
Another assumption of the regression model is that none of the explanatory 
variables can be expressed as exact linear functions of the others. 
Multicollinearity refers to the case in which two or more explanatory variables in 
the regression model are highly correlated, making it difficult or impossible to 
isolate their individual effects on the dependent variable. With multicollinearity, 
the estimated OLS coefficients may be statistically insignificant (and have even 
the wrong sign) even though R2 may be high. In addition, the standard errors 
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could be very high or the t-ratios very low. The confidence intervals for the 
parameters of interest are thus very wide. When the explanatory variables are 
highly intercorrelated, it becomes difficult to disentangle the separate effects of 
each of the explanatory variables on the explained variable. It can be overcome or 
reduced by collecting more data or dropping one of the highly collinear variables. 
5.3 The models to be estimated 
This section describes the econometric tests and methodologies that will be- used 
in the following chapters. In Chapter 6, we focus on the time-series properties of 
the excess NAV and the discount return in terms of autocorrelation, normality, 
stationarity, and seasonality. These tests are crucial as they test the key 
assumptions of the multiple regression models and determine whether we should 
use standard regression or cointegration analysis. Chapter 7 is about performance 
persistence. We try to identify if persistence is related to the anomalies 
documented in the finance literature in terms of size,, value effect or manager 
skills. The fact that we find some weak evidence for managerial performance 
persistence motivates us to use a performance measure later in Chapter 8 to 
investigate whether it affects the excess discount retum. Three models are applied 
in Chapter 7: Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, an extended version 
of Fama and French's model that incorporates a market timing variable, and 
finally the performance persistence correlation analysis also used by Carhart 
(1997) and Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001). In Chapter 8, we focus on the 
possible factors that cause the fluctuation and persistence of the excess discount 
return. Four models are applied: Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, 
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Carhart's (1997) four-factor model and two versions of Guirguis" six-factor 
model. 
5.4 Measurement issues 
This section covers measurement issues relating to the dependent and independent 
variables. 
5.4.1 Refinition of the discount 
The discount on a closed-end fund is calculated as the difference between the 
share price and NAV divided by the NAV. 
d _Pt 
- NAVe x 100 t NA VE 
where dt is the discount in period t, Pt and NAVt are the share price and the net 
asset value per share of the closed-end fund in period t, respectively. As indicated 
in Chapter 4, the NAV of a closed-end fund or investment trust, usually expressed 
on a 'per share' basis, is the value of all its assets, less its liabilities, divided by 
(7) 
the number of shares. 
NAV = 
Total Assets - Liabilities (8) 
Number of shares 
When the share price is below the net asset value it is trading at a discount. Share 
prices above the net asset value are at a premium. For example, if the closed-end 
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fund is trading at f-9.50 and its net asset value is f 10, then it is trading at a 5% 
discount. 
5.4.2 Average discount of a categorV 
The average discount d of a sector (or category) is defined as follows: 
d= 
nP- NA Vl 
i=, NAVZ 
i= 1ý2 
n 
where d the discount of a sector and n is is the number of funds in the sector. 
5.4.3 Total returns 
This section defines total returns for closed-end funds in terms of share price 
return, NAV return, and index return We do not take logarithms as the discounts 
in the UK and the US are approximately normally distributed (see Chapter 6). In 
addition, the fact that we used NAV returns and not share price returns 
substantiates the nonnality of our data. 
5.4.4 Share price returns 
We define total monthly share price returns as the ratio of the difference of the 
monthly share price in addition to the fund's annual dividend yield. 
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Rp,,, - 
[(Pi,, 
- Pj,, -, 
+ DYj, j1 Pi,, 
-, 
]* 100 (10) 
where Pi, i is the share price of fund i at time t, DYj, t is the annual dividend yield 
measured at time t. 
5.4.5 NAV returns 
We define total monthly NAV returns as the ratio of the difference of the monthly 
NAV in addition to the fund's annual dividend yield. 
RNAvit =[(NAVit-NAV,, _, 
+DYi, )INAVit-i]*100 (11) 
where NAVit is the net asset value of fund i at time t,, DYjt is the annual 
dividend yield measured at time t. The closed-end fund dividend is paid out of 
the portfolio's income, after deducting expenses. Dividends are paid out of 
income, not out of capital. This measure of the total NAV return is, therefore, net 
of expenses. 
5.4.6 Index returns 
We define total monthly index returns as the ratio of the difference of the monthly 
index changes in addition to the fund's annual dividend yield. 
R indu ,, = 
[(Index,, 
- Index,, _, 
+ DY,, ) / Index,, -, 
]* 100 
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where Inclexit is the value of index i at time t and DYjt is the annual 
dividend yield measured at time t. 
5.5 Data sources 
This section describes briefly the sources of data available for the analysis of the 
UK investment trust industry and US closed-end funds. 
5.5.1 Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC) 
The AITC publishes the Monthly Inforination Service including monthly data on 
each fund in terms of NAV,, share price, discount, gearing, total returns, and 
dividend payment date. The classical way of calculating NAV is by taking the 
value of the fund's investments less its liabilities (prior charges such as loans, and 
debentures at their par value) including any borrowings and dividing it by 
shareholders' funds expressed as an amount per ordinary share. 
5.5.2 Datastream 
Datastream provides monthly data including NAV, share prices, dividends, retail 
flows and a wide range of indices. NAV is defined as the market value of total 
assets less all prior charges valued at their par or asset value, all divided by the 
number of shares in issue. Prior charges are defined as including all debentures, 
all loans and short term loans and overdrafts that are to be used for investment 
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purposes, reciprocal foreign currency loans, currency facilities to the extent that 
they are drawn down. 
5.5.3 Thomson Financial Investment View Wiesenberller for US funds 
Thomson Financial Investment View Wiesenberger is the leading provider of 
financial data for the US market. Thomson Financial estimates daily and monthly 
NAVs as follows: NAV is calculated by taking the value of the fund's 
investments less its liabilities (such as loans, and debentures) divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding to be expressed as an amount per ordinary share. 
Gearing on the other hand is calculated by dividing total assets by net assets and 
multiplying by 100. In addition, they provide information for dividends, share 
prices and various US indices. 
They enter the most recent asset allocation breakdown into their database. When 
an official NAV is released by the fund, they back work out what the gross assets 
are. For example, they multiply the NAV per share by the number of shares in 
issue and add on any liabilities to arrive to gross asset figures. They then estimate 
forwards using this new gross assets figure applying the same asset allocation 
spread as was revealed in the most recent breakdown. 
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5.5.4 Bankers Thomson Analytics 
Thomson Banker One provides detailed price and financial information for over 
45,000 UK and international companies. It includes share prices and market 
indices. The database is very helpful with the research and analysis of a wide 
range of financial data, which can be formulated into graphs and charts. Features 
of the fonner Extel database, such as the Extel cards and news, have been 
incorporated into this database. Thomson Banker One offers quick and easy 
access to quotes, earnings estimates and financial fundamentals. 
5.5.5 Yale School of Management 
The Yale School of Management publishes an investor confidence index, which 
we use as an investor sentiment proxy in Chapter 8. The sample of US individual 
investors from 1989 to 1998 was purchased from W. S. Ponton, Inc., a list of 
"high-grade multi-investors". Starting in 1999, the sample was a random sample 
of high-income Americans purchased from Survey Sampling, Inc. The index is 
derived from the responses to a single question that has been asked consistently 
through time since 1989 to a consistent sample of respondents. The wording of 
the question focused on how pessimistic or optimistic investors are towards the 
stock market. 
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5.6 Sample sizes and descriptive statistics 
According to AITC, there were 263 conventional trusts with total assets of f 55.6 
billion in 2005 in the UK. Each fund is allocated to one of 16 different categories. 
The largest category of US closed-end funds in terms of assets under management 
is municipal bond funds which occupy around 42%. In October 2003, there were 
286 municipal funds with almost $135 billion under management. These funds 
invest in bonds issued by state and local government and agencies. In addition, a 
majority of municipal bond closed-end funds employ leverage to enhance their 
return potential. This category is out of the scope of our research as we focus 
mainly on equity funds. 
Each of the funds that we study is allocated to one of the 16 categories described 
in Table I for UK investment trusts and one of the 4 categories described in Table 
2 for US closed-end funds. This study investigates almost half of the entire 
investment trust industry, with the exception of funds that invest in unquoted 
securities such as venture and development, private equity and specialist funds 
(such as the Energy sector), emerging market funds, hedge funds, municipal bond 
funds and split capital trusts. The reason for excluding unquoted securities is that 
if a significant proportion of investments held are unquoted, there will be some 
uncertainty as to the true value of the underlying assets. By excluding the above, 
our sample consists finally of 16 categories with a total number of 120 funds 
including the "dead" ones. On the other hand, we investigate 4 categories of US 
closed-end funds with a total number of 30 funds. 
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The different categories of funds, the total number of funds, and average discount 
by category are described in Table I and 2. In addition, Tables 3 to 8 show 
descriptive statistics for the UK and US categories concerning the discount, share 
price and NAV. Tables 9 and 10 detail the various funds by category. Table II 
shows the "dead funds" included in our dataset in terms of liquidated, unitised or 
open-ended and merged funds for UK investment trusts. On the other hand, the 
only information that we have for US closed-end funds from Thomson Financial 
Investment View database is that the Progressive Return Fund and Investor First 
Fund were converted to the Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund which belongs to 
the Equity Income category under the CEFA classification. We use a full data set 
with no missing data from January 1990 to January 2003. All the funds that we 
analyze have a full history in terms of share price, NAV and discount. 
In Chapter 7 we investigate the performance of live and 30 "dead" UK investment 
trusts. In the sample investigated, we include the different types of dead funds in 
order to avoid survivorship bias. Specifically, our sample of funds has the 
potential to avoid survivorship bias as it contains defunct and surviving funds. 
Survivorship may be expected to bias a performance measure upwards especially 
when we get averages for the whole sector or for industries within specific sectors 
(e. g. see Grinblatt and Titman, 1988; Brown, Goetzmann, lbbotson and 
Ross, 1992; Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; Malkiel, 1995). Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(1996b) included defunct funds and showed that with and without defunct funds 
they obtained different results of performance measurement. The problem of 
funds disappearing because of bad performance and poor management may result 
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in evidence of performance persistence when in reality there is no clear sign of it. 
Our analysis eliminates the problem of survivorship bias by including the dead 
funds that disappeared during the period 1990 to 2003, namely 27 liquidated, 1 
merged and 2 unitised or open-ended. These 30 funds correspond to the funds 
that Datastream classifies as "dead" funds and for which it keeps a back 
history. The overall sample covers 120 different funds. 
In this study we investigate the behaviour of UK investment trusts and US closed- 
end funds over the period January 1990 to January 2003. Table I presents the 
various sectors of UK investment trusts in terms of number of funds and average 
discount classified by AITC. 
Table 1 Description of various sectors of UK investment trusts 
AITC Category List Mnemonic Number of Funds 
1/1990 - 1/2003 
Average 
Discount 
1/1990 -1/2003 
Global Growth LITGLBGW 21 -6.10 
Global Growth & Income LITGLBGI 2 -9.62 
Global Smaller Companies LITGLBSC 2 -9.89 
UK Growth LITUKGRO 12 -8.90 
UK Growth & Income LITUXGRI 9 -6.02 
_UK 
Smaller Companies LITUKSCO 12 -13.36 
_North 
America LITNAMER 2 -10.41 
_North 
America Smaller Companies LITNAMSC 2 -15.15 
_ 
Far East (Including Japan) LITFEIJP 2 -14.40 
jar East (Excluding Japan) LITFEXJP 6 -12.37 
Japan LITJAPAN 3 -9.49 
Ja anese Smaller Companies LITJAPSC 2 -15.45 
Europe LITEUROP 7 -6.74 
_European 
Smaller Companies LITEURSC 3 -12.26 
_Country 
Specialist - Far East LITCSFAR 3 -12.22 
_Sector 
Specialist - Property LITSSPRO 2 -19.62 
Total 16 90 1 -11.38 
Source: Datastream University of Piraeus, Athens, Greece. Association of Investment 
Trust Companies (AITC). 
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According to Table 1, all sectors by AITC are traded at a significant discount. In 
more detail, the Sector Specialist Property sector traded at the largest average 
discount of - 19.62 per cent. The North America Smaller Companies sector 
average discount was - 15.15 per cent and the Japanese Smaller Companies sector 
average discount was -15.45 per cent. In contrast, the sectors with the lowest 
average discounts were UK Growth and Income estimated at -6.02 per cent and 
Global Growth with a discount of -6.10 per cent. The overall average discount of 
the 16 sectors was - 11.3 8 per cent. 
Table 2 shows the average discount of the various categories of US closed-end 
funds classified by CEFA. 
Table 2 Description of various sectors of US closed-end funds. 
CEFA Category List Mnemonic Number of Funds 
1/1990 - 1/2003 
Average Discount 
1/1990 - 1/2003 
Equity Income FNfUFDB 9 -5.66 
Global Equity FWFDC 3 -5.77 
Growth and Income FWFDD 8 -3.71 
Growth Domestic FNWFDE 10 -7.38 
Total 4 30 -5.63 
Source: Datastrearn University of Piraeus, Athens, Greece and Thomson Financial 
Investment View 
According to Table 2, it is clear that all sectors by CEFA category also traded at a 
discount, but the levels are not as high as in UK investment trusts. To be specific, 
the lowest discount was Growth and Income which was traded at -3.71 per cent 
and the largest discount was Growth Domestic which traded at -7.38 per cent. The 
overall average discount of the 4 sectors was -5.63 per cent. 
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Table 3 surnmarises descriptive statistics of the average discount of UK 
investment trusts by AITC sectors for the period January 1990 to January 2003. 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the UK average discount. 
AITC Category Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Min Max 
_Global 
Growth -6.10 5.83 28.98 -26.19 2.78 
Global Growth & 
Income 
-9.62 4.91 20.25 -19.41 0.84 
_ Global Smaller 
Companies 
-9.89 7.53 33.30 -30.68 2.62 
_ UK Growth -8.90 2.86 16.17 -18.08 -1.90 _ UK Growth & Income -6.02 5.31 22.71 -17.52 5.19 _ UK Smaller Companies -13.36 6.07 28.61 -26.30 -2.30 
North America 
- -10.41 
5.20 23.59 -22.09 1.50 _ North America Smaller 
Companies 
-15.15 5.38 27.06 -29.84 -2.78 
_ Far East (Including 
japan) 
-14.40 5.48 25.32 -26.21 -0.88 
Far East (Excluding 
Japan) 
-12.37 5.41 25.34 -25.33 0.00 
Japan -9.49 5.14 24.53 -21.46 3.07 
Japanese Smaller 
Companies 
-15.45 6.89 34.02 -30.59 3.43 
Europe -6.74 4.20 25.70 -19.59 6.11 
European Smaller 
Companies 
-12.26 4.95 25.70 -27.69 -1.98 
Country Specialist - Far 
East 
-12.22 4.84 25.50 -23.50 2.00 
Sector Specialist - 
Property 
-19.62 5.67 32.95 -38.62 -5.67 
L Average -11.38 
5.35 26.23 -25.19 1.04 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to Table 3, it is clear that there is a wide range between the lower and 
upper bounds in each category by AITC. For example, Japan has a range of 24.53 
percentage points with a lower bound of -21.46 per cent and an upper bound of 
3.07 per cent. UK Growth has a range of 16.17 percentage points with a lower 
bound of -18.08 per cent and an upper bound of -1.90 per cent. 
This suggests that 
there is an active interaction between arbitrageurs and noise traders. So 
if 
investment trusts trade at a discount to NAV, an apparent arbitrage profit can be 
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realised by holding the fund's shares. However, if the discount stays relatively 
constant over the investment horizon, the arbitrageurs make no profit. In addition, 
from the means and standard deviations, we see that there is a high degree of 
dispersion in all sectors by AITC category. For example, for Sector Specialist 
Property, the coefficient of variation (a measure of relative dispersion calculated 
as the percentage of the standard deviation to the mean) is 28.90%. Japanese 
Smaller Companies has a coefficient of variation of 44.60%. In general, the 
average fund by sector has an average discount of -11.38%, a coefficient of 
variation of 47.01 % and a range of 26.23 percentage points with a lower bound of 
-25.19% and an upper bound of 1.04 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the UK average NAV return 
AITC Category Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Min Max 
Global Growth 0.62 3.62 22.57 -10.14 12.42 
Global Growth & Income 0.19 4.57 27.32 -14.39 12.94 
Global Smaller 
Companies 
0.53 6.24 40.86 -18.83 22.03 
UK Growth 0.48 4.21 25.40 -13.97 11.44 
UK Growth & Income 0.32 4.70 27.54 -15.50 12.05 
UK Smaller Companies 0.22 5.72 40.86 -21.32 19.54 
North America 0.61 5.09 28.61 -13.81 14.80 
North America Smaller 
Companies 
0.67 5.04 33.48 -17.39 16.08 
Far East (Including 
Japan) 
0.04 6.18 30.17 -14.73 15.44 
Far East (Excluding 
Japan) 
0.40 7.44 42.43 -19.18 23.25 
Japan 0.02 7.93 42.83 -18.49 24.33 
Japanese Smaller 
Companies 
0.21 10.31 80.71 -22.00 58.70 
Europe 0.57 5.81 38.93 -20.17 18.76 
European Smaller 
Companies 
0.51 6.61 56.33 -22.20 34.13 
Country Specialist - Far 
East 
0.19 6.28 34.73 -15.27 19.45 
Sector Specialist - 
Property 
LAverage 
0.18 
0.36 
4.79 
5.91 
29.14 
37.62 
-13.86 
-16.95 
15.28 
20.67 
Source: calculated by the author 
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Table 4 summarises descriptive statistics of the average NAV return of UK 
investment trusts by AITC sectors for the period January 1990 to January 2003. 
According to Table 4, it is clear that there is a wide dispersion between the lower 
and upper bounds in each category by AITC. For example, the Global Growth 
sector has a range of 22.5 7 percentage points with a lower bound of - 10.14 per 
cent and an upper bound of 12.42 per cent. The UK Smaller Companies sector has 
a range of 40.86 percentage points with a lower bound of -21.32 per cent and an 
upper bound of 19.54 per cent. The Far East Excluding Japan sector has a range 
of 42.43 percentage points with a minimum value of -19.18 per cent and a 
maximum value of 23.25 per cent. This suggests that there is a large fluctuation in 
NAV returns. We see also that there is a high degree of dispersion between the 
sectors by AITC category. For example, the Global Smaller Companies sector has 
a coefficient of variation of 11.77 per cent compared with the coefficient of 
variation of Japanese Smaller Companies sector, which is 49.10 per cent. 
Similarly, UK Growth has a lower coefficient of variation compared with UK 
Smaller Companies, which is 8.77 per cent. In general, the average fund by sector 
has an average NAV return of 0.36 per cent, a standard deviation of 5.91 per cent 
and a wide range of 37.62 percentage points with a lower bound of -16.95 per 
cent and an upper bound of 20.67 per cent. 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of the average share price return of UK 
investment trusts by AITC sectors for the period January 1990 to January 2003. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the UK average share price return 
AITC Category Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Min Max 
Global Growth 0.72 
- 
4.27 
- 
32.35 -12.74 19.61 Global Growth & Income 0.25 5.28 - 37.55 -20.49 17.06 Global Smaller 
Companies 
0.56 
-- 
7.85 
- 
54.52 -24.04 30.48 
UK Growth 0.43 4.55 28.62 -14.38 14.24 
_UK 
Growth & Income 0.41 5.24 36.36 -17.66 18.70 
. 
UK Smaller Companies 0.24 6.66 43.18 -21.28 21.90 
_North 
America 0.66 
_5.87 
34.31 -16.72 17.59 North America Smaller 
Companies 
0.77 6.18 44.11 -23.62 20.49 
Far East (Including 
Japan) 
0.12 7.60 43.29 -19.76 23.53 
Far East (Excluding 
Japan) 
0.44 8.75 50.42 -22.51 27.91 
Japan 0.02 8.94 46.25 -18.29 27-96 
Japanese Smaller 
Companies 
0.27 11.53 82.70 -25.82 56.88 
Europe 0.45 6.97 44.86 -22.39 22.47 
European Smaller 
Companies 
0.44 7.72 54.37 -26.74 27.64 
Country Specialists - Far 
East 
0.06 6.53 48.23 -24.74 23.49 
Sector Specialists - 
Property 
0.21 7.09 53.63 -20.97 32.65 
Average 0.38 6.94 45.92 -20.76 25.16 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to Table 5, the wide dispersion of the share price return reflects the 
fact that investment trusts are companies quoted on the stock market and the share 
price is affected by demand and supply in the market. There is a wide difference 
between the minimum and maximum value in each category by AITC. For 
example, the Global Smaller Companies sector has a range of 54.52 percentage 
points with a lower bound of -24.04 per cent and an upper bound of 30.48 per 
cent. The UK Smaller Companies sector has a range of 43.18 percentage points 
with a lower bound of -21.28 per cent and an upper bound of 21.90 per cent. 
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This suggests that there is a very large fluctuation in share price returns which in 
turn suggests that NAV returns, rather than share price returns, should be used to 
measure managerial performance in Chapter 7 as they are not affected by the 
supply and demand in the market. In addition, we use the coefficient of variation 
to compare relative dispersion. We see that there is a high degree of dispersion 
between the sectors by AITC. For example, the UK Growth sector has a lower 
coefficient of variation of 10.58 per cent compared to the coefficient of variation 
of UK Smaller Companies, which is 27.75 per cent. The Far East Including Japan 
sector has a high dispersion of 63.33 per cent relative to Far East Excluding 
Japan, which is 19.89 per cent. In general, the average fund by sector has an 
average share price return of 0.38 per cent, a standard deviation of 6.94 per cent 
and a very wide range of 45.92 percentage points with a lower bound of -20.76 
per cent and an upper bound of 25.16 per cent. 
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of the US average discount 
CEFA Category Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Min Max 
_Equity 
Income -5.66 4.90 22.52 -16.85 5.67 
_Global 
Equity -5.77 5.53 45.71 -18.36 27.35 
_Growth 
and Income -3.71 5.25 25.97 -13.39 12.58 
_Growth 
Domestic -7.38 3.35 16.72 -13.63 3.09 
Average -5.63 4.76 27.73 -15.56 12.17 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 6 summarises descriptive statistics of the average discount of US closed- 
end funds by CEFA sectors for the period January 1990 to January 2003. 
According to Table 6, it is obvious that there is a difference in the fluctuations of 
the discount documented in the UK and the US. A simple comparison could be 
made based on the average discount. For example, the Growth and Income 
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category has a mean of -3-71 and a range of 25.97 with maximum value of 12.58 
and a minimum value of -13.39. In contrast, all UK sectors display discounts 
higher than 6%. 
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is based on the observation that 
individual investors own the largest stake of US closed-end funds. Despite the 
fact that British closed-end funds go through periods of discount and premium 
similar to most US funds,, their clientele is and has been over the last decade, 
almost entirely institutional. The proportion of closed-end fund shares held by 
institutions in the United Kingdom was 77% per cent in 2003. In contrast, in the 
US, closed-end funds owned by institutional investors were only 6.6% (see 
Chapter 2). 
Table 7 surnmarises descriptive statistics of the average NAV return of US 
closed-end funds by CEFA sectors for the period January 1990 to January 2003. 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics of the US average NAV return 
CEFA Category Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Min Max 
_Equity 
Income -0.11 3.38 20.63 -13.88 6.75 
_Global 
Equity -0.08 4.85 27.82 -15.49 12.32 
_Growth 
and Income 0.01 2.91 17.76 -10.91 6.85 
Growth Domestic 0.11 4.10 24.48 -15.43 9.04 
Average -0.02 3.81 22.67 -13.93 8.74 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to Table 7, it is clear that the NAV returns of the US market differ 
from those of UK investment trusts. There is a wide difference between the lower 
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and upper bounds in each category by CEFA, but not as large as in the UK. For 
example the Equity Income sector has a range of 20.63 percentage points with a 
lower bound of -13.88 per cent and an upper bound of 6.75 per cent. The Global 
Equity sector has a range of 27.82 percentage points with a lower bound of - 15.49 
per cent and an upper bound of 12.32 per cent. In general, the average fund by 
sector has an average NAV return of -0.02 per cent, a standard deviation of 3.81 
per cent and a range of 22.67 percentage points with the lower bound estimated at 
- 13.93 per cent and the upper bound at 8.74 per cent. In contrast, the average fund 
by UK sector has a higher average NAV return of 0.36 per cent, a higher standard 
deviation of 5.91 per cent and a wider range of 37.62 percentage points. In 
addition, from the coefficient of variation, we see that there is a high degree of 
relative dispersion between all sectors by CEFA category. For example, the 
Global Equity sector has a coefficient of variation of 60.63 per cent compared 
with the coefficient of variation of 30.73 per cent of Equity Income. 
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics of the average share price return of US 
closed-end funds by CEFA sectors for the period January 1990 to January 2003. 
Table 8 Descriptive statistics of the US average share price return 
CEFA Category Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range Min Max 
Equity IncOme 
- Global Equity 
-0.08 
-0.04 
3.23 
5.72 
20.46 
36.36 
-14.27 
-16.04 
6.2 0 
20.32 
- Growth and Income 0.09 3.25 23.59 -13.38 10.22 
- Growth Domestic 0.16 4.61 1 30.22 -17.93 12.29 [-Average ---1 777ýý: 03::::: J -4.20- I 
. 
27.66 -15.41 12.26 
Source: calculated by the author 
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Again, there is a wide difference between the minimum and maximum value in 
each category by CEFA, but not as wide as in the UK market. For example, the 
Equity Income sector has a range of 20.46 percentage points and the Growth 
Domestic sector has a range of 30.22 percentage points. This suggests that there is 
a very large fluctuation in share price returns as they are affected by supply and 
demand in the market. In general, the average US sector has an average share 
price return of 0.03, a standard deviation of 4.20 and a range of 27.66 with a 
minimum value of - 15.41 and a maximum value of 12.26. In contrast, the average 
fund by UK sector has a higher average share price return of 0.38, a higher 
standard deviation of 6.94 and a much wider range of 45.92. 
Tables 9 and 10 show the various funds allocated to the 16 categories of UK 
investment trusts and 4 categories of US closed-end funds. Our sample consists of 
120 UK investment trusts and 30 US closed-end funds. We use a full data set with 
no overlapping or missing data between January 1990 and January 2003. The 
funds all have a full history in terms of share price, NAV and discount. 
Table 9 Details the funds in each AITC category of UK investment trusts 
Global Growth 
ALLIANCE TRUST 
ANGLO & OVERSEAS 
BANKERS INV. TRUST 
BRITISH EMPIRE SECS 
BRUNNER INV. TST 
FOREIGN & COLONIAL 
GARTMORE GLOBAL TST 
HENDERSON ELEC. &GEN 
JUPITER PRfMADONA GROWTH 
LAW DEBENTURE 
LONDON & ST. LAWRENCE 
MAJEDIE INVS. 
MONKS fNV. TRUST 
PERSONAL ASSETS 
RIT CAPITAL PARTNERS 
SCOTTISH AMERICAN 
SCOTTISH fNV. 
SCOTTISH MORTGAGE 
SECOND ALLIANCE 
TRIBUNE TRUST 
WITAN INV. TRUST 
J-UP. INTL. GREEN ORD. DELISTED 
19/03/01 
MCIT CAPITAL. DELISTED 25/06/98 
BARING STRATTON UNITISED 
05/05/98 
Turkey Trust Delisted 25/11/99 
TR Technoloizv Delisted 22/10/99 
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Global Growth & Income 
BRITISH ASSETS 
MURRAY INTL. 
Global Smaller Companies 
F&C SMALLER COS. 
HENDERSON STRATA 
GENERAL CONS. CAP. DELISTED 
06/01/98 
HENDERSON American CAP. 
DELISTED 26/02/99 
Gartmore American Smaller Secs 
UK Growth 
ALBANY INV. TRUST 
CAPITAL GEARING TST. 
EDINBURGH INV. TRUST 
EDINBURGH UK TRACKER 
JINSBURY GROWTH TST. 
JLEMING MERCANTILE 
HANSA TRUST 
JPMF. CLAVIERHOUSE 
JPMF MID CAP IT. 
KEYSTONE IT. 
_UK 
SELECT TRUST 
Group Trust Delisted 17/08/01 
_British 
Inv. Trust dead 19/05/97 
_Brit. 
AM& General 
_ 
Sphere Inc & Resi. Cap 
_Radiotrust 
UK Growth & Income 
CITY OF LONDON 
_DUNEDIN 
INC. GROWTH 
LOWLAND INV. 
MERCHANTS TRUST 
MURRAY INCOME 
SECURITIES TST. 
_SHIRES 
INCOME TST. 
TEMPLE BAR 
_VALUE 
& INCOME 
FLEM. INTL. DELISTED 31/10/96 
JUP. EXTRA INC. ORD. DELISTED 
28/09/00 
Gartmore Value 
-UK 
Smaller Companies 
ALLIANZ DRESDNER SMCOS. 
DUNEDIN SMALLER COS. 
GARTMORE SMALLER COS. 
HENDERSON SMALLER COS 
I&S. UK SNMLLER COS. 
INVESCO ENGLISH & 
INTERNATIONAL 
INVESCO PERP. UK SMCOS. 
PLATINUM INV. TST. 
SCHRODER UK MID & SMALL 
SMALLER COMPANIES IT. 
THROGMORTON TRUST 
31 SM. QUOTED COS. TRUST 
Throgmorton USM 
North America 
AMERICAN OPPOR. TST. 
EDINBURGH US TRACKER TST. 
US INV. TST. DEAD 
/Unitised(O 1/0 1/2000) 
North America Smaller Companies 
JPMF US DISCOVERY 
NORTH ATLANTIC SMCOS. 
Far East (Including Japan) 
F&C PACIFIC 
MARTIN CURRIE PACIFIC 
Far East (Excluding Japan) 
ABERDEEN NEW DAWN IT. 
EDINBURGH DRAGON TST. 
HENDERSON FAR EAST INC. 
HENDERSON TR PAC. IT 
PACIFIC ASSETS 
PACIFIC HORIZON 
SIAM SELECTIVE GW. DELISTED 
23/07/01 
Trio Trust dead 12/1/93 
Pacific Property 
Gartmore Emerg. Pacific delisted 04/10/99 
First Philippine delisted 26/06/97 
Japanese Smaller Companies 
BAELLIE SHIN NIPPON 
JPMF JAPANESE SMCOS. 
Japan 
BAILLIE GIFFJAPAN 
FLEMING JAPANESE 
PERPETUAL JAPAN 
JF JAPAN OTC DELISTED 27/07/98 
THORNTON ASIAN EMRG. 'DELISTED 
26/03/971 
Europe 
F&C EUROTRUST 
FLEMING CONT. EUROPE 
GARTMORE EUROPEAN 
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fNVESCO PERP. EUR. IT. 
MARTIN CURRIE EUR. 
HEND. EUROTR. ORD 
MERRILL LYNCH EUROPEAN 
JUP. EUROPEAN ORD. DELISTED 
20/11/00 
CHARTER EUROPEAN DELISTED 
22/04/02 
_GERMAN 
INV. TST. DEAD - ACQ 
Country Specialists - Far East 
ABERDEEN NEW THAI 
NEW ZEALAND INV. 
STOCKS CONVERTIBLE TST. 
Sector Specialists - Property 
JR PROPERTY R-; V. 
_TRUST 
OF PROPERTY 
Charter European Delisted 22/04/02 
Schroder Mediterranean Delisted 06/08/96 
Paribas French Inv Dead 31/08/97 
Europe n Smaller Companies 
EUROPEAN ASSETS TST. 
JPMF EUROPEAN FLEDGELING 
TR EUROPEAN GROWTH 
Source: Datastrearn University of Piraeus, Athens, Greece. Association of Investment 
Trust Companies (AITC). 
Table 10 Details the funds in each CEFA category of US closed-end funds 
Equity Income 
Adams Express Company 
Boulder Growth and Income Fund 
Comerstone strategic value Fund 
Comerstone total return fund 
J Hancock Patriot Prem Div Fd I 
Liberty all star equity fund 
Source Capital 
_Tri -continental 
corporation 
Global Equity 
Aberdeen Australia Equity Fund 
z-seven fund 
J Hancock Global Trends Fund 
Growth and Income 
Bancroft Convertible Fund 
Blue Chip Value Fund 
Castle convertible Fund 
Ellsworth convertible growth 
Franklin Multi Income Trust 
Lincoln National Convertible 
TWC Convertible Securities Fund 
_Zweig 
Total Retum Fund 
Growth Domestic 
Central Securities 
Engex 
Gabelli Equity Trust 
General American Investors 
Liberty All-star growth Fund 
NAIC Growth Fund 
Royce Focus Trust 
Royce Value Trust 
Salomon Brothers Fund- 
Zweig Fund 
First Financial Fund 
Source: Datastream University of 
Association of Investment Trust 
Companies (AITC). 
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Table II summarises the sample of 30 "dead" UK investment trusts. As mentioned 
above, the term "dead" can mean liquidated, unitised or open-ended, or merged. In the 
sample investigated, we included the different types of dead funds by AITC category 
in order to avoid survivorship bias. 
Table 11 Dead funds included in our dataset in terms of liquidated, unitised or open- 
ended and merged for UK Investment Trusts. 
AITC Category / Name of Fund Status of Dead Funds 
Global Growth 
JUP. INTL. GREEN ORD. DELISTED 
19/03/01 
Liquidated 
MCIT Capital IT Delisted 25/06/98 Liquidated 
Turkey Trust Delisted 25/11/99 Liquidated 
_TR 
Technology Delisted 22/10/99 Liquidated 
BARING STRATTON UNITISED 
05/05/98 
Unitised 
Global Smaller Companies 
Henderson American. Cap Delisted 
26/02/99 
Liquidated 
Gartmore American Small Secs Liquidated 
General Cons. Cap. Delisted 06/01/98 Liquidated 
UK Growth & Income 
FLEM. INTL. DELISTED 31/10/96 Liquidated 
JUREXTRA INC. ORD. DELISTED 
28/09/00 
Liquidated 
Gartmore Value Liquidated 
UK Smaller Companies 
Throgmorton Trust Liquidated 
_ UK Growth 
Group Trust Delisted 17/08/01 Liquidated 
British Inv. Trust dead 19/05/97 Liquidated 
Brit. AM & General Liquidated 
Sphere Inc & Resi. Cap Liquidated 
Radiotrust Liquidated 
North America 
US INV. TST. DEAD 
/Unitised(O 1/0 1/2000) 
Unitised 
Far East (Excluding Japan) 
SIAM SELECTIVE GW. DELISTED 
23/07/01 
Liquidated 
Trio Trust dead 12/1/93 Liquidated 
Pacific Property Liquidated 
Gartmore Emerg. Pacific delisted 04/10/99_ Liquidated 
First Philippine delisted 26/06/97 Liquidated 
Japan 
THORNTON ASIAN EMRG. Liquidated 
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'DELISTED 26/03/97' 
JF Japan OTC Delisted 27/07/98 
Europe 
Liquidated 
JUP. EUROPEAN ORD. DELISTED 
20/11/00 
Liquidated 
Charter European Delisted 22/04/02 Liquid ed 
Schroder Mediterranean Delisted 06/08/96 Liquidated 
Paribas French Inv Dead 31/08/97 
- 
Liquidated 
GERMAN INV. TST. DEAD - ACQ _ .. _Merged Total 30 
Nource: vatastream "university ol Firaeus". 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the main methodological and measurement issues 
relating to the studies in subsequent chapters. The use of five databases, namely the 
Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC), Datastream, Thomson Banker 
One, the Yale School of Management database and Thomson Financial Investment 
View yields extensive information on the closed-end fund industry in the UK and the 
US. The databases that were mainly used are Datastream, Thomson Financial 
Investment View and the Yale School of Management database. Datastream provides 
most of the funds that disappeared. This chapter describes some issues relevant to the 
definition of the closed-end fund discount and returns. We also describe the sample 
sizes and present sets of descriptive statistics. In the following chapter, we investigate 
the time-series properties of the excess NAV return, the discount and the excess 
discount return as a preliminary to the econometric studies presented in Chapters 7 
and 8. 
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Chapter 6 
Time-series properties of the NAV and the discount 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the time-series properties of the excess NAV return and the 
excess discount return in terms of autocorrelation,, stationarity, normality and 
seasonality. The excess NAV return is the difference between the NAV return (as 
defined in Chapter 5) and the one-month risk-free rate. The excess discount return is 
the difference between the discount first difference and the one-month risk-free rate. 
In the next chapter, we use the excess NAV return as an indicator of managerial 
performance in models designed to identify performance persistence. Finally, in 
Chapter 8, we investigate the possible factors that might explain the persistence of the 
excess discount return in the UK and the US, using managerial performance as one of 
the possible factors. 
Gemmill and Thomas (2002) found that the discounts in II UK sectors were non- 
stationary but became stationary at their first differences by applying the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. The sectors investigated were Emerging Markets, 
Europe, Far East Including Japan, Far East Excluding Japan, International, Japan, 
North America, Property, UK Income, UK Smaller Companies, and UK Composite. 
On the other hand, Pontiff (1995) conducted an ADF test on 49 funds in the US with 
more than 25 months of data for the discount first difference. For 53 per cent of the 
funds the test rejected a unit root at the 10 per cent sianificance level. Similarly, 
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Ammer (1990) by testing a large number of investment trusts, concluded that the 
discount first differences of UK investment trusts were stationary. Our results show 
that excess NAV returns are not autocorrelated in their levels. In addition, through 
ADF tests we find that discounts are highly autocorrelated in their levels, but not in 
their first differences. On the other hand, the excess NAV returns and excess discount 
returns are stationary. Finally, there are no significant differences in the discount 
during the month of January and other months. Thus, we have no evidence that the 
UK investment trust and the US closed-end fund discounts are characterised by a 
January effect. 
6.2 Autocorrelation of the excess NAV return 
Autocorrelation analysis is the first step in characterising the time series properties of 
the excess NAV return. Table 12 shows the autocorrelation coefficients of the excess 
NAV return of the various sectors of UK investment trusts. According to Table 12, 
the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is 0.2 and decays to 0.01 after 12 lags. The t- 
statistics for all order autocorrelation coefficients in excess NAV levels are all 
insignificant except for the first and second coefficients, which implies that there is no 
autocorrelation problem. This result is consistent with the UK excess NAV being 
stationary. 
Table 13 surnmarises the average first to twelfth order autocorrelation coefficients of 
excess NAV returns for US closed-end funds. 
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Table 12 Autocorrelation of the excess NAV return of UK investment trusts 
The table shows the average first to twelfth-order autocorrelation levels. The t-statistics of the 
autocorrelation coefficients are shown. The results are based on the average for all sixteen 
sectors of UK investment trusts. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 20031. 
AC t-Stat 
1 0.167 2.11 
2 0.155 1.95 
3 0.099 1.24 
4 0.122 1.53 
5 -0.014 -0.17 
6 0.05 0 632 
7 -0.145 -1.82 
8 0.022 0.27 
9 0.007 0.09 
10 0.012 0.15 
11 -0.061 -0.76 
_12 
0.013 0.16 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 13 Autocorrelation of the excess NAV return of US closed-end funds 
The table shows the average first to twelfth-order autocorrelation of excess NAV return. The 
t-statistics of the autocorrelation coefficients are shown. The results are the average for all 
four categories. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003 2. 
AC t-Stat 
1 0.297 3.87 
2 0.114 1.43 
3 0.131 1.65 
4 0.055 0.69 
5 0.104 1.30 
6 0.086 1.07 
7 0.107 1.34 
8 0.04 0.50 
9 0.078 0.97 
10 0.076 0.95 
11 0.067 0.84 
12 -0.035 -0.44 
Source: calculated by the author 
I The autocorrelation of UK excess NAV returns was also tested for each individual sector. As shown 
in appendix B all sectors show no autocorrelation. 
2 The autocorrelation of US excess NAV return was also tested for each individual sector. All sectors 
show no autocorrelation. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
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According to Table 13, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is equal to 0.3 and 
decays to -0.04 after 12 lags. The t-statistics for all order autocorrelation coefficients 
in excess NAV returns are all insignificant except for the first one, which implies that 
there is no autocorrelation problem. So this result is consistent with the US excess 
NAV being stationary. 
6.3 Autocorrelation of the discount 
Autocorrelation analysis is the first step in characterising the time-series behaviour of 
the discount. We start by investigating the autocorrelation process of the discount, and 
then the excess discount return, which is the dependent variable that will be used in 
Chapter 8. Tables 14 and 15 show the results for the discount and the excess discount 
return for all sixteen sectors of UK investment trusts. 
Table 14 Autocorrelation of the UK discount of investment trusts 
The table shows the average first to twelfth-order autocorrelation coefficients of discount 
levels. The t-statistics of the autocorrelation coefficients are shown. The results are based on 
the average for all sixteen sectors of UK investment trusts. We use monthly data from 
January 1990 to January 2003. 
AC t-Stat 
1 0.912 27.33 
2 0.847 20.09 
3 0.796 16.60 
4 0.746 14.12 
5 0.708 12.55 
6 0.672 11.24 
7 0.650 10.65 
8 0.617 9.84 
9 0.577 8.86 
10 0.541 7.99 
11 0.494 7.00 
12 0.463 6.45 
Source: calculated by the author 
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According to Table 14, by using monthly data, the average first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient is 0.91 and decays to 0.46 for the twelfth-order autocorrelation. The t- 
statistics for all order autocorrelation coefficients in discount levels are highly 
significant which imPlies a high degree of autocorrelation. The result suggests that the 
discount is strongly autocorrelated (to the 12 th lag), which probably reflects long-run 
trends in the series. What is more important is to investigate the excess discount 
return. Table 15 summarises the average first to twelfth order autocorrelation 
coefficients for the excess discount return. 
Table 15 Autocorrelation of the UK excess discount return of UK investment trusts 
The table shows the average first to twelfth-order autocorrelation coefficients of the excess 
discount return. The t-statistics of the autocorrelation coefficients are shown. The results are 
the average for all sixteen categories of UK investment trusts. We use monthly data from 
January 1990 to January 2003.3 
AC t-Stat 
1 -0.161 -2.03 
2 0 0.00 
3 0.16 -2.02 
4 -0.026 -0.32 
5 -0.064 -0.80 
6 0.052 0.65 
7 0.077 0.96 
8 -0.021 -0.26 
9 -0.032 -0.40 
10 -0.023 -0.29 
11 0.006 0.07 
12 -0.078 -0.97 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to Table 15, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is -0.16 and decays 
to -0.08 after 12 lags. The t-statistics for all autocorrelation coefficients are 
insignificant. Although, the discount in the previous table is strongly autocorrelated, 
3 Autocorrelation of UK excess discount return was tested for each individual sector. All sectors show 
no autocorrelation. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
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the excess discount return has insignificant autocorrelation coefficients (from the first 
lag onwards), which is consistent with the first-difference series being stationary. 
Tables 16 and 17 show the autocorrelation coefficients of the discount and the excess 
discount return for all four categories of US closed-end funds. According to Table 16, 
by using monthly data, the average first-order autocorrelation coefficient is 0.86 and 
decays to 0.40 at the twelfth lag. The t-statistics for all order autocorrelation 
coefficients in discount levels are highly significant which implies a high degree of 
autocorrelation. The result suggests that the discount is strongly autocorrelated (to the 
12th lag), which probably reflect long-run trends in the series. It is important, 
therefore, to investigate the first difference of the discount or, equivalently, the excess 
discount return. 
Table 17 surnmarises the average first to twelfth order autocorrelation coefficients of 
the excess discount return for the US closed-end fund market. According to Table 17, 
the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is 0.14 and decays to 0.06. The t-statistics 
for all autocorrelation coefficients are insignificant. Although the discount in Table 16 
is strongly autocorrelated, the excess discount return has insignificant autocorrelation 
coefficients (from the first lag onwards), which is consistent with the excess 
discount 
return being stationary. 
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Table 16 Autocorrelation of the US discount of closed-end funds 
The table shows the average first to twelfth-order autocorrelation coefficients of discount levels. The t-statistics of the autocorrelation coefficients are shown. The results are the 
average for all four categories. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
AC t-Stat 
1 0.861 20.98 
2 0.798 16.60 
3 0.752 14.12 
4 0.678 11.55 
5 0.610 9.58 
6 0.576 8.86 
7 0.544 7.99 
8 0.511 7.38 
9 0.480 6.81 
10 0.465 6.63 
11 0.438 6.10 
_1 
2 0.404 5.43 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 17 Autocorrelation of the US excess discount return of closed-end funds 
The table shows the average first to twelfth-order autocorrelation of excess discount return. 
The t-statistics of the autocorrelation coefficients are shown. The results are the average for 
all four categories. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003.4 
AC t-Stat 
1 0.136 1.71 
2 0.101 1.26 
3 0.017 0.21 
4 0.052 0.65 
5 0.065 0.81 
6 0.02 0.25 
7 0.096 1.20 
8 0.134 1.68 
9 0.020 0.25 
10 -0.014 -0.17 
11 0.028 0.35 
12 0.062 0.77 
Source: calculated by the author 
4 Autocorrelation of US excess discount return was tested for each individual sector. All sectors show 
no autocorrelation. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
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6.4 Stat 
non-stationary series tends to yield statistically significant spurious correlation 
when variables are regressed. Therefore we now test whether the excess NAV, the 
discount and the excess discount return on UK investment trusts and US closed-end 
funds follow a random walk, a random walk with drift and trend or are stationary. 
6.4.1 Unit root test 
A popular test of stationarity is the unit root test. The specifications of the test are the 
following: 
AY, = 7Y, -, 
+ c, (13) 
where the null hypothesis to be tested is v =0. c, is the stochastic error term that is 
assumed to be non-autocorrelated with a zero mean and with a constant variance. 
Such an error term is also known as a white noise error term. 
The main problem when performing ADF tests is to decide whether to include a 
constant term and a linear trend or neither in the test regression. The general principle 
is to choose a specification that is a plausible description of the data under both the 
null and alternative hypotheses (Hamilton, 1994, p. 501). If the series seems to contain 
a trend, we should include both a constant and trend in the test regression. If the series 
seems not to contain a trend, we should include neither a constant nor a trend in the 
test regression. We start by testing if the excess NAV return and excess discount 
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return in the UK and the US follow simple random walks (with no constant and no 
time trend) or are stationary. We state the hypotheses as follows: 
H0: y=O 
HI: y<0 
Table 18 shows the ADF test for the excess NAV return for the UK investment trust 
sectors defined by AITC. 
Table 18 ADF test of the UK excess NAV return by excluding a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test of the excess NAV return by all AITC sectors for the period 
January 1990 to January 2003 for two different critical values (one per cent and five per cent). 
We test if the excess NAV return follows a random walk by excluding a constant and a linear 
time trend. 5 
ADF Test Statistic -4.189743 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value :ý -1.9420 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. I 
Source: calculated by the author 
For a level of significance of I per cent and a sample size larger than 100 
observations, the critical value of the t-statistic from Dickey-Fuller's tables for no 
intercept and no trend is -2.58. According to Table 18, we can reject the null 
hypothesis, namely the existence of a unit root with one per cent significance level. 
The ADF test statistic is -4.19. In other words, the excess NAV return is stationary. 
Table 19 summarises the unit root test for the US closed-end funds sector defined by 
CEFA. 
5 We checked the unit root test for excess NAV return for UK investment trusts 
by individual sectors. 
They are all stationary at their levels by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. 
The results are 
presented in Appendix B. 
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Table 19 ADF test of US excess NAV return by excluding a constant and a trend 
This table shows ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the excess NAV return follows a 
random walk by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. 6 
ADF Test Statistic -4-091810 1% CriticalValue* 
- -2.5798 5% CriticalValue -1.9420 *MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unif-root I 
Source: calculated by the author 
For a level of significance of I per cent and a sample size larger than 100 
observations, the critical value of the t-statistic from Dickey-Fuller's tables for no 
intercept and no trend is -2.58. According to Table 19, we can reject the null 
hypothesis, namely the existence of a unit root at the one per cent significance level. 
The ADF test statistic is -4.09. In other words, the excess NAV return is stationary. 
Similarly, we test if the discount and the excess discount return in the UK and the US 
follow random walks or are stationary. Table 20 summarises the unit root test of the 
discount for the UK investment trusts sector defined by AITC. 
Table 20 ADF test of UK discount by excluding a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the discount follows a random walk 
by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. 
ADF Test Statistic -0.347150 1% Critical 
Value* -2.5791 - 5% Critical Value -1.9419 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Source: calculated by the author 
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According to the Table 20, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, namely the existence 
of a unit root at the one per cent significance level. The ADF test statistic is -0.35 
which is greater than the critical value of -2.58. In other words, the discount follows a 
random walk and is not stationary. 
Table 21 summarises the unit root test of the excess discount return for the UK 
investment trust sector defined by AITC. 
Table 21 ADF test of UK excess discount return by excluding a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the excess discount return follows a 
random walk by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. ' 
ADF Test Statistic -5.077 1% Critical Value* -2.5793 
5% Critical Value -1.942 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
- Source: calculated by the author 
According to the Table 2 1, we can reject the null hypothesis, namely the existence of 
a unit root at the one per cent significance level. The ADF test statistic is -5.08 which 
is less than the critical value of -2-58. In other words, the excess discount return does 
not follow a random walk and is stationary. 
6 We checked the unit root test for excess NAV return for US closed-end funds by individual sectors. 
They are all stationary at their levels by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. The results are 
presented in Appendix B. 
7 We checked the unit root test for excess discount return for UK investment trusts 
by individual 
sectors. They are all stationary at their levels by excluding a constant and a 
linear time trend. The 
results are presented in Appendix B. 
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Table 22 surnmarises the unit root test of the discount for US closed-end defined by 
CEFA. 
Table 22 ADF test of US discount by excluding a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the discount follows a random walk 
by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. 
ADF Test Statistic -1.631350 1% Critical Value* -2.5791 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to the Table 22,, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, namely the existence 
of a unit root at the one per cent significance level. The ADF test statistic is -1.63 
which is greater than the critical value of -2.58. In other words, the discount does 
follow a random walk and it is not stationary. 
Table 23 surnmarises the unit root test of the US excess discount return for the sectors 
defined by CEFA. 
Table 23 ADF test of US excess discount return by excluding a constant and a trend. 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the excess discount return follows a 
random walk by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. 
8 
ADF Test Statistic -4.235335 1% Critical Value* -2.5793 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Source: calculated by the author 
8 We checked the unit root test for excess discount return for US closed-end funds 
by individual 
sectors. They are all stationary at their levels by excluding a constant and a linear time trend. 
The results 
are presented in Appendix B. 
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According to the Table 23, we can reject the null hypothesis, namely the existence of 
a unit root at the one per cent significance level. The ADF test statistic is -4.24. In 
other words, the US excess discount return does not follow a random walk and is 
stationary. 
The next set of tables (Tables 24-29) surnmarise the unit root test with a constant and 
time trend for the excess NAV,, the discount and the excess discount return for UK 
investment trusts and US closed-end funds. The specifications and hypothesis of the 
test are the following: 
AY+),, Yl 
za 
AY +'8t +C (14) + I., A t-A A=4 
wherep is the drift, Ya,, AY, are lags included so that c, contains no 
A=4 
autocorrelation, and, 8t is a time trend. 
We state the hypotheses as follows: 
Ho: 8, )l =0 (existence of a unit root) 
H, : 8,; v <0 (stationarity) 
The existence of a unit root is measured using an ADF test. For a one per cent 
significance level and a sample size larger than 100 observations, the critical value of 
the t-statistic from Dickey-Fuller's tables is -4.02. Table 24 summarises the unit root 
test of the excess NAV return for UK investment trust sectors by AITC. 
ill 
Table 24 ADF test of UK excess NAV return by including a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the excess NAV return follows a 
random walk by including a constant and a linear time trend. 9 
ADF Test Statistic 1-4.531134 1 1% Critical Value* -4.0237 11 5% Critical Value -3.4413 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hVpothesis of a unit root. 
I F-statistic 1 17.97964 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to the Table 24, the sample evidence suggests that we can reject the null 
hypothesis, namely the existence of a qnit root at the one per cent significance level. 
The t-statistic for all UK sectors is -4.53,, which is less than the critical value of -4.02. 
Thus the UK excess NAV return is stationary. To check if there is a time trend, we 
compare the F-statistic of the model with the one given from the ADF tables. From 
our model, the F statistic is 17.98 > 6.34, so we reject the null hypothesis. 
Table 25 surnmarises the unit root test with a constant and a time trend for US closed- 
end funds defined by CEFA. According to Table 25, the sample evidence suggests 
that we can similarly reject the null hypothesis, namely the existence of a unit root at 
the one per cent significance level and conclude that the US excess NAV return is 
stationary. 
Tables 26 and 27 summarise the unit root tests with a constant and a time trend for the 
discount and the excess discount return in the UK. 
9 We checked the unit root test for excess NAV return for UK investment trusts by individual sectors. 
They are all stationary at their levels by including a constant and a linear time trend. The results are 
presented in Appendix B. 
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Table 25 ADF test of US excess NAV return by including a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the excess NAV return follows a 
random walk by including a constant and a linear time trend or drift. 10 
ADF Test Statistic 1-4.421175 
-1 
1% Critical Value* -4.0237 1 -]-5-% Critical Value -3.4413 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
I F-statistic 1 14.02866 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 26 ADF test of UK discount by including a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the discount follows a random walk 
by including a constant and a linear time trend. 
ADF Test Statistic -1.968091 1% Critical Value -4.0208 1 5% Critical Value 
±-3.4399 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
F-Statistic: 1.88 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 27 ADF test of UK excess discount return by including a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the excess discount return follows a 
random walk by including a constant and a linear time trend. " 
ADF Test Statistic -5.206948 1% Critical Value* -4.0212 
5% Critical Value -3.4401 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
I F-statistic 1 35.14127 
Source: calculated by the author 
'0 We checked the unit root test for excess NAV return for US closed-end funds by individual sectors. 
They are all stationary at their levels by including a constant and a linear time trend- The results are 
presented in Appendix B. 
11 We checked the unit root test for excess discount return for UK investment trusts by 
individual 
sectors. They are all stationary at their levels by including a constant and a linear time trend. 
The 
results are presented in Appendix B. 
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According to the Table 26, the sample evidence suggests that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, namely the existence of a unit root at the one per cent significance level. 
The t-statistic for all UK sectors is -1.97, which is greater than the critical value. Thus 
the UK discount is non-stationary. To check if there is a time trend, we compare the 
F-statistic of the model with the one given from the ADF tables. From our model, the 
F statistic is 1.88 < 6.34, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
According to the Table 27, the sample evidence suggests that we can reject the null 
hypothesis, namely the existence of a unit root at the one per cent significance level. 
The t-statistic for all UK sectors is -5.2 1, which is less than the critical value. Thus the 
UK excess discount return is stationary. To check if there is a time trend, we compare 
the F-statistic of the model with the one given from the ADF tables. From our model, 
the F statistic 35.14 > 6.34, so we reject the null hypothesis. 
Tables 28 and 29 summarise the unit root tests with a constant and a time trend for the 
discount and excess discount return of US closed-end funds defined by CEFA. 
According to the Table 29, the sample evidence suggests that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis at the one per cent significance level. Thus the US discount is non- 
stationary. 
According to the Table 29, the sample evidence suggests that we can reject the null 
hypothesis, namely the existence of a unit root at the one per cent significance 
level. 
Thus, the US excess discount return is stationary. 
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Table 28 ADF test of US discount by including a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the discount follows a random walk 
by including a constant and a linear time trend or drift. 
ADF Test Statistic 1-1.8151 1% Critical Value -4.0208 1 
ýý 
5% Critical Value* -3.4399 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. r-statistic 1 3.650400 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 29 ADF test of US excess discount return by including a constant and a trend 
This table shows an ADF test for the period January 1990 to January 2003 for two different 
critical values (one per cent and five per cent). We test if the excess discount return follows a 
random walk by including a constant and a linear time trend or drift. 12 
ADF Test Statistic 1-5.292898 1 1% Critical Value* 1 -4.021 
11 5% Critical Value 1 -3.4403 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
I F-statistic 1 18.34110 
Source: calculated by the author 
6.5 Normality 
This section focuses on tests of normality related to the dependent variables, namely 
the excess NAV return and the excess discount returns for the UK and US. We show a 
histogram, Jarque Bera test and related descriptive statistics. Table 30 and Figure 7 
show the results of the Jarque Bera test, which is used to test if the UK excess NAV 
series is normal or non-normal. This type of test uses the chi-squared distribution and 
specifically is a goodness-of-fit test. So we state the hypothesis as follows: 
12 We also checked the unit root test for excess discount return for US closed-end 
funds by individual 
sectors. They are all stationary at their levels by including a constant and a 
linear time trend. The 
results are presented in Appendix B. 
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Ho: Excess NAV return is nonnally distributed 
HI: Excess NAV return is not normally distributed 
Table 30 and Figure 7 Jarque Bera normality test of UK excess NAV return 
Table 30 and Figure 7 show the results of Jarque Bera test of normality and related 
descriptive statistics for UK excess NAV return. We use monthly data from January 1990 to 
January 2003.13 
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Series: NAV 
Sample 2 158 
Observations 1 56 
Mean 1.160473 
Median 0.957070 
Maximum 18.62115 
Minimum -17.81061 
Sid. D ev. 6.583173 
Skewness 0.199221 
KurtDsis 3.481567 
Jarque-Bera 2.539308 
Probability 0.280929 
From Table 30, the Z statistic (2.54) is below the critical value at the 5% significance 
level, so we accept HO, even though the distribution is slightly positively skewed and 
has positive kurtosis. We apply the same test for the US excess NAV return in Table 
31 and Figure 8. 
13 We checked the non-nality tests for UK excess NAV return by individual sectors. They are all 
normally distributed. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
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Table 31 and Figure 8 Jarque Bera normality test of US excess NAv return 
Table 31 and Figure 8 show the results of Jarque Bera. test of normality and related descriptive statistics of US excess NAV return. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003.14 
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Series: NAV 
Sample 3 158 
Observations 155 
Mean 1.080131 
Median 1.354454 
Maximum 18.40418 
Minimum -15.89950 
Std. Dev. 5.812126 
Skewness 0.174792 
Kurtosis 3.511818 
Jarque-Bera 2.481078 
Probabiliý 0.289228 
From Table 3 1, the Z statistic (2.48) is below the critical value at 5% significance 
level, so we cannot reject Ho, even though the distribution is slightly positively 
skewed and has positive kurtosis. 
Next, we apply the same test for the UK and US excess discount returns. Tables 32 
and 33 and Figures 9 and 10 show the results for the UK and US excess discount 
retums respectively. We can state the hypotheses as follows: 
HO: Excess discount return is nonnally distributed 
HI: Excess discount return is not nonnally distributed 
14 We checked the normality tests for US excess NAV return by individual sectors. They are all 
normally distributed. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
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Table 32 and Figure 9 Jarque Bera normality test of UK excess discount return 
Table 32 and Figure 9 show the results of Jarque Bera test of normality and related descriptive statistics of UK excess discount return. We use monthly data from January 1990 
to January 2003. " 
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-16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 
Series: D IS 
Sample 3 158 
Observations 1 56 
Mean -10.39519 
Median -10.74000 
Maximum -2.750000 
Minimum -17.37000 
Std. Dev. 3.317673 
Skewness 0.114079 
Ku rtos is 2264017 
Jarque-Bera 3.859222 
Probability 0.145205 
From Table 32, the Z statistic (3.86) is below the critical value at the 5% significance 
level, so again we accept HO, even though the distribution is slightly positively 
skewed and has positive kurtosis. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
UK excess discount return is nonnally distributed. 
From Table 33, the X2 statistic of 1.06 is also below the critical value at the 5% 
significance level, so we cannot reject Ho, even though the distribution is slightly 
positively skewed and has positive kurtosis. Therefore, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the US excess discount return is normally distributed. 
15 We checked the normality tests for UK excess discount return by individual sectors. They are all 
normally distributed. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
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Table 33 and Figure 10 Jarque Bera normality test of US excess discount return 
Table 33 and Figure 10 show the results of Jarque Bera test of normality and related descriptive statistics for US excess discount return. We use monthly data from January 1990 
to January 2003.16 
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, 
6.6 Seasonality of the discount 
Series: D IS 
Sample 3 158 
Observations 1 56 
Mean -9.042308 
Med ia n -9.185000 
Maximum -0220000 
Minimum -18-99000 
Std. Dev. 4.034628 
Skewness 0.084526 
Kurtosis 2.633406 
Jarque-Bera 1.059302 
ProbabiliV 0.588810 
This last section tries to identify if there is any seasonality in the UK and US discount 
series. We did not test for NAV seasonality as it is the underlying asset value of the 
fund which, unlike the share price, is not affected by supply and demand. 
Specifically, we are interested in whether the discount during the month of January is 
significantly different from the rest of the year. To test this hypothesis, we calculate 
the discount percentage changes during the month of January and compare them with 
the other months. The results show that, on average, the discount is not affected 
significantly during the month of January and the other months. 
16 We checked the normality tests for US excess discount return 
by individual sectors. They are all 
normally distributed. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
119 
Table 34 summarises our results on discount seasonality for UK investment trusts by 
AITC Category. 
Table 34 Discount seasonality of UK investment trusts 
The table shows the average discount based on our sample of 120 UK funds by each AITC 
sector. The results are shown as percentage values. The figures shown represent the average 
of January months and the average of all other months. The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: 
Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East Including Japan, GGI: Global Growth and Income, 
GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller 
Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector 
Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGI: UK Growth and Income, UKSC: UK Smaller 
Companies. 
CFE EU EUS FEXJ FED GG GGI GSC 
January -1.93 -0.91 -0.49 -0.34 -0.32 -0.43 -1.53 -0.77 
All other 
months -1.83 -1.04 -0.39 -0.40 -0.39 -0.37 -1.45 -0.95 
Source: calculated by the author 
i isc NASC NA SSP UKG UKGI UKSC 
January -0.50 -0.45 -0.65 -0.. 91 -0.20 -0.61 -0.56 0.81 
All other 
months -0.47 -0.26 -0.73 -0.86 -0.28 -0.67 -0.60 0.84 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to Table 34, the North America category shows an average January 
discount of -0.91 compared to -0.86 for the other months. 
UK Growth displays an 
average January discount of -0.61 compared to -0.67 
during the other months. The 
Country Far East sector shows an average discount of -1.93 during January compared 
to -1.83 in the other months. At first sight, there seems 
to be no evidence of a January 
effect. To substantiate this, we use a t-test. Thus the hypotheses are as 
follows: 
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Ho: p, - P2 : ":: 
PI - P2 : ý6 
The calculated t-value is -0.93, which is within the ± 2.13 acceptance range at the 5 
per cent significance level. So the sample evidence suggests that there is no difference 
between the average discount during the month of January and the other months. 
Therefore, there is no evidence of January effect in the UK. 
Table 35 sununarises our results of discount seasonality for US closed-end funds by 
CEFA category. 
Table 35 Discount seasonality of US closed-end funds 
The table shows the average discount based on our sample of 30 US funds by each CEFA 
sector. The results are shown as percentage values. The figures shown represent the average 
of January months and the average of all other months. The abbreviations used are the 
following: El: Equity Income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: Global Equity, GI: Growth and 
Income. 
El GE GI GD 
January 0.33 -5.90 -0.18 -1.03 
All other months 0.28 -5.12 -0.21 -1.01 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to Table 35, the Global Equity category shows largest average discount of 
-5.90 in January, compared to a discount of -5-12 in the other months. Growth 
Domestic displays an average January discount of -1.03 compared to -1.01 during the 
other months. The Equity Income sector shows an average premium of 0.33 during 
January compared to 0.28 in the other months. 
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The calculated t-value is only -0.92, so the sample evidence suggests that at the 5% 
significance level, there is no difference between the average discount during the 
month of January and other months. Therefore, there is no evidence of January effect 
in the US. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In autocorrelation analysis, we find that the excess NAV return is not autocorrelated. 
Discounts are highly autocorrelated in their levels, but the excess discount return is 
not autocorrelated. Similarly, ADF tests show that the UK and US excess NAV 
returns and excess discount returns are stationary series. We also find that the UK and 
US excess NAV returns and excess discount returns are normally distributed by using 
a Jarque-Bera test. Finally, we find no evidence of seasonality in the behaviour of the 
discount. Changes in the discount during the month of January are not significantly 
different from the other months. 
We now turn to the main part of our empirical study: in the next chapter, we test for 
perfonnance persistence and in Chapter 8 we try to identify the factors that might 
explain the fluctuation and persistence of the excess discount return in the UK and the 
us. 
122 
Chapter 7 
Performance persistence 
7.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to test whether management performance is 
persistent among closed-end funds. The results are mixed, but sufficient to motivate 
us to use this factor in Chapter 8 to investigate its effect on the excess discount return. 
This chapter has four objectives. The first one is to investigate whether perfonnance 
persistence is related to anomalies documented in the finance literature, such as size 
and the book-to-market effect. The second objective is to test if fund managers have 
market timing ability and can predict the movement of the market. The third objective 
is to test perfonnance and discount persistence by using the approach followed by 
Carhart (1997) and Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001). The fourth objective is to 
assess the perfonnance of UK "dead" funds. 
The argument that discounts reflect the quality of the management has been 
investigated in the past but the results were mixed. However, in these studies 
managerial performance is measured by the raw return on the fund's NAV (Grinblatt 
and Titman, 1992; Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavka, 1993; and Elton, Gruber, and 
Blake, 1996a). Possible sources of persistence in raw return figures include 
differences in risk exposures, size, the book-to-market ratio and fund manager skills. 
In this study, fund performance is measured by the excess NAV return net of 
expenses. The reason that we use a net figure is that all funds are required by law to 
pay out dividends annually. The closed-end fund dividend is paid out of the 
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portfolio's income, after deducting expenses. By law, at least 85 per cent of the 
dividend received from the holdings must be paid out. Dividends are paid out of 
income, not out of capital. Our measure of the excess NAV return is,, therefore,, net of 
expenses. 
We measure the manager's quality after controlling for various anomalies 
documented in the finance literature. Three approaches are followed: Fama and 
French's (1993) three-factor model, an extended version of the Fama and French 
model to include the market timing ability variable from a model developed by 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and finally the approach followed by Carhart (1997) and 
Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001). By applying Fama and French's three-factor 
model, we find that for both the UK and the US the results are mixed, suggesting that 
managerial performance is a factor that needs more investigation. From the extended 
Fama and French model, we also find mixed results for both the UK and the US 
markets. Finally, by using the method of Carhart (1997) and Dimson and Minio- 
Kozerski (2001), we find weak evidence of performance persistence in the US (but 
not the UK) and strong evidence of discount persistence in both countries. 
Finally, we assess the performance of UK "dead" funds and the results show that 
during the last five years of trading, funds that open-ended, merged or unitised were 
characterized by a wide discount and very weak NAV perfonnance. By the term 
'dead' we mean funds that were liquidated, merged, or unitised. 
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7.2 Models and data 
The quality of mutual fund management has been investigated in the literature largely 
in relation to the ability to select stocks and market timing ability. The aim of this 
chapter is to test the null hypothesis that fund managers cannot outperform the market 
and do not have market timing skills. The alternative hypothesis is that fund managers 
can outperform the market and have market timing skills which enable them to predict 
the movement of the market. 
To test these hypotheses, we use a rolling methodology for the first, third, fifth and 
ninth years. The term 'rolling' means that the third year includes the first, second and 
third years and the fifth year includes all the previous years, and so on. We test the 
hypothesis of Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and lbboston 
(1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and Wermers (1996) who found evidence of 
persistence in mutual fund performance over relatively short-term horizons of one to 
three years and attribute the persistence to skilled and market timing fund managers. 
The ninth year includes observations that start from the fifth year. We test the 
hypothesis of Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavha (1993), 
and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Blake (I 996a) who documented mutual fund return 
persistence over longer periods of five to ten years and attribute the persistence to 
skilled managerial performance. The rolling methodology approach is consistent with 
Gruber (1996), Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
Our first approach follows Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model and aims to 
measure performance as the intercept from the regression that 
includes size, a book- 
125 
to-market factor and the excess market return as independent variables. Our second 
approach is the Farna and French (1993) three-factor model extended to include a 
variable from the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model related to market timing ability. 
This additional independent variable is the square of the market rate of return. The 
third approach is an application of rank correlation analysis to test for Carhart's 
(1997) momentum effect. The different models are tested and compared and a 
summary of the empirical evidence is presented. 
in terms of the signs of the coefficients of the independent variables, we expect to find 
positive values for the coefficients of the market return and size, and negative values 
for the book-to-market effect. The market effect has always played an important role 
in return explanation, based on the CAPM, and we expect to find a positive estimate 
of the beta. The size effect was documented in Fama and French's model in which 
small firms outperform big firms, which leads us to expect a positive estimated 
coefficient on the size variable. The book-to-market effect is expected to have a 
negative value based on the results obtained by Pontiff (1997), who found that the 
book-to market effect was negative (but insignificant) and affected funds with low 
premiums and discounts. With regard to the momentum effect, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) showed that buying past winners and selling past losers could generate 
significant profits when returns are measured over three to twelve-month periods. 
This hypothesis is tested later by using deciles and trying to test the significance 
between rankings. In contrast, momentum is expected to be 
insignificant over the long 
term as we assume that information both private and public 
is incorporated in the 
prices of funds. 
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The study focuses on a large number of UK investment trusts with the exception of 
funds that invest in unquoted securities, venture and development, private equity, 
specialist funds (such as IT funds), emerging market funds, hedge funds, and split 
capital trusts. The reason of excluding unquoted securities is that if a significant 
proportion of investments held are unquoted, there will be some uncertainty as to the 
true value of underlying assets. This leaves us with 16 sectors with a total number of 
120 funds. In addition,, we investigate 4 categories of US closed end funds with a total 
number of 30 funds. 
In the sample investigated, to avoid survivorship bias due to the problem of funds 
disappearing because of poor performance, we include the 30 UK funds that 
disappeared during the period 1990 to 2003 for the selected sectors. These 
correspond to the funds that Datastrearn classifies as "dead" funds and for which it 
keeps a back history. 
In the studies, a decision has to be taken whether to use a performance measure based 
on the market value of the fund shares or on asset values. According to Malkiel 
(1977) market values "include the effects of changing premiums and discounts, the 
variable that we are trying to explain. Therefore, in order to measure the performance 
of the fund managers themselves, it is important to use asset values rather than the 
market prices of the fund shares. " (Malkiel, 1977, p-853) 
7.3 Tests for non-stationarity and multicolline-a-r-i-Y- 
In the models estimated in this chapter, fund performance (the 
dependent variable) is 
measured by the excess NAV return, which was shown to 
be stationary in Chapter 6. 
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The independent variables used are the excess market return, size, the book-to-market 
effect,, and the square of the market return. Sets of descriptive statistics for these 
independent variables for the UK and the US are presented in Tables 36 and 37 
respectively. An ADF unit root test is used to test these variables for non-stationarity 
and the results are surnmarised for the UK and the US respectively in Tables 38 and 
39. 
Table 36 Descriptive statistics of the UK independent variables 
The abbreviations used are the following: 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for the UK, 
(Rs 
- Rb 
)is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect and 
(R. )2 
measures 
market timing ability. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
(Rm-Rf) (Rs-Rb (Rg - Rj 
(Rm)' 
Mean -2.04 -12.89 -0.20 18.84 
Standard 
Deviation 7.51 8.72 2.23 22.02 
_ Kurtosis 0.43 0.40 1.50 3.40 
_ Skewness -0.20 -0.21 -0.47 
1.71 
Range 43.21 50.20 14.49 127.50 
_ Minimum -25.37 -38.65 -8.11 -3.95 _ 
_Maximum 
1 17.85 11.56 6.38 123.55 
Source: calculated by the author 
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Table 37 Descriptive statistics of the US independent variables 
The abbreviations used are the following: (Rm - Rf 
) is the excess market return for US, 
(R, 
v - 
Rj is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect, and 
(R.. )2 
measures 
market timing ability - We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
(R 
-Rf) m 
(R 
-R sh 
(Rg 
- Rj 
(R 
"Y 
Mean 0.11 0.02 0.06 23.42 
Standard 
Deviation 7.34 3.59 2.32 23.45 
Kurtosis 0.87, 4.59 0.41 0.70 
Skewness 0.09 0.40 -0.13 1.21 
Range 42.08 30.54 12.68 101.37 
Minimum -21.39 -12.96 -6.58 -4.80 
Maximum 20.70 17.57 6.10 96.57 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 38 ADF tests of UK independent variables 
This table shows the results of unit root tests of the independent variables for the UK. The 
abbreviations used are the following. 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, 
(Rs 
- Rb 
)is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect and 
(Rm )2 
measures 
market timing ability. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
Variable ADF-statistic 
(R,, 
- Rfj -5.14** 
(R, 
- Rj -3.66** TR R, 
-4.98** 
(R,, )' -5.01** 
Source: calculated by the author 
Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 39 ADF tests of US independent variables 
Table 39 shows the results of unit root tests of US independent variables. The abbreviations 
used are the following. 
(Rm 
- Rf 
)is the excess market return for US, (R, - Rh 
) is the size 
effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect and 
(R. )2 
measures market timing ability. We 
use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
Variable ADF-statistic 
ýRm Rf 
-5.93 ** 
(Rs Rb 
-7.02** TR R, 
-4.87** 
(R,, )2 -5.46** 
Source: calculated by the author 
Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at I% level 
From the ADF unit root tests, it is clear that, for the UK and the US, all four 
independent variables are 1(0) at the I% level of significance and therefore stationary. 
Since all variables are stationary, standard OLS regression may be used. 
Multicollinearity refers to the case in which two or more explanatory variables in the 
regression model are highly correlated, making it difficult or impossible to isolate 
their individual effects on the dependent variable. To test for multicollinearity, we 
construct correlation matrices and compute variance -inflation factors. 
Tables 40 and 41 show the correlation matrices for the four independent variables 
used in UK and US models respectively. 
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Table 40 Correlation matrix of UK independent variables 
The table shows the correlation matrix of the UK independent variables. The abbreviations 
used are the following. 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, (Rs - Rb 
)is the size 
effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect and 
(R. )2 
measures market timing ability. We 
use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
- 
(Rm-Rf) (Rs-Rb) (Rg - Rj 
(R,, )' 
Rf ) TR. -- 1 
(Rs 
- 
Rb 
0.14 1 
-[Rý RRT, 
2 -0.04 
0.03 1 
(R,,, ) 
-0.11 0.06 0.09 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 41 Correlation matrix of US independent variables 
The table shows the correlation matrix of the independent variable. The abbreviations used 
are the following. (RM - Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, (RS - Rb) is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect and 
(Rm )2 
measures market timing ability. We use 
monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003 
(Rm 
- Rf (Rv - Rb) 
(Rg 
- Rj 
(km-)"-- n 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) 
(R, 
- 
Rb 
- 
0.01 1 
TR RRT, 
-0.04 -0.33 1 
(R, 
n)' 0.18 -0.06 -0.03 1 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to both tables, none of the correlation coefficients is greater than 0.2 and 
therefore the independent variables are not strongly correlated. 
Another method for detecting multicollinearity is the variance-inflation factor (VIF). 
It is calculated as: 
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1 
VIF, =1- Ri 
where VIF is the variance-inflation factor and R, ' is the squared multiple correlation 
coefficient obtained from a regression of the ith independent variable on the other 
independent variables. A high VIF suggests a collinearity problem, but a VIF less 
than 10 indicates that there is unlikely to be a collinearity problem. Table 42 
summarises the results for the UK and Table 43 surnmarises the results for the US. 
Table 42 VIEF results of the UK independent variables 
Table 42 shows the VIF results of the UK independent variables. The abbreviations used are 
the following. (RM - Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, (R, - Rb) is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect and 
(Rm )2 
measures market timing ability. We use 
monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
(Rm-Rf) (Rs-Rb) (R9 - Rv) 
(Rm)' 
OF 1.64 1.18 1.13 1.93 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 43 VIEF results of the US independent variables 
Table 43 shows the VIF results of the US independent variables. The abbreviations used are 
the following. (Rm - Rf 
) is the excess market return for US, 
(R,, 
- Rb, 
) is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect and 
(R,, )2 
measures market timing ability. We use 
monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003 
(R,,, 
- Rf 
(R,, 
- 
Rb) (Rg 
- Rj 
(R,, )2 
VIF 1.02 1.26 1.38 1.06 
Source: calculated by the author 
13 2 
it is clear from both tables that all the independent variables show a VIF less than 2, 
which is a sign that there is no multicollinearity. 
7.4 Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the model of Fama and French (1993) was constructed and 
implemented on various portfolios of shares to explain various anomalies in financial 
markets in tenns of size and the book-to-market ratio. This led to the three-factor 
model. Gruber (1996) tested perfonnance persistence by identifying four factors: the 
local equity market index, a size index, a bond index and an index which measures the 
performance of the difference between growth and value stocks. The last factor is 
used because of the importance of the book-to-market ratio in explaining returns 
(Fama and French, 1993). We ignore the bond index factor as we do not focus on 
income funds that invest in bonds. Even the Equity Income category is dominated by 
shares. 
Following Gruber (1996) and Fama and French (1993), we define one, three, five and 
nine year performance based on monthly returns, which are defined as excess NAV 
returns for the period January 1990 to January 2003. The intercepts (a's ) from the 
regression equations for one, three, five and nine years respectively are used to 
measure the contribution of the manager to the performance of the fund. 
Thus, a 
positive and statistically significant alpha indicates superior performance of the 
fund, 
whereas negative values or statistically insignificant values represent 
inferior or 
neutral managerial performance. 
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The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
Ho :a<0, Fund managers have an inferior or neutral performance 
HI: a>0 Fund managers have a superior performance 
The model that will be used for each UK and US sector is the following: 
RATA ý,, 
I=a +A(R,,, - Rf 'I) 
+, 82(Rs, t - Rh, t) +, 
83 (Rg, 
t - 
Rv, 
t) + c, (16) 
where the 6.. 's are the coefficients measuring the sensitivity of each factor. RNAVs, t 
is the excess NAV return for each sector and Rft, represents the risk-free rate, proxied 
by the one-month treasury bill rate, consistent with Fama and French (1993). 
(R -R actor which is measured as the difference between the return S'l b, t 
)isthe size E 
on a small stocks index and the return on a large stocks index. (Rg,, - Rv, t) 
is the book- 
to-market factor which is measured as the difference between the return on an index 
of high book-to-market stocks (or growth stocks) and the return on an index of low 
book-to- market stocks (or value stocks). The intercept, a, from regressing the excess 
NAV returns on the market variables, is interpreted as a measure of the contribution 
of the manager. 
Consistent with Elton, Gruber and Blake (I 996a) and Fama and French (1993), we 
use two style indices to measure the size effect and the book-to-market effect. 
Specifically, the UK size effect is measured as the difference between the return on 
the FTSE Smaller Companies index and the return on the FTSE 100 index. The FTSE 
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100 is used as a proxy for the return on large companies. The US size effect is 
measured as the difference between the return on S&P Small Cap and the return on 
the S&P 500 Composite, the latter being used as a proxy for the return on large 
companies. The UK book-to-market effect is measured as the difference between the 
return on the FTSE 350 Growth index and the return on the FTSE 350 Value index. 
The US book-to-market effect is measured as the difference between the return on the 
S&P 500/Barra Growth index and the return on the S&P 500/Barra Value index. 
Table 44 summarises the results of Farna and French's (1993) model for the UK 
market. 
Table 44 Fama and French's three-factor model of UK excess NAV return 
We use 12,, 365 60 and 109 observations by applying a rolling methodology. The sample 
includes 16 sectors of UK investment trusts with total number of 120 funds. We use two style 
indices to measure the size effect, and the book-to-market effect. Specifically, the UK size 
effect is measured as the difference between the return on the FTSE Smaller Companies 
index 
and the return on the FTSE 100 index. The FTSE 100 is used as a proxy 
for the return on 
large companies. The UK book-to-market effect is measured as the difference 
between the 
return on the FTSE 350 Growth index and the return on the FTSE 350 Value 
index. 
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C - Category AIT Coeffi cients ly 5Y 9Y 
h b lG 2 rowt a Glo Adj R 0.89 0.71 0.67 0.48 
a 3.87 0.72 1.91- -0- . 56 3.30)** 1.27) (3.01)** (-0.89) 
Market (A) 1.68 0.81 ). 65 0.69 (9.7 0) **- (9.74) (4.4 5) (5.85)** 
Size 
(1 
2) 1.29 0.73 0.33 0.49 
(2.9 9) ** (1.91)* (3.2 5) ** (3.3 0) ** 
Book-to-market -1.85 0.71 -0.05 0.39 (-1.99)* (2.11)* (-0.22) (1.58) 
D/W 2.10 2.11 1.96 1.95 
Global Growth & 2 Adj R 0.87 0.71 0.83 0.55 
Income 
a 1.60 1.18 0.37 -0.46 (2-9 5) (2.02)* (0-97) (-1.15) 
Market (A) 0.95 0.82 0.86 0.66 (8.60)* (10.89)** (17.78)** (6.92) ** 
Size (182) 0.66 -0.00 -0-05 -0.02 (4.22) (-0.02) (-1.18) , (-0.17) 
Book-to-market 0.72 -0.28 -0.11 -0-18 
(A) (1.55) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.77) 
D/W 2.10 2.13 1.98 2.04 
Global Smaller Adj R2 0.89 0.74 0.67 0.49 
Companies 
a 3.54 -0.42 1.91 -0.45 
(3.24)** (-0.33) (3.01)** (-0.70) 
Market (A) 1.64 1.13 0.65 0.71 (10.34)** (10.06)** (4.4 5) (5.7 7) 
Size 682) 1.25 0.20 0.33 0.49 
(2.9 9) ** (0.99) (3.2 5) ** (3.3 0) ** 
Book-to-market -1.73 -0.89 -0.05 0.39 ('83) (-1.91)* (-1.78)* (-0.22) (1.57) 
D/W 2.03 1.95 1.96 1.97 
UK Growth Adj Rl- 0.90 0.84 0.80 0.78 
a 2.27 0.81 0.53 0.12 
(1.60) (1-50) (1.29) (0.34) 
Market (A) 0.82 0.69 0.82 0.82 (6.64) ** (13.15)** (15.56)** (13.54)** 
Size 
0 ) 0.20 0.68 0.02 0.83 
2 (2.3 6) ** (5.9 6) ** (2.18)* (9.6 5) 
Book-to-market -0.18 -0.63 -0.40 0.06 
(A) (-2.10)* (-1.73)* (-1.26) (0.23) 
D/W 2.00 1.98 2.05 2.01 
UK Growth & Income Adj R2 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.76 
a 1.88 1.23 0.22 0.06 
(1.08) (2.02)* (0.46) (0.16) 
Market (A) 0.74 0.68 
0.86 0.77 
(4.2 9) (11 . 
00)** (13.55)** (9.24) 
Size 06 0.23 0.70 -0.11 
0.82 
2 (2.25)* (5.70) ** (-1.03) (9.4 8) 
Book-to-market -0.13 -0.67 -0.63 
0.06 
(A) (-1.09) (-2.43)** (-1.83)* (0.22) 
D/W 2.07 1.95 2.10 1.93 
: UK §m-a I I-e-r ---------- 0.89 0.84 0.69 0.79 
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Companies 
a 2.43 0.85 1.97 0.13 
(1.65)* (1.58) (2.43)** (0.38) 
Market (A) 0.84 0.68 0.54 0.83 
(5.92) ** (13.44)** (4.76)** (13.94)** 
Size 
(#2 0.20 _ 0.70 0.60 0.84 
(2.3 2) (6.42)** (5.21)** (9.5 4) ** 
Book-to-market -0.19 -0.67 -0.10 0.06 063) (-2.06)* (-1.86)* (-0.84) (0.23) 
D/W 2.04 1.97 1.99 2.06 
North America 2 0.53 0.76 0.79 O., <0 V a -0.93 0.99 0.48 0.64 
(-0.89) (1.53) (1.05) (1.77)* 
Market (A) 0.47 0.92 0.95 0.77 (3.52)** (10.11)** (14.82)** (9.5 3) ** 
Size (82) -0.61 0.67 0.62 0.43 
(-1.86)* (2.33)* (2.9 8) ** (4.3 7) ** 
Book-to-market 1.51 -0.21 -0.09 0.19 063) (-1.80)* (-1.30) (-0.98) (0.97) 
D/ 2.05 2.09 1.99 2.06 
North America Adj R2 0.79 0.84 0.61 0.69 
Smaller Companies 
a 1.98 0.82 0.28 0.63 
(1.37) (1.44) (0.25) (1.73)* 
Market (A) 0.58 0.86 0.69 0.71 (3.16)** (2.9 7) ** (6.2 3) ** (9.5 6) 
Size ( 82) 0.93 0.49 0.40 0.43 
' (3.3 4) (3.46) ** (1.73)* (4.40)** 
Book-to-market -1.30 0.25 -0.43 0.18 
('83) (-1.79)* (0.79) (-1.76)* (0.94) 
D/W 1.95 1.92 1.97 2.07 
Far East (Including Adj R2 0.68 0.78 0.75 0.53 
Japan) 
a -1.45 0.93 0.87 -0.17 
(-0.66) 3 8) (1.60) (-0.32) 
Market (A) 0.63 0.96 0.91 0.82 (2.07)** (10.05)** (12.96)** (11.06)** 
Size (8 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.27 2 (0.34) (1.92)* (1.08) (2.03)* 
Book-to-market -0.03 -0.16 -0.37 0.24 
('83) (-0.04) (-1.03) (-1.21) (1.09) 
D/W 1.96 2.15 2.08 1.97 
Far East (Excluding Adj R2 0.63 0.44 0.24 0.25 
Japan) 
a -1.75 0.85 0.85 -0.09 
(-0.49) (0.68) (0.81) (-0.11) 
Market (A) 0.29 0.79 
0.57 0.39 
(1.35) (4.2 8) * (2.5 4) ** (4.01)** 
Size (8 -0.13 -0.13 -0.26 
0.08 
2 (-0.17) (-0.42) (-0.74) (0.63) 
Book-to-market 2.10 0.84 -0.12 0.49 
(183) (1.86)* (1.19) (-0.20) (2.3 1)* 
D/W 2.04 2.02 1.92 1.92 
Japan Adj R2 0.91 0.74 0.77 0.53 
.. Ia 4.40 -O. -Il 
-0.14 -0.18 
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(5.00)** (-0.08) (-0.24) (-0.3-3) 
Market (A) 1.70 1.16 1.13 0.81 (10.85)** (9.78) (16.43)** (19.99)** 
Size 062) 0.83 0.24 0.51 0.28 
(2.04)* (0.86) * (3.05)* (2.07)* 
Book-to-market -0.76 -0.84 _ -0.42 0.53 (183)- (-2.82)** (-1.72)* (-1.21) (1.55) 
D/W 1.93 2.03 1.96 1.98 
Japanese Smaller Adj R 0.80 0.80 0.65 0.53 
Companies 
a 3.54 0.35 0.40 -0.18 (1.99)* (0.32) (0.48) (-0.33) 
Market (A) 9.90 1.15 0.98 0.81 (9.5 0) ** (12.57)** (8.01)** (19.99)** 
Size (182 5.40 0.84 0.59 0.28 
(6.00)** (3.9 6) ** (2.8 2) ** (2.07)* 
Book-to-market -1.01 -0.51 -0.37 0.26 
(-1.50) (-0.82) (-0.77) (1.78)* 
D/W 1.95 1.92 1.96 1.98 
Europe Adj R2 0.37 0.78 0.75 0.41 
a 0.84 0.68 0.67 -0.03 
(1.36) (1.19) (1.33) (-0.07) 
Market (A) 0.60 0.73 0.79 0.67 (2.8 5) ** (10.05)** (11.05)** (5.2 3) 
Size ('82 0.32 0.16 0.04 0.16 
(0.75) (1.52) (0.50) (0.93) 
Book-to-market -0.25 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
(A) (-0.37) (-0.12) (-0.08) (-0.08) 
D/W 1.94 1.99 1.97 2.08 
European Smaller Adj R2 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.71 
Companies 
cr 0.69 -0.11 0.48 -0.48 
(0.88) (-0.28) (1.52) (-1.28) 
Market (A) 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.84 (12.45)** (21.13)** (16.27)** (10.13)** 
8 Size ( 0.44 0.32 0.23 0.49 
' 2 (2.3 0) (3.19)** (2.6 6) (3.69)** 
Book-to-market 0.50 0.40 0.02 0.30 
(A) (1.07) (1.92)* (0.11) (-1.36) 
D/W 2.02 2.02 2.06 
Country Specialists Adj 0.83 0.87 0.80 0.53 
Far- East 
a 1.65 0.32 1.16 -0.17 
(2.45)** (0.52) (1.82)* (-0.30) 
Market (A) 0.93 
0.99 0.94 0.82 
(7.91)** (13.50)** (13.62)** (6.62) 
Size 06 0.64 0.32 -0.02 
0.27 
2 (3.5 8) ** (3.4 5) ** (2.3 1)* (2.11)* 
Book-to-market 0.45 0.25 -0.07 0.24 
(183) (0.78) (4.18) (-0.91) (1.04) 
- 2.01 2.09 2.06 1.97 
Sector Specialists Adj R 0.67 0.110 0.69 0.58 
Property 
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a 3.17 0.22 0.99 0.60 
- 
(1.50) (0.20) (0.94) (1.64)* 
Market (A A 0.90 0.70 0.51 - 0.70 
(4.3 9) (6.0 3) (3.2 3) ** (9.5 3) ** 
Size 
062) 1.03 0.46 0.35 - 0.42 
(1.53) (2.00)* (2.04)* (4.2 8) ** 
Book-to-market -1.95 -0.40 -0.23 0.19 063) (-3.40)** (-1.58) (-1.09) (0.99) 
- 
I D/W 2.05 2.01 2.09 2.04 
rvations 
ý 
lotal obse 1 12 36- 60 
ýýource. autnor cuicutation 
* represents t -value that is statistically significant at 5% significance level 
** represents t-value that is statistically significant at 1% significance level 
According to Table 44, the adjusted R squared for most AITC categories is higher 
than 0.50. In addition, there is no evidence of first-order autocorrelation in the above 
regressions as on average the Durbin/Watson statistic (D/W) for each sector is close 
to 2.00. For example, the European Smaller Companies category has an adjusted R 
squared value of 0.89 for the first 12 months and 0.88 for the first 60 months. 
Similarly, UK Growth has an adjusted R squared value of 0.90 for the first 12 months 
and 0.84 for the first 36 months. 
As indicated above, a is used to measure the ability of managers to outperform the 
base index. A positive and statistically significant a indicates a skilled fund manager 
whose decisions add value to the fund. Rhodes (2000) argued that "persistent 
performance shows that some fund managers are able to outperform their peers. This 
implies that the fund managers must either have access to information that is insider 
or not widespread or make use of information in a speedier way than other managers. 
As markets become more efficient it will be more difficult for any fund manager to 
outperform the market continuously" (Rhodes, 2000, P-7). On the other hand, negative 
a values or statistically insignificant values represent inferior or neutral performance 
of the manager. In other words, a negative a indicates a poorly performing manager 
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whose decisions affect negatively the value of the fund. According to Table 44, the 
results are mixed. Eleven out of the sixteen sectors display an a that is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels (in one-tailed tests) for at least one of 
the time periods. In more detail, Global Growth and Income shows a positive and 
statistically significant cr for the first year at the 1% level and at the 5% significance 
level for the first three years. Japan displays a significant a for the first year at the 
1% significance level. Global Smaller Companies show a positive and statistically 
significant a at the I% level the first five years. Finally, Japanese Smaller 
Companies and Country Specialist Far East display a positive and statistically 
significant a for the first 12 months at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. On the 
other hand, the rest of the sectors show a mixed picture of positive and negative 
alphas that are not statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels. Furthermore,, only 
two alphas are significant for the nine-year period at the 5% level in one-tailed tests. 
So while there is some evidence for managerial performance persistence in the short- 
tenn, there is little evidence for persistence in the long run. 
Most of the sectors show significant t-statistics for both the market return and size. 
The t-statistic for the UK size effect measured as the difference between the return on 
the FTSE Smaller Companies index and the return on the FTSE 100 index is 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level. On the other hand, the UK book-to- 
market effect measured as the difference between the return on the FTSE 350 Growth 
index and the return on the FTSE 350 Value index is negatively and positively 
significant for some of the sectors and statistically insignificant for most of the 
sectors. Thus, consistent with Pontiff (1997), we find that the book-to-market 
factor 
does not seem to have any significant explanatory power. Through 
his cross-sectional 
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regression, Pontiff found that the book-to-market effect only influenced funds with 
low premiums and discounts. 
Table 45 summarises the results of the Fama and French's (1993) model for the US 
market. 
Table 45 Fama. and French's three-factor model of US excess NAV return 
We use 12,36,60 and 109 observations of data by applying a rolling methodology. The 
sample includes 4 sectors of US closed-end funds with total number of 30 funds. We will use 
two style indices to measure the size effect, and the book to market effect. Specifically, the 
US size effect is measured as the difference between the return on S&P Small Cap and the 
return on the S&P 500 Composite as it is used as a proxy for the return on large companies. 
The US book-to-market effect is measured as the difference between the return on the S&P 
500/Barra Growth index and the return on the S&P 500/Barra Value index. 
CEFA Category Coefficients ly 3Y 5Y 9Y 
Equity Income Adj R2 0.79 0.60 0.83 0.69 
a 1.68 0.28 0.88 0.61 
(1.33) (0.25) (2.0 6) ** (1.70)* 
Market 0.54 0.70 0.90 0.71 
(, 8 
1) 
(3.3 7) (6.14) (15.75)** (9.5 6) 
Size 0 0.95 0.40 0.42 0.43 2 (3.31)** (1.78)* (3.8 3) ** (4.3 6) 
Book-to- -1.26 -0.40 0.04 0.18 
market (-1.72)* (-1.66)* (0.17) (0.96) 
(A) 
D/W 1.99 1.97 1.95 2.06 
Global Equity A 0.86 0.85 0.70 0.78 
a 2.41 0.79 1.83 0.11 
(1.43) (1.49) (2.26)* (0.31) 
Market 0.84 0.67 0.57 0.81 
(A) (4.5 9) (14.30)** 
(5.00)** (13.00)** 
Size (9 0.22 0.70 0.61 
0.83 
2 (2.27)* (6.44) ** (5.5 9) (9.5 7) 
Book-to- -0-18 -0.64 -0.13 
0.06 
market (-1.55) (-1.77)* (-1.14) (0.23) 
(18 
D/W 2.14 1.98 1.95 2.00 
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Growth and Adj R2 0.86 0.73 0.63 0.53 
income 
a 2.41 0.28 0.31 -0.22 (1.43) (0.25) (0.33 5) (-0. -39) 
Market 0.84 1.05 0.96 0.82 
(A) (4.5 9) ** (6.21)** (7.8 9) ** (6.5 3) 
Size (82) 0.22 0.79 0.59 0.28 
(2.27)* (3.68)* (2.7 7) ** (2.16)* 
Book-to- -0.18 -0.43 -0.42 0.22 
market (-1.55) (-0.68) (-0.87) (0.94) 
- 
(18 
3) 
- D/W 2.14 1.97 2.00 1.95 
Growth Domestic Adj R2 0.47 0.87 0.57 0.77 
a 0.22 0.35 1.28 1.20 
(0.15) (0.56) (2.20)* (1.85)* 
Market 0.59 0.99 0.66 0.89 
(A ) (2.64) ** (3.5 0) ** (8.3 3) (11.49)** 
Size (02) 1.02 0.32 1.06 -0.10 
(2.23)* (3.44) ** (3.6 8) ** (-0.87) 
Book-to- 0.60 0.24 -0.43 0.09 
market (0.82) (4.0 8) (1.00) (0.57) 
(63) 
D/W 1.95 2.04 2.00 2.01 
Total observations 12 36 60 109 
Source: author calculation 
* represents t -value that is statistically significant at 5% significance level 
** represents t-value that is statistically significant at 1% significance level 
According to Table 45, the adjusted R squared for most CEFA categories is higher 
than 0.50. In addition, there is no first-order autocorrelation problem in the above 
regression as on average the Durbin/Watson statistic for each sector is close to 2.00. 
Based on our regression results, three out of four sectors display an a that is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for various years. For example, Global 
Equity displays a positive and statistically significant alpha for the first five years. 
Similarly, Equity Income and Growth Domestic show a positive and statistically 
significant alpha for the first five and nine years. Most of the sectors show a 
Significant t-statistic for both the market return and size. For most time perlods the t- 
statistic for US size is statistically significant at the I% 
level. The book-to-market 
effect is negatively and statistically significant for some sectors and not statistically 
142 
significant for most of the sectors. Thus, consistent with Pontiff (1997) and our UK 
results, we find that the book-to-market factor does not seem to have any significant 
explanatory power. 
The objective of the next study is to investigate if fund managers have market timing 
ability (namely the ability to predict the movement of the market) by extending Fama 
and French's (1993) three-factor model to include Treynor and Mazuy's (1966) 
variable of market timing ability. 
7.5 Extended Fama and French's (1993) model 
In this section, we extend Fama and French's model estimated in section 7.4 to 
include an additional independent variable following the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
model. The extra variable is the square of the market return, which is included in an 
attempt to capture market timing ability. The intercepts (a's ) from the regression 
equations for one, three, five and nine years respectively are used to measure the 
contribution of the manager to the performance of the fund. Thus, as before, a positive 
and statistically significant alpha indicates superior managerial performance of the 
fund, whereas negative values or statistically insignificant values represent inferior or 
neutral managerial performance. In their paper, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) assume 
that if a mutual fund is not engaged in market timing and maintains a constant fund 
beta, the relationship between the fund return and the return on the benchmark will be 
linear. However, if the fund is successful at market timing, the fund return will be 
higher than the benchmark return, and the relationship between the fund return and 
the return on the benchmark will be non-linear. Thus we can test for timing 
abilitýT by 
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testing for this nonlinearity. To do this, we include the square of the market return as 
an additional independent variable (with coefficient y ). A negative or zero 7 means 
that fund managers do not have market timing ability, whereas a positive 7 would 
imply that fund managers have market timing ability. 
The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
Ho :a <- 0, v<0 Fund managers have an inferior or neutral performance 
HI: a>0, v>0 Fund managers have a superior performance 
The model that will be used is the following: 
_p tv, t) V 
(k, 
l 
)2 
+ RNA V, Rf,, ) +A(R C. ,,, -Rb,, )+A(Rg, t 1 
where the P's and )/ are the coefficients measuring the sensitivity of each factor. 
RNAV,, t is the monthly excess NAV return for each sector and Rft is the return on 
one-month treasury bills. (Rs, t - 
Rb, 
t )is the size factor which is measured as the 
difference between the return on a small stocks index and the return on a large stocks 
index. (R 
g'I - 
Rv, 
t 
)is the book-to-market factor which is measured as the difference 
between the return on an index of high-book-to-market stocks (or growth stocks) and 
the return on an index of low-book-to- market stocks (or value stocks). The 
intercept, a, from regressing NAV excess returns on the market measures the 
contribution of the manager and )/ is the coefficient that measures market timing 
ability. 
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Table 46 surnmarises the results of Fama and French's (1993) extended three-factor 
model that includes the market timing ability variable for the UK. As before, we use a 
rolling methodology with 12,36,60 and 109 observations. The sample includes 16 
sectors of UK investment trusts with a total number of 120 funds. 
Table 46 Extended Fama and French's three-factor model of UK excess NAV return 
We use 12,36,60 and 109 observations by applying a rolling methodology. The sample 
includes 16 sectors of UK investment trusts with total number of 120 funds both alive and 
dead. 
AITC Category Coefficients ly 3Y 5Y 9Y 
Global Growth Adj R' 0.90 0.73 0.81 0.45 
a 2.53 -0.28 0.50 -0.15 
(1.44) (-0.34) (1.14) (-0.25) 
Market (A) 1.79 0.80 0.60 0.58 (12.68)** (10.74)** (6.7 8) ** (4.33)** 
8 Size ( ) 1* 36 0.82 0.35 0.49 ' 2 (3.41)** (2.27)* (3.45)** (3.21)** 
Book-to-market -1.21 0.01 0.02 0.42 
('83) (-1.67)* (0.07) (0.07) (1.77)* 
market timing 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
ability (y) (1.39) (1.96)* (3.07)** (-0.81) 
D/W 2.07 2.02 2.03 1.94 
Global Growth & Adj R2 0.85 0.72 0.83 0.55 
Income 
a 1.21 1.53 0.28 -0.20 
(1.44) (2.27)* (0.63) (-0.43) 
Market (A) 0.95 0.70 0.85 0.61 (7.99)** (6.00)** (12.72)** 
_(5.21)** 
Size (8 ) 0* 63 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 2 (3.5 2) (-0.43) (-1.14) (-0.13) 
Book-to-market 0.71 -0.35 -0.10 -0.18 
(183 ) (1.46) (-0.70) (-0.47) (-0.69) 
_ 
market timing 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
ability (y) (0.73) (-1.62) (0.41) 
(-0.50) 
2 D/W 2.07 2.00 2.00 2.0 
0 48 Global Smaller Adj R2 0.90 0.73 0.82 . 
anies Com p - 29 ) a 1.69 -0.89 0.47 . 
(0.79) (-0.70) (1.07) (-0.48) 
69 0 
Market (A) 1.70 (14.83)** 
1.16 
(8.3 5) 
0.61 
(6.7 9) 
. (4.2 1 jjýý 
8 Si e( 
) 1.28 0.23 0.36 0.49 ** ' z ' 2 (3.69) ** (1.03) (3.61)** ( ). 21) 
3 38 0 Book-to-market -1.18 -0.79 
0.0 . 
1 1 (-1.60) 1 
(- 1.7.2) * (0.14) (1.58) 
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ý3) 
market timing 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.00 ability (y) (1.48) (0.83) (2.9 7) ** (-0 26) . D/W 2.13 2.10 2.00 1.94 
h UK Growt Adj 0.92 ). 84 0.80 0.78 
a 0.55 0.65 0.68 0.24 
(0.30) (0.85) (1.50) (0.57) 
Market ()61) 0.60 0.67 0.84 0.82 
(2.6 9) ** (10.50)** (12.92)** (14.22)** 
Size 06 2) 0.17 0.68 0.01 0.83 
(2.61)** (5.84) ** (2.10)* (9.3 1)** 
Book-to-market -0.12 -0.61 -0.41 0.08 (A) (-1.18) (-1.51) (-1.27) (0.28) 
market timing 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
ability (y) (1.52) (0.44) (-0.77) (-0.68) 
D/W 2.03 1.95 2.02 2.02 
UK Growth & Income Adj R2 0.88 0.83 0.76 0.76 
a -0.03 0.76 0.34 0.42 
(-0.01) (1.02) (0.61) (0.95) 
Market 0.48 0.68 0.87 0.79 
(10.82)** (10.46)** (11.21)** (12.63)** 
Size 062 0.20 0.68 -0.11 0.82 
(2.19)* (5.7 9) (-1.04) (8.92)** 
Book-to-market -0.05 -0.65 -0.63 0.10 063) (-0.39) (-1.66)* (-1.83)* (0.37) 
market timing 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
ability (y) (1.55) (0.36) (-0.42) (-1.44) 
D/W 2.10 1.94 2.09 2.01 
UK Smaller Adj R2 0.89 0.84 0.71 0.78 
Companies 
a 0.36 0.81 1.35 0.23 
(0.17) (1.13) (2.00)* (0.55) 
Market ()61) 0.68 0.67 0.52 0.83 
(2.90)** (10.45)* (4.90)** (14.50)** 
Size (8 ) 0.10 0.70 0.64 0.84 2 (1.09) (6.21)** (5.46)** (9.3 2) ** 
Book-to-market -0.07 -0.66 -0.25 0.07 
(A) (-0.69) (-1.74)* (-1.80)* (0.27) 
- market timing 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
ability (y) (1.40) (0.14) (1.63) (-0.56) 
- D/W 2.12 1.97 2.04 2.03 
North America Adj R2 0.47 0.76 0.79 0.69 
- a -1.14 0.99 0.48 
0.64 
(-0.47) (1.53) (1.05) (1.77)* 
- Market 0.49 0.92 
0.95 0.77 
(4.19) ** (10-11)** 
- 
(14.82)** (9.5 3) 
Size 03 
) 0.59 0.34 0.01 0.44 
2 (2.46)* (2.14)* (1.04) (4.28)* 
Book-to-market 1.55 0.52 0.44 0.19 
(A) (1.73)* (1.52) (-2.30)* (1.01) 
market timing 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.00 
ability (y) (0.25) (3.94) (3.01)**_ _(-0.35) 
D/W 2.05 2.09 1.99 2.06 
North America 0.80 0.62 0.83 0.69 
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Smaller Companies 
- - a 2.84 1 06 0 63 0.80 
(1.35) (0.85) (1.41) (2.05)* 
Market (A) 0.31 0.76 0.86 0.71 (2.16)* (6.11)** (10.81)** (9.15) 
Size 
(, 82) 1.18 0.44 0.43 0.44 
___ 
(2.5 1)** (2.25)* (3.79)** (4.3 0) ** 
Book-to-market -0.96 -0.38 0.03 0.19 063) (-1.88)* (-1.64)* (0.13) (0.98) 
market timing -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 ability (y) (-0.85) (-1.22) (0.92) (4-139) 
D/W 2.04 2.01 1.97 2.06 
Far East (Including 2 Adj R 0.73 0.85- 0-77 0.54 
Japan) 
a 0.17 0.66 0.38 -0.80 (0.06) (0.84) (0.84) (-1.35) 
Market (A) 0.62 0.90 0.86 0.83 (2.44) ** (10.16)** (6.61)** (7.12)** 
Size 8 ( 2) 0.22 0.48 0.13 0.27 
(0.76) (3.71)** (2.5 2) ** (2.00)* 
Book-to-market 0.49 -0.09 -0.36 0.22 ('83) (0.90) (-0.26) (-1.64)* (0.79) 
market timing -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ability (y) (-1.40) (1.69)* (1.33) (0.83) 
D/W 1.96 2.08 2.09 2.05 
Far East (Excluding Adj R2 0.59 0.42 0.24 0.25 
Japan) 
a -2.34 0.70 1.14 -0.44 
(-0.63) (0.43) (0.84) (-0.55) 
Market (A) 0.12 0.76 0.61 0.37 (0.25) (4.3 8) ** (3.0 7) (3.5 6) ** 
Size 
(82) 
-0.46 -0.13 -0.28 -0.01 
(-0.45) (-0.40) (-0.75) (-1.12) 
Book-to-market 2.58 0.85 -0.13 0.46 
(183) (1.71)* (1.17) (-0.21) (-2.18)* 
market timing -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
ability (y) (-0.88) (0.14) (-0.27) (1.78)* 
D/W 2.00 2.04 1.94 1.94 
Japan Adj R2 0.55 0.74 0.77 0.53 
a 3.44 -0.68 0.29 -0.79 
(0.78) (-0.48) (0.41) (-1.33) 
Market (A) 0.86 1.16 1.18 
0.82 
(10.66)** (9.9 0) ** (15.39)** (17.19)** 
Size 
06 ) 1.58 0.33 0.34 0.27 
2 (1.28) (1.09) (2.08)* (2.0-3 W 
Book-to-market -2.46 -0.76 -0.54 
0.24 
(A) (-1.75)* (-1.66)* (-1.50) (0.89) 
market timing -0.05 0.01 -0.01 
0.01 
ability (y) (-0.65) (1.54) (-1.94)* 
(0.80) 
D/W 1.97 2.14 1.95 2.05 
Japanese Smaller Adj R2 0.89 0.76 0.65 
0.53 
Companies 
-- - a 1.78 ). 49 
(0.73) (0.35) (-0.17) (-1.33) 
0 82 
Market (A) 1 
1.67 1.26 0.93 . 
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(14.71)** (8.8 7) ** (6.40)** 17 19) 
- - . Size 8 
(1 
2) 
1.22 0.50 0.64 0.27 
(3.2 8) (2.93)** (2.91)** (2.03)* 
Book-to-market -1.46 -0.70 -0.32 0 24 063) (-1.80)* (-0.97) (-0.68) . (0.89) 
market timing 0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
ability (y) (1.19) (-0.10) (1.06) (0.80) 
D/W 1.95 1.97 1.96 2.05 
Europe Adj R2 0.56 0.78 0.75 0.41 
Cr 1.54 0.58 0.89 -0.37 (1.63) (0.99) (1.73)* (-0.71) 
Market (A) 0.60 0.72 0.82 0.71 (2.74)* (6.9 7) ** (9.4 3) ** (7.3 2) 
Size 062 0.35 0.17 0.03 0.14 
(0.72) (1.68)* (0.36) (0.83) 
Book-to-market -0.18 -0.02 -0.03 - 0.0 35 Oq3 ) (-0.25) (-0.08) (-0.13) (-0.12) 
market timing -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
ability (y) (-0.51) (0.26) (-0.78) (0.68) 
D/W 2.03 1.98 1.98 2.12 
European Smaller Adj R2 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.71 
Companies 
a 0.85 -0.28 0.39 -0.42 
(0.94) (-0.65) (1.30) (-0.93) 
Market (A) 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.83 (6.0 7) (11.38)** (13.03)** (8.49) 
Size 682 0.26 0.33 0.24 0.49 
(2.92) ** (3.3 1) (2.7 5) (3.6 6) 
Book-to-market 0.49 0.42 0.03 0.31 
(A) (0.71) (1.94)* (0.17) (1.35) 
market timing -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
ability (y) (-0.43) (0.95) (0.17) (-0.15) 
D/W 2.04 1.99 2.03 2.07 
Country Specialists Adj R2 0.80 0.86 0.79 0.54 
Far- East 
a 1.71 0.22 1.17 -0.80 
(2.02)* (0.29) (1.73)* (-1.35) 
Market (A) 0.93 0.90 0.94 
0.83 
** (7.3 7) (9.8 1)* (11.84)** (7.12) 
Size 68 0.64 0.37 -0.02 
0.27 
2 (3.22) ** (3.66)** (2.40)** (2.00)* 
Book-to-market 0.42 0.06 -0.07 0.22 
('83) (0.52) (0.56) (-0.90) (0.79) 
market timing -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
0.01 
ability (y) (-0.08) (1.34) (-0.05) 
(0.83)) 
D/W 2.01 2.09 2.06 2.05 
Sector Specialists Adj R2 0.74 0 0.33 0.69 
Property 
- 
a - 5.28 . 
21 121 0.99 0.78 
(1.94)* (0.98) (0.94) (1.99)* 
70 
Market (A) 0.69 (3.86)** 
0.78 
(5.66)** 
0.51 
(3.2 3) 
0. 
(9.09)** 
8 Size 
( ) 0.78 0.53 0.35 0.4 -3 ** ' 2 (2.81)**_ (2.62) ** , 
(2.04)* (4.19) 
. 
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Book-to-market -1.29 -0.40 -0.23 0 20 03 ) (-6.41)** (-1.74)* (-1.09) . (1.04) 
market timing -50-8 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 ability (y) (-2.04)* (-1.53) (0.16) (-0.41) 
D/W 2.07 2.10 208 2.03 
Total observations 1 12 - 109 
; ýouw%, u. allLIIUI %, amumuun 
* represents t -value that is statistically significant at 5% significance level 
** represents t-value that is statistically significant at 1% significance level 
The adjusted R squared for most AITC categories is higher than 0.50. There is no 
autocorrelation problem in the above regressions, as on average the Durbin/Watson 
statistic for each sector is close to 2.00. The results are mixed. Only seven out of the 
sixteen sectors show a positive and statistically significant market timing ability (y) at 
the 1% or 5% significance levels. These are: 
e Global Growth over three and five years 
* Global Smaller Companies over five years 
* North America over three and five years 
* Far East (Including Japan) over three years 
* Far East (Excluding Japan) over nine years 
9 Japan over five years 
* Sector Specialists Property over one year 
In addition and consistent with our previous results, seven out of the sixteen sectors 
display an a that is positive and statistically significant at the I% or 5% significance 
levels. These are: 
0 Global Growth and Income over three years 
* UK Smaller Companies over five years 
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* North America over nine years 
North America Smaller Companies over nine years 
e Europe over five years 
9 Country Specialists Far East over one and three years 
9 Sector pecial sts Property over one and nine year 
The mixed results provide a picture of semi-strong and strong form market efficiency 
in the UK through the various years. Efficiency is said to be semi-strong if today's 
prices reflect all available infonnation and strong if the available information (public 
and inside) is reflected in current shares or fund prices. The estimated coefficient of 
the market return, size and book-to market effects are qualitatively similar to those 
reported above for the Farna and French model. 
Table 47 summarises the results of Fama and French's (1993) extended three-factor 
model that includes the market timing ability variable for the US. 
Table 47 Extended Fama and French's three-factor model of US excess NAV return 
Table 47 shows the results of Farna and French (1993) extended three-factor model for the 
US. We use 12,36,60 and 109 observations by applying a rolling methodology. The sample 
includes 4 sectors of US closed-end funds with total number of 30 funds. 
CEFA Category Coefficients ly 3Y 5Y 9Y 
_Equity 
Income Adj R2 0.81 0.61 0.82 0.69 
a 2.70 1.15 0.69 0.79 
(1.30) (0.91) (1.54) (2.01)* 
Market 0.31 0.77 0.86 0.71 
(A) (2.41)** (6.14)** 
(10.62)** (9.15)** 
Size 8 
) ( 1*18 0.45 0.43 0.44 
2 
(2.65)** (2.3 1)* (3.77)** (4.26)** 
Book-to- -0.98 -0.36 
0.04 0.19 
market (-1.81)* (-1.63) (0.16) 
(1.01) 
('83) 
market -0.01 -0.01 
0.00 -0.00 
timing (-0.80) (-1.32) (0.93) -(-0. 
-39) 
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ability (y) 
D/W 2.09 1.97 1.96 2.05 
Global Equity Adj R' 0.90 0.85 0.71 0.78 
a -0.01 0.73 1.39 0.26 
(-0.00) (1.00) (2.16)* (0.61) 
Market 0.57 0.66 0.54 0.81 
(A) (2.3 5) (10.49)** (3.94) (13.85)** 
Size (82) 0.17 0.70 0.64 0.83 
(2.3 1)* (6.2 5) ** (5.3 6) * (9.2 9) 
Book-to- -0.09 -0.64 -0.24 0.08 
market (-0.87) (-1.63) (-1.63) (0.29) 
(A) 
market 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
timing (1.92)* (0.22) (0.93) (-0.81) 
ability (y) 
D/W 2.10 1.97 2.02 2.01 
Growth and Adj R2 0.90 0.75 0.63 0.53 
Income 
-0.01 0.85 -0.27 -0.86 
(-0.01) (0.68) (-0.29) (-1.46) 
Market 0.57 1.19 0.91 0.83 
(A) (2.3 5) ** (9.3 8) ** (6.3 9) (7.0 3) 
Size (8 0.17 0.45 0.64 0.27 2 (2.3 1)* (2.9 6) ** (2.8 6) ** (2.05)* 
Book-to- -0.01 -0.82 -0.37 0.20 
market (-0.87) (-1.43) (-0.78) (0.73) 
('83) 
market 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
timing (1.92)* (-0.42) (1.12) (0.85) 
ability (y) 
D/W 2.10 2.00 1.98 2.04 
Growth Domestic Adj R2 0.42 0.86 0.77 0.51 
a 1.49 0.20 1.40 -0.82 
(0.65) (0.26) (2.03)* (-1.41) 
Market 1.11 0.92 0.94 0.79 
('81 ) (2.5 4) (10.41)** (12.86)** (6.94) ** 
Size 06 
) 1.31 0.35 1.06 0.26 
2 (2.26 (3.62) (3.6 8) ** QN* (1.88) 
Book-to- -0.25 0.13 0.08 
0.30 
market (-0.16) (1.68)* (0.55) (1.18) 
(A) 
market 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
timing (1.91)* (1.18) (-1.04) (0.66) 
ability (y) 
D/W 1.98 2.00 1.98 1.98 
Total observations 12 36_ 
60 109 
Source: author calculation 
* represents t -value that is statistically significant at 
5% significance level 
represents t-value that is statistically significant at 1% significance 
level 
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In this case, the size effect is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels and 
market effect is significant at the I% level. Three out of four sectors (i. e. Global 
Equity, Growth and Income, and Growth Domestic) show a positive and statistically 
significant market timing performance (y) over the first 12 months, but not in the 
longer-term. The other results are all qualitatively similar to the Fama and French 
results reported above. In addition, the adjusted R squared for most categories of 
CEFA is higher than 0.50 and there is no autocorrelation problem in the above 
regressions as on average the Durbin/Watson statistic for each sector is close to 2.00. 
We have analysed if fund managers have market timing ability by extending Fama 
and French's (1993) three-factor model. The coefficient estimates obtained by 
applying the above model vary from sector to sector, but the most marked difference 
is between the UK, where there is evidence of market timing ability in the long run in 
some sectors and the US, where there is very limited evidence restricted to the first 
year. 
7.6 Performance persistence rank correlation analysis 
Mutual fund persistence is well documented in the finance literature. Wermers (1996) 
suggests that it is momentum that generates short-term persistence. Carhart (1997) 
argues that persistence of returns can be attributed mainly to the difference in 
expenses charged. Much of the remaining persistence is driven by the one-year 
momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In more detail, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) show that buying past winners and selling past 
losers generates 
significant profits when returns are measured over three to twelve-month periods. 
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They show, with NYSE and AMEX securities over the period 1965-1989, that a 
successful momentum strategy was buying the winners from the previous six months, 
(for example, the assets at the top of the rankings) and selling the losers from the 
previous six months. This shows that asset returns exhibit momentum, which means 
that the winners of the past continue to perform well and the losers of the past 
continue to perform badly. Fama and French (1993) stress that their model does not 
explain the short-term persistence of returns highlighted by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). Carhart (1997), on the other hand, suggests that performance persistence is 
due to the use of momentum strategies by the fund managers, rather than the 
managers being particularly skilful at picking winning stocks. 
Using our sample of 120 investment trusts funds, both alive and dead, and 30 US 
closed end funds, we test the hypothesis of managerial performance persistence and 
secondly, we test the hypothesis of discount persistence. Perfonnance is defined as 
gross managerial performance less expenses charged by managers. Funds are grouped 
into portfolios ranked on the level of past perfonnance and allocated to deciles. As 
before, past performance is measured over one, three five and nine year periods 
by 
using monthly data from 01/01/1990 to 01/01/2003. In the finance literature, the most 
frequent test that is used to test performance persistence is the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient. The method is to break down the distribution into percentile 
groups (say, deciles) based on past performance in order to be able to 
detect 
persistence among the selected groups through the subsequent years. 
A weakness of 
this methodology is that researchers arbitrarily choose as a 
benchmark the past 
performance that will be compared with subsequent years. Dimson and 
Minio- 
Kozerski (2001) found that there is managerial performance persistence 
during the 
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first two years of the life of the funds. Similarly, Allen and Tan (1999) used as a 
benchmark the first two-year period compared with the subsequent two-year period. 
Our approach is different in terms of the subsequent years. We test for short- and 
long-term persistence by using as a benchmark the first two years, measured as the 
average NAV return, and test for persistence over the first year, the first three years, 
the first five years and then the nine-year period starting at the fifth year. 
Tables 48 and 49 show the deciles and the Spearman rank correlation coefficients, 
together with t-tests for the UK and US respectively. Spean-nan rank correlation is a 
nonparametric test measuring the correlation between the ranks of the deciles over the 
subsequent performance periods. In other words, Spearman's rank correlation test 
checks for the existence, strength and direction of a relationship between two 
rankings. 
Table 48 Managerial performance persistence of the UK market 
Funds are ranked on past performance and grouped into portfolio over one, three five and 
nine years measured and allocated to deciles. Spearman rank correlation coefficients are also 
computed in SPSS between the value of each decile's average performance and its rank. The 
sample includes 120 UK Investment trusts over the period 1990-2003. 
Decile of Average NAV 
performance 
IY 3Y 5Y 
- 
9y 
I (Highest performance) -0.28 0.41 0.61 0.55 
2 -0.62 0.02 0.35 
0.15 
3 0.62 0.79 0.97 0.55 
4 1.14 0.90 0.99 0.48 
5 1.17 0.79 0.92 0.51 
6 1.13 0.94 0.85 0.48 
7 0.57 0.78 0.88 
- 
0.53 
8 1.33 1.33 1.92 0.56 
9 0.41 0.97 0.92 
- 
0.59 
I O(Lowest performance) 0.26 0.94 0.82 0.51 
S warman rank correlation test 
Correlation coefficient -0.24 -0.77** -0.26 -0.32 
Significance t-statistic 
Number of observations 
0.51 
12 
0.01 
36 
0.47 
_ 
60 
0.37 
133 
Source: author calculation 
"represents t -value that is statistically significant at 1% significance 
level 
represents t -value that is statistically significant at 5% significance 
level 
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From Table 48, we see that for the UK, all the correlation coefficients are wrong-signed, 
so there is no evidence of performance persistence. This lack of evidence of performance 
persistence in the UK contradicts Dimson and Minio-Kozerski's (2001) finding of 
short-term persistence in the UK market, and Gruber's (1996) findings of perfonnance 
persistence in US mutual funds. Gruber used the same methodology as ours. Funds were 
ranked and placed into deciles on the basis of past returns. His sample was free of 
survivorship bias and he used five years of data (1990-1994) to examine S&P 500 index 
funds and bond index funds. He found that all of the rank correlations were statistically 
significant at the I% significance level. 
Table 49 Managerial performance persistence of the US market 
Funds are ranked on past performance and grouped into portfolio over one, three, five and 
nine years measured and allocated to deciles. Spearman rank correlation coefficients are 
computed between the value of each decile's average performance and its rank. The sample 
includes 30 US closed-end funds over the period 1990-2003. 
_Decile 
of NAV performance ly 3Y 5Y 9y 
I (Highest performance) 2.01 0.96 1.10 -0.56 
2 0.09 0.00 0.26 -0.98 
3 1.13 0.59 0.63 -0.57 
4 0.66 0.33 0.41 -0.10 
5 0.55 0.49 0.62 -0.16 
6 0.01 0.24 0.63 -0.26 
7 0.25 -0.19 0.20 -0.29 
8 0.37 -0.26 0.04 -0.13 
9 -0.28 -0.14 -0.01 -0.42 
I O(Lowest performance) 1 1.16 0.29 0.34 -0.35 
Spe arman rank correlation test 
Correlation coefficient 0.31 0.61 0.64* -0.37 
Significance t-statistic 0.39 0.06 0.04 0.29 
Number of observations 12 36 60 
Source: author calculation 
"represents t -value that is statistically significant at I% significance level 
* represents t -value that is statistically significant at 5% significance level 
Our findings for the US market shown in Table 49 are consistent with Grinblatt and 
Titman (1992), Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavha (1993), and Elton, Gruber, Das, and 
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Blake (1996a). They document mutual fund return predictability over longer periods 
of five to ten years. In more detail, the rank correlation coefficients of 0.61 and 0.64 
show that the rankings of the deciles are Positively correlated over the three and five year 
periods. The correlation is much weaker over the one-year period (0.3 1) and negative 
over the nine-year period. Our results contradict Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
(1993), Goetzmann and lbbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and 
Wermers (1996) who find evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance in 
the US over relatively short- term horizons of one to three years. 
On the other hand, our evidence for the UK and the US provides only limited support 
for the Jegadeesh-Titman momentum hypothesis. In more detail, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) show that the strategies of buying past winners and selling past losers 
generate significant profits when returns are measured over three- to twelve-month 
periods. According to our results, past winners do not seem to do better than past 
losers. On the contrary, performance measured over one and three years by using 
monthly observations is characterized by a negative and insignificant rank correlation 
coefficient for the first year (-0.24) and a negative and significant rank correlation 
coefficient for the first three years (-0.77) in the UK investment trust market. In the 
US, there is only weak evidence of performance persistence in the short term. 
7.6.1 Discount persistence 
Discount persistence is investigated by using the same method as that employed 
in 
Carhart (1997) and Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (2001). The 120 funds for the 
UK 
and 30 funds for the US are allocated to deciles based on their discount levels. The 
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hypothesis that the discount persists over the life of the fund means that the small- 
discount portfolio (Decile 1) should show a low discount or premium in subsequent 
time periods. We test for short and long-term persistence by using as a benchmark the 
average discount in the first two years. 
Table 50 shows the results of discount persistence in the UK market. Funds are 
ranked based on the discount and, as before, grouped into portfolios over one, three, 
five and nine years. 
Table 50 Discount persistence of the UK market 
Funds are ranked based on their discount level and grouped into portfolios over one, three, 
five and nine years measured and allocated to deciles. Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
are also computed in SPSS between the value of each decile's average performance and its 
rank. The sample includes 120 UK Investment trusts over the period 1990-2003. 
Decile of average discount ly 3Y 5Y 9y 
I (Largest Premium) 19.90 25.73 11.86 3.91 
2 -4.50 -4.31 -4.56 -7.19 
3 -11.89 -8.70 -7.94 -8.30 
4 -7.21 -5.29 -5.40 -8.78 
5 -12.50 -8.82 -7.98 -9.64 
6 -13.88 -9.24 -9.49 -12.30 
7 -17.11 -14.02 -13.32 -13-12 
8 -19.72 -15.43 -12.88 -14.07 
9 -17.82 -11.28 -9.54 -10.53 
I O(Largest discount) -27.36 -20.03 -4.96 -9.46 
Spearman rank correlation test 
Correlation coefficient 0.98** 0.95** 0.60 0.75** 
Significance t-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 
Number of observations 12 36 60 133 
Source: author calculation 
"represents t -value that is statistically significant at 1% significance level 
* represents t -value that is statistically significant at 5% significance level 
According to Table 50, the rank correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level 
in the first year, the first three years and for the nine-year period, which implies that 
there is momentum during the first year and a long-run trend over the three- and nine- 
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year periods. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Chapter 6, which 
showed the UK discount to be autocorrelated and non-stationary. 
Table 51 shows the results of discount persistence in the US market. Funds are ranked 
based on the discount and, as before, grouped into portfolios over one, three, five and 
nine years and allocated to deciles. 
Table 51 Discount persistence of the US market 
Funds are ranked based on their discount level and grouped into portfolio over one, three, five 
and nine years measured and allocated to deciles. Spearman rank correlation coefficients are 
computed between the value of each decile's average performance and its rank. The sample 
includes 30 US closed-end funds over the period 1990-2003. 
Decile of average discount ly 3Y 5Y 9y 
I (Largest Premiwn) 3.82 0.36 4.82 1.39 
2 7.69 5.34 4.30 1.61 
3 1.75 1.02 -1.48 -0.60 
4 -3.28 -7.35 -8.44 -6.88 
5 -0.69 -5.42 -7.95 -8.14 
6 -5.28 -6.04 -7.97 -10.03 
7 -2.94 -4.87 -7.30 -8.23 
8 -8.94 -10.67 -11.98 -11.01 
9 -9.51 -10.73 -12.86 -12.18 
I O(Largest Discount) -16.34 -16.55 -15.67 -13.32 __ Spearman rank correlation test 
Correlation coefficient 0.93** 0.86** 0.89** 0.98** 
Significance t-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of observations 12 36 60 133 
Source: author calculation 
"represents t -value that is statistically significant at I% significance level 
* represents t -value that is statistically significant at 5% significance level 
Table 51 shows that the rank correlation coefficients are positive and significant for 
all periods, a result that is consistent with our finding in Chapter 6 that the discount is 
autocorrelated and non-stationary. 
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7.7 Empirical assessment of the performance of UK "dead" funds 
This section is of interest to investors, as it investigates how a "dead" fund behaves 
before liquidation, takeover or unitisation. The UK investment trust industry has gone 
through intense changes and restructuring. There have been several departures from 
the industry. Datastrearn provides data for 30 ftinds that disappeared between 1990 
and 2003 for the sixteen sectors selected in this study. This section investigates the 
performance of these funds during the months preceding their disappearance. 
Takeovers, liquidations and unitisations are referred to as open-ending. 
The first characterisation of the funds that have disappeared is to measure their 
average discount and average performance in terms of NAV during the last five years 
of trading. We define the average discount as the difference of the price to NAV 
ratio across the 30 UK "dead" funds. Figure II shows the results. 
The funds seem to have traded at a large discount, an average of more than 20 per 
cent during the last years of trading. The discount disappears when the fund is open- 
ended. During the last year of trading the discount gradually moves towards zero, 
particularly during the last 6 months of trading. Table 52 summarises the average 
discount and managerial performance of the 30 UK "dead" funds over their last five 
years. 
Figure 11 average discount and average NAV before open-ending. 
The graph shows the average discount and NAV performance of 30 "dead" 
funds before 
open-ending. The average discount during the 60 observation or 5 years preceding open- 
ending is measured as the difference of the price to NAV ratio across the 30 UK 
"dead" funds 
that disappeared during the period from January 1990 to January 2003. NAV performance 
is 
measured as the ratio of the difference between the return of the succeeding and preceding 
return 
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Source: Author's calculation based on data obtained from Datastream. 
Table 52 Average discount and managerial performance of 30 UK "dead" funds 
Table 52 shows the results of average discount and managerial performance of 30 UK "dead" 
funds. We use 60 monthly observations or the last five years of the life of each fund in order 
to investigate the characteristics before open-ending or unitisation, liquidation and merging. 
The sample includes 30 UK dead funds from various sectors. 
Fund Type Management Group Average Discount Average NAV 
JUREUROPEAN DELISTED Jupiter -34.80 1.50 
20/11/00 
SIAM SELECTIVE GW. Management -17.44 -2.15 
DELISTED 23/07/01 International (Guernsey) 
THORNTON ASIAN EMRG. Thornton Asset -13.27 -0.60 
'DELISTED 26/03/97' Management 
JUREXTRA INC. DELISTED Jupiter -16.32 0.58 
28/09/00 
JUP. INTL. GREEN DELISTED Jupiter -30.22 0.63 
19/03/01 
FLEMING INTL. DELISTED Jupiter -13.67 0.68 
31/10/96 
HENDERSON AMERICAN Henderson Investors -27.56 1.11 
CAP. DELISTED 26/02/99 
BARING STRATTON Baring Private -17.32 0.83 
UNITISED 05/05/98 
USDC INV. TST. DEAD - Wellington -15.94 
0.99 
CONVERTED 
_ GERMAN INV. TST. DOE Hill Samuel -17.73 
0.58 
ACQ. BY 926246 
JF JAPAN OTC DELISTED Jardine Fleming -10.54 -1.10 
27/07/98 
CHARTER EUROPEAN Charter Asset -41.07 
0.02 
DELISTED 22/04/02 Management 
GENERAL CONS. CAP. Henderson Investors -34.78 
1.43 
DELISTED 06/01/98 
MCIT CAPITAL IT. Martin Currie -34.51 
1.79 
DELISTED 25/06/98 
LGROUP TRUST DELISTED Legal and General -16.15 
0.25 
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17/08/01 Ventures 
TURKEY TRUST DELISTED 
25/11/99 
Henderson Investors -13.80 -0.08 
BRITISH fNV. TRUST DEAD - 
19/05/97 
Edinburgh Fund 
Managers -23.96 -0.04 
SCHRODER 
MEDITERRANEAN 
DELISTED 06/08/96 
Schroder -15.60 0.58 
TRIO TRUST DEAD 12/1/93 Henderson Investors -26.55 0.67 
BRIT. AM. &GENERAL Ivory and Sime -12.84 -1.20 SPHERE INC. & RESI. CAP Glasgow Investment 
Managers -19.14 
0.08 
PACIFIC PROPERTY Ivory and Sime -40.79 -0.15 
RADIOTRUST Lombard Odier -19.20 0.08 
GARTMORE AMERICAN 
SECS. 
Gartmore -15.90 -0.17 
GARTMORE EMRG. PACIFIC 
DELISTED 04/10/99 
Gartmore -12.86 -1.37 
FIRST PHILIPPINE 26/06/97 Jupiter -16.93 -0.34 
THROGMORTON USM Framlington -15.42 -0.49 
TR TECHNOLOGY. 
DELISTED 22/10/99 
Henderson Investors -58.14 -1.59 
PARIBAS FRENCH INV. 
DEAD - 31/08/97 
Paribas -10.83 0.88 
GART. VALUE ORD. Gartmore 
1 
-15.60 
1 
0.78 
Total 1 30 1 -21.96 0.14 
Source: Datastream University of Piraeus, Athens, Greece. 
The results show that during the last five years of trading, funds that open-ended are 
characterized by a wide discount and poor NAV performance. In more detail, 
according to Table 52, TR Technology, delisted 22/10/99, showed the widest discount 
of -58.14 and poor performance of -1-59 under Henderson Investors management 
group. Similarly, Pacific Property showed a large average discount of -40.79 and 
negative performance of -0.15 under the Ivory and Sime management group 
(see 
appendix A for a detailed list of the management groups). From the overall sample of 
30 dead funds, average investors will hold a fund with an average discount of -21.96. 
Moreover, the analysis identifies 5 groups (Henderson investors, Ivory and 
Sime, 
Charter Asset Management, Jupiter, and Martin Currie) as the least successful 
managers. The average discount of the funds under management 
is significantly 
higher than the discount of the industry. The question that arises is: does the 
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management group tend to affect the discount or can other factors explain this 
persistence. The evidence suggests that future research should focus on the 
management group and analyse the factors and problems that lead to open-ending. 
possibility would be to investigate the management contracts and the management 
ownership structure. 
The performance of the sample of "dead" funds suggests that funds disappear after 
periods of poor NAV performance and wide discounts. At open-ending, we find 
evidence that share prices increase toward NAV. Future research could also attempt to 
identify the benchmark that managers actually aim to beat when they are in a critical 
positions, for example during a merger. 
7.8 Conclusion 
By estimating Fama and French's three-factor model and the extended version to 
include the market timing ability variable from Treynor and Mazuy, we can conclude 
that for both the UK and the US the results are mixed and therefore managerial 
performance is a factor that needs more investigation. We find evidence of managerial 
performance persistence, but only for some sectors over certain time periods in both 
the UK and the US. 
By using rank correlation analysis, we find no evidence of performance persistence in 
the UK. Our findings for the US market are consistent with Grinblatt and Titman 
(1992), Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavha (1993), and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Blake 
996a). They document mutual fund return predictability over longer horizons 
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periods of five to ten years. In more detail, rank correlation coefficients of 0.61 and 0.64 
for the US market show that the ranking of the deciles are positively strongly correlated 
during the first three and the first five years. On the other hand, in terms of discount 
persistence when funds are ranked on discount levels, measured over one, three, five 
and nine years and allocated to deciles the bottom performing portfolios tend to be 
characterised by larger discounts. In both the UK and the US markets, all the 
correlation coefficients are positive and significant. 
Finally, we assess the performance of UK "dead" funds and the results show that 
during the last five years of trading, funds that open-ended, merged or unitised were 
characterized by a wide discount and poor NAV performance. 
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Chapter 8 
Determination of the excess discount return 
8.1 Introduction 
After analysing the time-series properties and related problems of the discount and 
excess discount return in Chapter 6 and finding some evidence of managerial 
performance persistence in some sectors in Chapter 7, we attempt in this chapter to 
extend Fama and French's three-factor model to explain the fluctuations of the excess 
discount return in the UK and the US. We first take into account market risk, small 
firm risk and book-to-market risk. Then an attempt is made to explain the excess 
discount return by introducing additional factors, such as momentum, noise-trader 
sentiment and expenses. 
Dimson and Minio-Paluello (2002) extended Fama and French's (1993) three-factor 
model by including management performance (measured as the difference between the 
fund's NAV return in excess of the mean NAV performance for the sector). A sector 
factor (measured using equally-weighted changes in the discount where they included 
all the funds in a sector except the fund of interest), and a mean-reversion factor 
(defined as the difference between the mean discount for the sector and the fund's 
discount). However, they did not include an analysis of the time-series properties of 
their dependent and independent variables in terms of stationarity, normality and 
Multicollinearity. Their sample consisted of 244 UK investment trusts 
during the 
period January 1980 to March 1997. The results indicated that their multi-factor model 
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explained on average 35% of the month-to-month changes in the discount of UK 
investment trusts. 
The superiority of the study presented in this chapter is that it also includes the US 
market for comparison and uses other factors to explain the excess discount return. In 
addition, we investigate in detail the time-series properties of the UK and US excess 
discount return and related independent variables. We find that the Guirguis six-factor 
model explains 67% of the variation of the excess discount return in the UK market 
and 66% of the variation in the US market. 
8.2 Explanation of factor selection 
The most common approach for choosing factors that affect stock returns are firm 
sPecific attributes. As we have seen, a well-known model is the three-factor model of 
Fama and French (1993). Fama and French group common stocks according to their 
size and their ratios of book-to-market value. 
From the standpoint of both the academic researcher and practitioner, it is crucial to 
be able to identify which factors best capture stock return variation and specifically 
the discount variation. As a result, there has been a proliferation of research that 
attempts to identify the various factors. The importance of market risk, book-to- 
market risk and small firm risk in explaining cross-sectional differences in stock 
returns is discussed in Fama and French (1993). Carhart (1997) adds a fourth 
factor to these three risk measures, which is based on the results of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), that mutual funds are affected by momentum, namely that past 
winners will continue to be next winners the following year and past losers will 
continue to be losers. In other words, a finn's past return helps to predict future 
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returns (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996; Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter, 
1992; DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein, 1984). We found 
some evidence for this managerial performance persistence in our empirical studies 
reported in Chapter 7. Momentum creates the suspicion that management 
performance might influence the discount return. Momentum is defined as the 
difference between a fund's NAV return and the sector's average NAV return 
(RNAVfd - RNAV,, ). Past performance is measured over the full history of the funds. 
We test the momentum anomaly documented in Carhart's four-factor model. 
We add two more factors to these four risk measures. The first one is based on the 
results of Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) that closed-end funds are subject to 
systematic "investor sentiment risk". In more detail, one possible explanation for 
variations in the discount is based on the existence of two categories of investors. The 
first category includes rational investors, namely arbitrageurs, who make rational 
decisions in accordance with their preferences. The second category includes the so- 
called noise traders. These investors do not act fully rationally, and their investment 
decisions are considered as unpredictable. In some periods they overestimate expected 
returns relative to the rational expectations and in other periods they underestimate 
them. Therefore, prices of securities are a function of both categories. 
The interaction of these two categories of investors may help to explain the variation 
of the discount. For arbitrageurs to buy funds that are characterized by a constant 
discount would be costly and, therefore not always profitable. In more 
detail, if 
investment trusts trade at a discount and then at a premium to NAV, an apparent 
arbitrage profit can be realised by selling the fund's share above the risk 
free rate. 
I ()() 
However, if the discount stays relatively constant over the investment horizon, the 
arbitrageurs make no profit. According to the descriptive statistics presented in 
Chapter 5, there is a wide range between the lower and upper bounds of the discount 
in each AITC and CEFA category, which suggests that there is active interaction 
between both parties. This active interaction can be measured quantitatively by using 
as proxies the retail flows of each sector or by using an investor sentiment index. 
The retail flow measure was first used by Malkiel (1977) to measure general investor 
sentiment regarding investment -companies. According to him "when individuals were 
showing little enthusiasm for open-end funds, it is probable that they showed a similar 
lack of enthusiasm for closed- end funds" (Malkiel, 1977, p. 856). The relationship 
between changes in fund discounts and net redemptions of open-end funds can be 
seen in Figure 12. 
Fil! ure 12 : Relationship between chan-2es in fund discounts and net redemptions 
P 
PA 
Q 
Closed-end funds Open-end funds 
Source: Malkiel (1977), the valuation of closed-end investment company shares 
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Sales Flow 
D 
In Figure 12, according to Malkiel (1977), " So is the supply curve of open-end funds, 
which is infinitely elastic because open-end funds will sell as many new shares or 
redeem outstanding ones at net asset value (PA). The suPply curve for the closed-end 
funds (Sc) is perfectly inelastic as there is a fixed supply of shares. Shifts in the 
demand curve for open-end shares will result in changes in the quantity of shares 
outstanding or net sales" (Malkiel, 1977, p. 856). Shifts in the demand curve for 
closed-end funds will result in changes in fund discounts or premiums. In a perfect 
market, demand shifts will not change the level of the discount but due to the 
interactions of noise and rational traders, we expect net sales of open-end funds to be 
associated with changes in the discount. Malkiel (1977) found that an increase in net 
sales of open-end funds was associated with an increase in the average discount, but 
the coefficients were not significant. The problem with his study was that he only 
used 24 US closed-end funds and not all companies could be included in his cross- 
sectional regression because of missing data. So the explanatory power of his model 
was weak. 
On the other hand, Gemmill and Thomas (2002) conducted a more detailed analysis to 
find out whether investor sentiment could explain fluctuations in the discount. They 
found that monthly flows of retail investment into particular sectors were closely 
related to changes in sector discounts. According to their findings investor sentiment 
not only affects the discount in the short-term but may also influence its 
level over 
periods of several years. They investigated II UK sectors, which consisted of 
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closed-end equity funds. 
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The second additional factor is management expenses. Malkiel (1977) defines 
management expenses as a percentage of fund assets. The problem is that the ratio of 
expenses to cash flow is not constant over the life of a fund. As the long-term expense 
to cash flow ratio is not observable, it can be proxied by current monthly expenses as 
a percentage of fund assets. In this chapter, we define expenses as the monthly 
management charge (or staff costs), auditors and custody fees, directors fees and 
mar eting costs as a percentage of fund assets. We test two contradictory hypotheses. 
The first one is Barclay, Holdemess and Pontiff s (1995) view that a possible 
explanation -of the discount is that as managers try to protect their private benefits, 
expenses increase over the long term and have an effect on the discount. The second 
one is Malkiel (1977) who claims that an expense ratio will not be significant due to 
the difficulty of measuring it accurately. The ratio of expenses to cash flow is not 
constant over the life of a fund. 
As in Chapter 7, the market factor is the difference between the return on the relevant 
index and one-month risk-free rate. The UK size effect is measured as the difference 
between the return on the FTSE Smaller Companies index and the return on the FTSE 
100 index. The FTSE 100 is used as a proxy for the return on large companies. The 
size effect is used to test the anomaly documented in Farna and French's three-factor 
model. The UK book-to-market effect is measured as the difference between the 
return on the FTSE 350 Growth index and the return on the FTSE 350 Value index. 
The US size effect is measured as the difference between the return on S&P Small 
Cap and the return on the S&P 500 Composite as it is used as a proxy 
for the return 
on large companies. The US book-to-market effect is measured as the 
difference 
1 IýQ 
between the return on the S&P 500/Barra Growth index and the return on the S&P 
500/Barra Value index. 
8.3 Data, sample description and independent variables 
As in Chapter 7, this study focuses on a large number of UK investment trusts with 
the exception of funds that invest in unquoted securities, venture and development, 
private equity, specialist funds, emerging market funds, hedge funds, and split capital 
trusts. The purpose of excluding unquoted securities is justified by the argument if a 
significant proportion of investments held are unquoted, there will be some 
uncertainty as to the true value of underlying assets namely NAV. This leaves us with 
16 sectors with a total number of 90 funds. On the other hand, we investigate 4 
categories of US closed end funds with a total number of 30 funds. 
The different categories of funds, the total number of funds, and average discount by 
category are described in Tables I and 2 (see Chapter 5). In addition, Tables 9 and 10 
detail the funds in the UK and US. We use a full data set with no missing data 
between the periods of January 1990 to January 2003. See Chapter 5 for the definition 
of the discount, index and NAV monthly returns. 
The overall sample covers 120 different funds for both UK and US. Table 
71 and 72 
detail the individual fund by category and their management groups (see appendix 
A) 
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8.3.1 Tests for non- stationarity and multicollinearity 
In the models estimated in this chapter, the dependent variable is the excess discount 
return, which was shown to be stationary in Chapter 6. The independent variables 
used are the excess market return, size, the book-to-market effect, rnomenturn,, 
sentiment (proxied first by retail flows and secondly by an investor sentiment index) 
and expenses. The investor sentiment index was available for the US market only and 
for a smaller sample. Descriptive statistics for the first three of these variables were 
presented in Chapter 7, where the variables were also shown to be stationary. 
Descriptive statistics for the remaining three independent variables (four for the US) 
are shown in Tables 53 and 54. ADF unit root tests were also performed on these 
variables and the results are surnmarised in Tables 55 and 56 for the UK and the US 
respectively. 
Table 53 Descriptive statistics of the UK independent variables 
The abbreviations used are the following: (RNAVfd -RNAVse) is momentum, (Flowt - 
Flowt -1) 
is sentiment and Exp, is expenses. We use monthly data from January 1990 to 
January 2003. 
(RNAVfd - 
RNAV,, 
(Flowt- 
Flow, 
-, 
) 
Exp, 
Mean -0.19 -1.14 5.74 
Standard 
Deviation 0.37 4.23 0.84 
Kurtosis 4.46 14.94 -0.90 
Skewness -0.46 -0.74 -0.56 
Range 3.09 27.08 3.24 
Minimum -1.57 -24.15 3.66 
Maximum_ 1.52 2.93 6.90 
Source: calculated by the author 
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Table 54 Descriptive statistics of the US independent variables 
The abbreviations used are the following: (RNAVfd - RNAVse) is momentum, (Flowt - Flowti) is retail flow used as a sentiment proxy and Exp, is expenses. We use monthly data 
from January 1990 to January 2003. ISI is an investor sentiment index. It is measured by 
using monthly data from October 1996 to January 2003. 
(RNAVfd, - 
RNAVse) 
(Flow, - 
Flow, 
-, 
) 
(ISIt) Exp, 
Mean 0.09 0.17 5.77 3.86 
Standard 
Deviation 1.46 1.09 1.28 0.86 
Kurtosis 26.45 31.49 6.38 -1.12 
Skewness 1.29 0.46 0.70 0.42 
Range 15.3 12.30 1.94 2.71 
Minimum -3.51 -3.22 -1.61 2.70 
Maximum 11.84 9.08 25.42 1 5.41 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 55 ADF tests of UK independent variables 
(RNAVfd - RNAV,,, ) is momentum, (Flow, - Flowt -1) 
is the change in retail flows used as a 
sentiment proxy and Exp is expenses. 
We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
Variable 
ADF- 
statistic 
(RNAVfd - RNAVse) -5.37** 
(Flowt - Flow, -, 
) -4.90** 
Exp -6.15 ** 
Source: calculated by the author 
Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 56 ADF tests of US independent variables 
(RNAVfd - RNAV,, ) is momentum, (Flow, - Flow, -1) 
is the change in retail flows used as a 
sentiment proxy, and Exp is expenses. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 
2003. ISI is an investor sentiment index. It is measured by using monthly data from October 
1996 to January 2003. 
Variable ADF-statistic 
(RNAVfd - 
RNAVse) 
-3.83 
(Flowt- Flowt -1) -7.64** 
(ISI) -4.42** 
Exp -6.88** 
Source: calculated by the author 
Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level 
From the ADF unit root tests reported in Tables 55 and 5 6, it is clear that, for the UK 
and the US all independent variables are 1(0) at the 1% significance level and 
therefore stationary. Since all variables are stationary, standard OLS regression may 
be used. 
As we saw in Chapter 7, multicollinearity refers to the case in which two or more 
explanatory variables in the regression model are highly correlated, making it difficult 
or impossible to isolate their individual effects on the dependent variable. To test for 
multicollinearity, we construct correlation matrices and compute variance-inflation 
factors. 
Table 57 and 58 show the correlation matrices for the full set of independent variables 
used in the UK and US models respectively. 
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Table 57 Correlation matrix of UK independent variables 
The abbreviations used are the following: 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, 
(Rs - Rj is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect, (RNAVfd - RNAVse) is 
momentum, (Flowt - Flowt -1) 
is the change in retail flows used as a sentiment proxy, and Exp 
is expenses. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
(R 
-Rf) m 
(R 
- Rj s 
(R", 
- Rj 
(RNAVfd 
- 
RNAV,, ) 
(Flow, - 
Flow, 
-, ) Exp, -TRm --RfT 
1 
_ 
-(R Rh) 0.14 1 
- FRg -R, 
-0.04 0.03 1 
(RNAVfd - 
RNAVse) 0.05 -0.09 -0.14 1 
(Flow, - 
Flowt -1) 
0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 1 
Exp -0.03 0.15 1 0.11 1 0.15 -0.05 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 58 Correlation matrix of US independent variables 
The abbreviations used are the following: 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, 
(R,, 
- Rb 
)is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect, (RNAVfd - RNAVs,, ) 
is 
momentum, (Flowt - Flow, -1) 
is the change in retail flows used as a sentiment proxy, and Exp 
is expenses. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003 
(Rm Rf (R,, Rb) (Rg - Rj 
(RNAVfd 
RNAVse) 
(Flow, - 
low, Flow, -1) 
Exp, 
(Rm 
- Rf 
T- 
1 
(R,, 
- 
Rb 
0.01 1 
(Rg 
- R, -0.04 -0.33 1 
(RNAVf d- 
RNAV ) 03 0 0.03 -0.17 1 se . (Flow, - 
) Flow 02 0 0.07 0.00 -0.35 t -1 . LE-xp -0.09 L -0.00 
0.02 0.02 -0.06 , 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 59 shows correlation matrix between the independent variables of 
the different 
categories of US closed-end funds for the second version of the 
Guirguis six-factor 
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model, which includes the investor sentiment index as an alternative indicator of 
sentiment. 
Table 59 Correlation matrix of US independent variables of Guirguis 11 six- factor 
model 
The table shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables. The abbreviations used 
are the following: 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, (R,, - Rb) is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect, (RNAVfd - RNAV,,, ) is momentum, (ISI ) is 
sentiment proxied by investor sentiment index, and Exp is expenses. We use monthly data 
from October 1996 to January 2003. 
(Rm-Rf) (R,, 
- 
Rb (Rg 
- RJ 
(RNAVfd 
RNAVse) 
isit Exp, 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) 
1 
(Rs, 
- 
Rb ) 
--0.46 (Rg 
- Rj -0.02 0.17 1 
(RNAVfd- 
RNAVse) 0.21 -0.16 -0.21 1 
(ISI) -0.23 0.13 0.07 0.02 1 
Exp 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.16 -0.07 
Source: calculated by the author 
According to Tables 57 to 59, none of the correlation coefficients is greater than 0.5 
and therefore the independent variables are not strongly correlated. 
Another measure to detect multicollinearity is the variance-inflation factor (VIF), 
defined in Chapter 7. Table 60 surnmarises the results for the UK and Tables 61 and 
62 surnmarise the results for the two US models. 
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Table 60 VIF results of the UK independent variables 
The abbreviations used are the following: (Rm - Rf 
) is the excess market return for UK, 
(Rs 
- Rj is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect, (RNAVfd - RNAVse) is 
momentum, (Flowt - Flowt -1) 
is change in retail flows used as a sentiment proxy, and Exp is 
expenses. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. 
(R 
-Rf) M, 
(R 
- Rj s 
(R 
-R 9 
(RNAVfl - 
RNAVs,, ) 
(Flowt - 
Flow, 
-1) Exp VIF 1.64 1.18 1.13 1.21 1.04 1.23 
zsource: caicutatec oy tne auttior 
Table 61 VIF results of the US independent variables (model I 
The abbreviations used are the following: 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for US, 
(Rs 
- Rj is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- Rj is the book-to-market effect, (RNAVfd - RNAVse, ) is 
momentum, (Flowt - Flow, -, 
) is the change in retail flows used as a sentiment proxy, and Exp 
is expenses. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003 
(R 
-Rf) m 
(R 
-R sb 
(Rg 
- Rj 
(RNAVfd 
RNAVse) 
(Flowt - 
Flow, 
-1) 
Expt 
VIF 1.02 1.26 1.38 1.45 1.35 1.03 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 62 VIEF results of the US independent variables (model H) 
The abbreviations used are the following: 
(Rm 
- Rf 
) is the excess market return for US, 
(Rs 
- Rb 
)is the size effect, 
(Rg 
- R, 
)is the book-to-market effect, (RNAVfd - RNAV,, ) is 
momentum, (ISI) is sentiment proxied by investor sentiment index, and Exp is expenses. We 
use monthly data from October 1996 to January 2003. 
(R 
-Rf) m 
(R 
-R sb 
(Rg 
- Rj 
(RNAVfd 
RNAVse) 
isi 
Exp 
VIF 1.42 1.32 1.10 1.15 1.67 1.63 
Source: calculated by the author 
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it is clear from the above tables that all the independent variables show a VIF less 
than 2, which is a sign that there is no multicollinearity. 
8.4 Analysis and results 
We begin this section by investigating the importance of Fama and French's three 
factors in explaining discount changes for UK investment trusts and US closed-end 
funds. The results show that the factors in terms of the market, size and the book-to- 
market effect cannot fully explain discount changes. We then introduce additional 
factors for the analysis of the excess discount return in terms of momentum, sentiment 
and expenses. 
From the theory, and for consistency with the CAPM and the Fama and French and 
Carhart models, we expect to find positive values for the coefficients of the market 
return and size, and negative values for the book-to-market effect and momentum. For 
consistency with Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), discussed above, we expect 
sentiment to have a positive coefficient. And following Barclay, Holderness and 
Pontiff s (1995) view, we expect expenses to have a negative coeffilcientý though if 
Malkiel (1977) is correct (see above), the expenses variable will be insignificant. 
8.4.1 Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model 
Fama and French (1993) show the importance of market risk, small firm and book-to- 
market risk in explaining cross-sectional differences in stock returns. The 
famous 
model of Fama and French (1993) was constructed and implemented on various 
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portfolios of shares to explain various anomalies in financial markets in terms of size. 
book/market ratio etc. Equation (18) enables us to test the significance of these three 
factors in relation to the excess discount return. We use the excess discount return 
because changes in the discount can be interpreted as returns, and the discount was 
shown in Chapter 6 to be non-stationary. 
d, :: =a +A(Rnl, t - Rf, t) +, 82(R.,, - 
Rb, 
t 
) +A(Rg, t - 
Rv,, ) + es', (18) 
where: d, is the excess discount return for each sector at time t 
(Rm', 
- Rf I) 
is the excess market return 
(Rs, 
t - 
R, 
'j 
is the size factor (small minus big), i. e the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks. 
(Rg'I 
- R,,, 
) is the book to market factor (high minus low), i. e the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market 
stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to- market stocks 
c, is the distrurbance tenn 
We test the significance of the estimated coefficients using t-statistics and F-tests. We 
also use the Durbin/Watson statistic to check for autocorrelation. The estimation 
results are shown in Table 63 for the UK and Table 64 for the US. 
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Table 63 Fama and French's three-factor model of the UK excess discount return 
The regressions y sector are estimated over the period January 1990 to January 2003 by 
using monthly observations. The sample covers 90 funds for UK investment trusts. The t- 
statistic for each factor is displayed in parentheses. in addition, we provide tests of 
autocorrelation. 
Factor I Fýc: tor 2 : ti ! or Factor 3 C 
Fund Name -by D/W F-Ratio Adjusted Market Size Book to market 0 
AITC category 
2 R RR 
M, t (R S'l -R I b, t (R R -R I V'I g, 
Global Growth 2.07 30.43 0.36 0.26 0.16 -0.36 (7.22)** (4.41)** (-2.65)** 
Global Growth & 2.01 37.52 0.41 0.34 0.11 -0.36 Income 
- -- ' 
(3.19) (2.30)* (-2.52)** 
alSimýaller GOb 1.94 47.17 0.47 0.41 0.07 -0.40 
Companies (7.24)** (1.78)* (-3.23)** 
UK Growth 2.05 40.40 0.43 0.28 0.15 -0.41 
(3.01)** (3.5 2) ** (-3.05)** 
UK Growth & 1.97 62.85 0.54 0.44 0.11 -0.33 
Income (9.92) (3.0 3) ** (-2.64)** 
UK Smaller 1.97 49.72 0.49 0.41 0.14 -0.25 
Companies (5.5 4) (3.3 2) ** (-1.77)* 
North America 2.06 35.43 0.40 0.46 0.10 -0.31 
(8.0 8) (1.79)* (-1.88)* 
North America 2.07 25.75 0.32 0.26 0.13 -0.64 
Smaller Companies (2.24)* (2.5 4) (-3.43)** 
Far East (Including 2.06 45.77 0.46 0.39 0.14 -0.21 
Japan) (4.0 5) (3.18) (-1.51) 
Far East (Excluding 2.02 24.33 0.31 0.27 0.14 -0.24 
Japan) (7.3 1) (3.0 7) (-1.41) 
Japanese Smaller 2.03 34.57 0.39 0.30 0.11 -0.43 
Companies (3.23)** (2.19)* (-2.78)* 
Japan 1.95 46.12 0.47 0.40 0.15 -0.27 
(5.5 8) ** (3.5 2) (-1.92)* 
Europe 2.03 49.67 0.49 0.36 0.12 -0.40 
(3.4 7) ** (2.55)* (-2.84)** 
Country Specialists 2.02 38.17 0.42 0.39 0.15 -0.45 
- Far East (5.89)** (3.3 7) (-2.41)** 
Sector Specialists - 2.06 30.78 0.37 0.25 0.17 -0.36 
Property (7.2 8) (4.7 0) (-2.65)** 
European Smaller 2.05 34.67 0.39 0.30 0.11 -0.42 
Companies (3.23)** (2.19)* (-2.73) 3 
L-__AySýaý. 2.02 0.42 
Source : author calculation 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at I% level 
From Table 63, we see that on average, the three-factor model can explain 
42% of the 
I. variations in the UK excess discount return by taking into consideration market, size, 
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and the book-to-market effect. As expected, the coefficients of the market and size 
effect are positive and statistically significant for all sectors, while the coefficients of 
the book-to-market effect are negative and significant for most of the 16 sectors. Thus 
we find that the book-to-market factor does have some explanatory power. It has a 
significant negative influence on the excess discount return. Our results contradict 
Pontiff (1997), who found that the book-to-market effect is insignificant and only 
affects funds with low premiums and discounts. 
There is no evidence of autocorrelation in the time-series of 158 monthly -observations 
from January 1990 to January 2003. On average, the D/W statistic is 2.02. The F-ratio 
is used to test the overall significance of the regression test. Overall, all the sectors 
show a significant F-ratio, which implies that the model as a whole has a significant 
degree of explanatory power. As an example, Europe has an F-ratio of 49.67, which 
exceeds the tabulated value of 3.04 at the 5% significance level with degrees of 
freedom of 2 and 155. 
To summarise the UK results, the UK book-to-market effect, measured as the 
difference between the return on the FTSE 350 Growth index and the return on the 
FTSE 350 Value index has a negative and statistically significant influence for most 
of the AITC sectors. As an example, UK Growth and North America Smaller 
Companies have significant t-statistics of -3.05 and -3.43. The coefficient 
for the UK 
size effect, measured as the difference between the return on the FTSE 
Smaller 
Companies index and the return on the FTSE 100 index, is statistically significant at 
the 1% or 5% levels for most of the sectors. For example, Global 
Growth and UK 
Growth and Income show significant t-statistics of 4.41 and 3.03. 
Finally, the market 
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effect is positive and statistically significant for all sectors. Global Growth and UK 
Growth and Income have significant t-statistics of 7.22 and 9.92. Far East (Excluding 
Japan) and Japan have t-statistics of 7.31 and 5.58. 
Table 64 Fama and French's three-factor model of the US excess discount return 
The regressions by sector are estimated over the period January 1990 to January 2003 by 
using monthly observations. The sample covers 30 funds for US closed-end funds. The t- 
statistic of each factor is displayed in parentheses. In addition, we provide tests of 
autocorrelation. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Fund Name by D/W F-Ratio Adjusted Market Size Book to 
CEFA category R2 (Rm', - Rf, l) (Rs, t - 
Rb, 
t 
) market 
(Rg, 1 - Rv,, 
Equity Income 1.99 84.25 0.62 0.62 0.02 0.00 
(11.73)** (0.55) (0.01) 
Global Equity 1.96 67.45 0.56 0.58 0.14 0.01 
(13.20)** (2.5 0) ** (0.92) 
Growth and Income 1.96 67.00 0.48 0.55 0.09 0.06 
(7.5 3) (0.82) (0.29) 
Growth Domestic 1.90 117.14 0.69 0.67 0.22 0.60 
(13.2)** (2.3 1)* (3.86)** 
Average 1.95 0.59 
Source : author calculation 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at I% level 
From Table 64, we see that the three-factor model can explain 59% of the variation in 
the US excess discount returns by taking into consideration market, size, and the 
book-to-market effect. As expected, the coefficients are statistically significant for the 
market and size effect for most of the sectors. There is no evidence of autocorrelation 
in the time-series of 158 observations from January 1990 to January 2003. 
On average 
the Durbin/Watson statistic is 1.95. Overall, all the sectors show a significant 
F-ratio, 
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irnplying that the model as a whole has explanatory power. As an example, the 
Growth and Income sector has an F-ratio, of 67.00 which exceeds the tabulated value 
of 3.04 at the 5% significance level with degrees of freedom of 2 and 155. 
To surnmarise the US results,, the US book-to-market effect is statistically 
insignificant for most of the CEFA sectors, except the Growth Domestic sector which 
has an unexpected positive sign. One possible explanation is that this sector is 
sensitive to the book-to-market index as it is dominated from growth funds and 
behaves in an irregular way. The t-statistics of the US size effect are statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level for Global Equity (2.50) and the Growth 
Domestic sector (2-3 1). On the other hand, the market effect is highly statistically 
significant for all sectors. Equity Income, Global Equity, and Growth and Income 
display significant t-statistics of 11.73,13.20, and 7.53 respectively. 
8.4.2 Carhart's(1997) four-factor model 
Carhart (1997) constructed his four-factor model using Fama and French's (1993) 
three-factor model plus an additional factor capturing Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) 
one-year momentum anomaly. This was motivated by the three-factor model's 
inability to explain cross-sectional variation in portfolio returns (Fama and French 
(1993)). Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) suggest that the momentum 
anomaly is market inefficiency due to slow reaction to information. However. the 
effect is robust to time periods (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Asness, 
Liew, and 
Stevens (1996)). 
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Equation (19) enables us to test the significance of the four factors for each sector in 
relation to the excess discount return. 
d, a+ #I (R.,, - Rf ,)+, 
62(R,,, - R6,, ) +, 83(Rg, t - 'ý', I) + 184 (RNA Vfd, 
RNAVse, 
t 
+ ct 
(19) 
where: d, is the excess discount return for each sector at time t 
(Rm't 
- Rf'j is the excess market return 
(RS't 
- 
Rb, 
i 
) 
is the size factor (small minus big), i. e the difference between 
the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of 
large stocks. 
(Rg't 
- Rv'j is the book to market factor (high minus low), i. e the 
the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market 
stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to- market stocks 
(RNAVfd, t - RNAV,,, t) is the momentum factor measured as the 
difference between the fund and sector NAV return 
c, is the distrurbance tenn 
We test the significance of the estimated coefficients using t-statistics and 
F-tests. We 
also use the Durbin/Watson statistic to check for autocorrelation. 
The estimation 
results are shown in Table 65 for the UK and Table 66 for the US. 
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Table 65 Carhart's four-factor model of UK excess discount return 
The regressions by sector are estimated over the period January 1990 to January 2003 
by using monthly observations. The sample covers 90 funds for UK investment trusts. 
The t-statistic of each factor is displayed in parentheses. In addition, we provide tests 
of autocorrelation. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
JNameby D/W F-Ratio Adjusted Market Size Book to Momentum 
V category 
R2 (Rm, 
t - Rf, t) (R, s, t - 
Rb, 
t) market 
(RNAVfdt 
(R g, 1 Rl,,, ) RNAVse, t) 
- obal Growth 2.05 24.23 0.37 0.28 0.15 -0.35 -0.56 (3.03)** (3.22)** (-2.50)** (-1.18) 
, bal Growth & 2.10 47.02 0.54 0.48 0.07 -0.32 0.79 
Income (9.88)** (2.03)* (-2.42)** (1.23) 
, obal Smaller 
1.98 39.61 0.50 0.45 0.05 -0.38 0.12 
Companies (9.56)** (1.51) (-2.85)** (0.39) 
X Growth 2.08 32.70 0.45 0.33 3 0.14 -0.39 -1.24 (2.5 8) (2.7 5) ** (-2.99)** (-1.71)* 
K Growth & 2.00 50.80 0.56 0.44 0.09 -0.24 -3.01 
Income (10.58)** (2.84) ** (-2.0 1)* (-2.64)** 
X Smaller 2.05 30.77 0.43 0.47 0.11 -0.31 -0.57 
Companies (8.2 9) ** (2.03)* (-1.87)* (-1.93)* 
- orth America 1.96 27.92 0.41 0.47 0.09 -0.27 -0.56 
(8.2 5) ** (1.64) (-1.58) (-1.84)* 
- orth America 2.02 32.11 0.45 0.32 0.12 -0.41 -0.08 
fler Companies (9.2 3) (3.3 5) (-2.89)** (-0.39) 
East (Including 2.07 32.15 0.44 0.37 0.15 -0.22 -1.13 
Japan) (9.71)** (3.74)** (-1.50) (-0.91) 
East (Excluding 2.11 29.68 0.43 0.39 0.09 -0.22 -1.21 
Japan) (3.12) (1.75)* (-1.77)* (-2.72)** 
)anese Smaller 2.10 19.93 0.33 0.32 0.18 -0.33 -0.71 
Companies (6.23)** (3.74) (-1.88)* (-1.83)* 
Japan 2.05 24.23 0.37 0.28 0.15 -0.33 -0.51 
(7.54)** (4.17) (-2.42)** (-1.51) 
Europe 2.00 32.65 0.45 0.33 0.12 -0.41 -0.08 
(2.77)** (2.62) (-2.76)** (-0.42) 
intry Specialists 2.04 21.17 0.34 0.33 0.16 -0.38 -0.68 
Far East (2.6 0) ** (2.93)** (-2.09)* (-1.82)* 
[or Specialists - 1.95 22.09 0.35 0.41 0.04 -0.26 -0.88 Property (3.44) ** (0.55) (-1.51) (-1.77)*- 
ropean Smaller 2.03 31.57 0.37 0.28 0.11 -0.42 -0.31 
Companies (2.63)** (2.20)* 
. 1 
(-2.67)** (1.20) 
Average 2.04 0.42 
Source : author calculation 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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Table 65 shows that on average, the four-factor model can explain 42% of the 
variation in the UK excess discount return by taking into consideration market, size, 
the book-to-market factor and momentum. As expected, the coefficients for the UK 
are positive and statistically significant for the market and the size effect. In additionl 
the coefficients are negative and statistically significant for the book-to-market effect 
for some of the sectors. The explanatory power is no better than the three-factor 
model. However, momentum is only negative and statistically significant (at the 5% 
level in one-tailed tests) in five out of the sixteen sectors. Thus, we have very limited 
evidence that managerial performance has any influence on the excess discount return 
in the UK in the long-run. There is no evidence of autocorrelation. On average the 
Durbin/Watson statistic is 2.04. Overall, all the sectors show a significant F-ratio. As 
an example, the North America Smaller Companies sector has an F-ratio of 32.11 
which exceeds the tabulated value of 2.65 at the 5% significance level with degrees of 
freedom of 3 and 154. 
To summarise the UK results, the book-to-market effect is negative and statistically 
significant for some of the AITC sectors, but insignificant for most of the sectors. As 
an example, UK Growth and Global Growth and Income have t-statistics of -2.99 and 
-2.42. The UK size effect is positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% 
level 
for most of the sectors. For example, Global Growth and Far East including Japan 
show significant t-statistics of 3.22 and 3.74. Also, the market effect is positive and 
highly statistically significant for all sectors at the I% level. For example, UK Growth 
and Income and UK Smaller Companies have t-statistics of 10.58 and 8.29. 
Japan and 
Sector Specialist Property shows t-statistics for the market effect of 7.54 and 
3.44. 
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Table 66 Carhart's four-factor model of the US excess discount return 
The regressions by sector are estimated over the period January 1990 to January 2003 by 
using monthly observations. The sample covers 30 funds for US closed-end funds. The t- 
statistic of each factor is displayed in parentheses. In addition, we provide tests of 
autocorrelation - 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Fund Name D/W F-ratio Adjusted Market Size Book to Momentum 
by CEFA R2 (Rm ,- Rf ) (Rs t- 
Rb market (RNAVfdt - 
category ' ' , 
, (Rg, 
J - R,,,, ) 
RNAVse, t) 
Equity 1.93 83.32 0.68 0.65 0.44 0.08 0.09 
income (12.41)** (2.94)** (1.05) (0.24) 
Global Equity 2.02 52.00 0.57 0.61 0.46 0.10 0.06 
(8.0 1)* (2.81)** (0.93) (0.13) 
Growth and 1.92 77.23 0.66 0.55 0.48 0.16 0.03 
Income (12.20)** (2.92)** (-2.01)* (0.11) 
Growth 1.97 89.41 0.70 0.68 0.53 0.12 -0.00 - 
Domestic (14.29)** (3.3 2) (1.40) (404) 
Average 1.96 0.65 
Source : author calculation 
Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
Statistically significant at I% significance level 
Table 66 shows that, on average, the four-factor model can explain 65% of the 
variation in the US excess discount return by taking into consideration the market 
effect, size, the book-to-market effect and momentum. Thus, there is a small 
improvement compared with the three-factor model. The coefficients for the US are 
statistically significant for the market and the size effect for all sectors. There is no 
autocorrelation. On average the Durbin/Watson statistic is 1.96. Overall, all the 
sectors show a significant F-ratio. As an example, Growth Domestic sector 
has an F- 
ratio of 89.41 which exceeds the tabulated value of 2.65 at the 5% significance 
level 
with degrees of freedom of 3 and 154. 
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However, the US book-to-market effect is statistically insignificant for most of the 
CEFA sectors. As an example, Global Equity has an insignificant t-statistic of 0.93. 
The t-statistic for the US size effect is statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level for Global Equity 2.81 and Growth Domestic sector 3.32. Finally, the market 
effect is highly statistically significant for all sectors. Equity Income, Global Equity 
and Growth and Income have significant t-statistics of 12.41,8.01, and 12.20. 
However,, the momentum variable is insignificant in all four sectors. 
8.4.3 Guirauis six-factor model (1) 
In this section we extend the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) by adding sentiment 
and expenses, as defined earlier. The purpose is to strengthen the four-factor model 
and finally verify which factors are statistically significant and able to explain the 
fluctuations and persistence of the excess discount return over the longer term. 
Equation (20) enables us to test the significance of the six factors in relation to the 
excess discount return. 
d, =a+A(R,,,,, - Rf 'I) 
+ 82(Rs, t -R)+, 
83(R -R 
AVfd, 
I- R IVA V,,,, 
) + h, t g, t v, t +A 
(P'N' 
(20) 
, 
8, (Flowt - Flowt-, ) +, 86Exp, + c, 
where: d, is the excess discount return for each sector at time t 
(Rm, 
t - 
Rf'j is the excess market return 
(Rs, 
t - 
Rb, t 
)is the size factor (small minus big), i. e the difference between 
the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of 
large stocks. 
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TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
(Rg't 
- Rv'j is the book to market factor (high minus low), ie the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market 
stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to- market stocks. 
(RNAVfd, t - RNAV,,, t) is the momentum factor 
(Flowt - Flowt - 1) 
is the difference of retail flows by sector used as a 
proxy for investor sentiment 
Expt is the expense factor. 
c, is the disturbance tenn 
As before, we test the significance of the estimated coefficients using t-statistics and 
F-tests. We also use the Durbin/Watson statistic to check for autocorrelation. The 
estimated results are shown in Table 67 for the UK and Table 68 for the US. 
Table 67 Guirguis six-factor model of the UK excess discount return 
Equation (21) measures the sensitivity of the excess discount related to the market, size, 
book- to-market factor, momentum, sentiment and expenses. The regressions by sector are 
estimated over the period January 1990 to January 2003 by using monthly observations. The 
sample covers 90 funds for UK investment trusts. The coefficient and t-statistic of each factor 
is displayed in parenthesis. In addition, we provide tests of autocorrelation. 
' 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
nd D/W F/ratio Adj R2 Market Size Book to Momentu Sentiment Expense 
ie by (Rm 
l- Rf 
(R, ,- 
Rb 
,) 
market m (Flowt - (Exp) FC , , , (Rg l- 
Rv 
l 
(RNAVfdt Flowt -0 ry DO , , 
RNAVse, 
t) 
bal 12 17.25 0.39 0.28 0.13 -0.01 -0.26 1.49 0.59 
wth (3.9 8) (2.4 8) (-0.57) (-1.25) (3.2 0) (1.38) 
bal 1.93 50.24 0.66 0.43 0.12 -0.14 0.33 0.87 -0 
-)5 
lh & (10.49) ** (3.5 0) ** (-1.23) (0.66) (3.54)** (-1.06) 
me 
- ýal 1.96 42.83 0.62 0.40 0.11 -0.09 0.60 0.82 -0.04 Iler (3.16) ** (-0.68) (-1.96)* (7.5 0) ** (-0.14) 
anies 
I - 2.04 60.65 0.70 0.58 0.06 -0.15 -2.76 0.88 
0.08 
Nth 
- - 
(12.90)** (2.11) (-1.41) (-6.89)** (3.18) (0.46) ý 
19-7 57.98 0.69 0.45 0.10 -0.14 -2.43 0.89 
0.68 
th & (11.3 1)* (3.22) (-1.3 1) (-2.54)** (6.6 0) (1.84)* 
IRR 
99 45 06 0 63 0 K 1. . . . 40 0.09 -0.11 -0.22 1.02 04 -0 
aller (9.90)** (2.83)** (-0.90) (-0.49) (5.8 1)** . (-0.09) 
)anies 
2 72 44 0 73 - )rth 2.0 . . 0.42 0.13 -0-14 0.02 09 8 0.0"N 
, rica 
(9.42)** (3.5 2) (-1.07) (0.16) (13.41)** 06) (0 70 10 0 _ . )rth 1.97 . . 73 0.43 0.11 -0-17 -1.02 0.97 -0.11 
crica (10.61)** (3.82)** (-1.42) (-1.47) (11.60)** (-0.55) 
aller 
)anies 
East 2.05 65.31 0.71 0.45 0.13 -0-18 -1.44 0.6-8 -0.49 
uding (11.27)** (4.18) (-1.42) (-1.53) (6.5 2) (-2.45)** 
)n) - East 2.06 62.34 0.70 0.37 0.12 ý. -15 -1.20 0-92 -0.55 luding (4.7 8) (3.11)** (-1.30) (-3.57)** (7.97)** (-1.73)* 
)an) 
mese 1.97 87.79 0.77 0.44 0.10 -0.15 0.15 0.93 1.13 
aller (10.13)** (3.0 7) ** (-1.33) (1.05) (12.98)** (2.29)** 
PaLe 
-s pan 1.94 92.07 0.78 0.46 0.12 -0.19 0.17 0.94 -0.59 (11.4 1)* (3.9 8) (-1.82)* (1.42) (14.58)** (-2.7 1)* 
rope 
1 
2.02 49.04 0.65 0.49 0.10 -0.34 0.15 0.32 -0.34 (11.26)** (3.12)** (-2.81)** (0.87) (3.89)** (-0.98) 
m try 1.97 41.03 0.61 0.39 0.12 -0.17 -0.27 0.78 -0.21 
ýialists (9.67) (3.33)** (-1.23) (-0.91) (8.89)** (-0.64) 
r East 
ctor 1.97 95.97 0.79 0.43 0.11 -0.20 -0.15 1.02 0.14 
: ialists (9.82)** (3.66)** (-1.80)* (-0.58) (14.78)** (0-87) 
)perty 
)pean 1.96 53.41 0.61 0.39 0.12 -0.17 -0.27 0.78 -0.21 
, aller (9.6 7) ** (3.33)** (-1.23) (-0.91) (8.89)** (-0.64) 
Eýe s 
- ýrage 2.00 0.67 
Source : author calculation 
Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
** Statistically significant at 1% significance level 
Table 67 shows that, on average, the six-factor model can explain 67% of the 
variation in the excess discount return by taking into consideration market, size, book- 
to- market effect, momentum, sentiment and expenses. The coefficients for the UK 
are statistically significant for the market, the size effect and sentiment. The book-to- 
market effect, momentum and expenses have t-statistics that are insignificant or 
negatively significant. In more detail, momentum is negative and statistically 
significant (at the 1% and 5% level in one tailed tests) in four out of the sixteen 
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sectors. Thus, we have limited evidence of managerial performance persistence wver 
the long-run. In addition, our results contradict the hypothesis proposed by Barclay, 
Holderness and Pontiff s (1995) view that a possible explanation of the discount is 
that as managers try to protect their private benefits3 expenses increase over the long 
term and have an effect on the discount. There is no autocorrelation in the time-series 
of our 158 monthly observations from January 1990 to January 2003. On average the 
Durbin/Watson statistic is 2.00. Overall, all the sectors show a significant F-ratio. As 
an example, Japan sector has an F-ratio of 92-07 which exceeds the tabular value of F 
=2.27 at the 5% significance level with degrees of freedom of 5 and 152. 
To surnmarise the UK results, the book-to-market effect and expenses are statistically 
insignificant for most of the AITC sectors. For example, Global Smaller Companies, 
UK Smaller Companies and North America Smaller Companies have insignificant t- 
statistics for the book-to-market effect of -0.68, -0-90, and -1.42. In addition, the same 
sectors have insignificant t-statistics for expenses of -0.14, -0.09, and -0.55. The t- 
statistics for the UK size effect and sentiment are statistically significant at the I% 
level for most of the sectors. For example, North America Smaller Companies, 
Japanese Smaller Companies, Japan and Country Specialist Far East have significant 
t-statistics for the size effect of 3.82,3.07,3.98 and 3.33. The same sectors display a 
statistically significant sentiment effect of with t-statistics equal to 11.60,12.9 8,14.5 8 
and 8.89 respectively. 
As in the other models, the market effect is positive and highly statistically significant 
for all sectors. UK Growth, Far East Including Japan, and 
European Smaller 
Companies have significant t-statistics of 12.90,11.27 and 9.67. 
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Table 68 Guirguis six-factor model (1) of the US excess discount return 
The regressions by sector are estimated over the period January 1990 to January 2003 by 
using monthly observations. The sample covers 30 funds for US closed-end funds. The t- 
statistic of each factor is displayed in parentheses. In addition, we provide tests of 
autocorrelation. 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
Fund D/W F/Ratio Adj Market Size Book to - --M-omenturn Sentiment Expense 
ýame W (Rm, 
t - 
Rf', (R,,, - Rb ,) 
market (RNAVfdt - (Flowt - (Expt) by , (R9 
1- 
Rv 
I 
RNAV,,,, ) Flowt 
-1) : EFA ' 1 
Itegog - 
quity 1.98 43.14 0.62 0.40 0.11 -0.09 0.60 0.83 -0.05 
- 
lcome 
-- 
(7.95)** (3.26) (-0.69) (1.98)* (7.5 3) (-0.20) 
lobal YOO 77.15 0.75 0.43 0.11 -0.17 -0.17 0.92 0.18 
quity (9.70)** (3.3 2) (-1.44) (-0.61) (8.80)** (0.91) 
irowth 2.00 56.53 0.68 0.44 0.10 -0.20 -2.60 0.81 
_ 0.61 
nd (11.19)** (3.3 8) (-2.48)** (-3.04) (6.01)** (1.60) 
lCome 
2.02 46.28 0.64 0.40 0.09 -0.09 -0.22 1.02 0.05 
)OMesti (9.8 6) (2.77) (-0.72) (-0.50) (6.06) (0.11) 
mrage , 
2.00 0.66 
Source : author calculation 
Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
Statistically significant at I% significance level 
On average, for the US the six-factor model can explain 66 % of the variation in the 
excess discount return by taking into consideration market, size, book-to-market 
effect, momentum, sentiment and expenses. The coefficients for the US are 
statistically significant for the market and the size effect for all sectors. There is no 
autocorrelation as on average the Durbin/Watson statistic is 2.00. Overall, all the 
sectors show a significant F-ratio. As an example, the Global Equity sector has an F- 
ratio of 77.15 which exceeds the tabulated value of 2.27 at the 5% significance 
level 
with degrees of freedom of 5 and 152. The momentum variable is significant in 
just 
two of the four sectors and the expenses variable is insignificant in all sectors. 
The 
sentiment factor is highly significant in all four sectors. In more detail, 
Equity 
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Income, Global Equity, Growth and Income and Growth Domestic category have t- 
statistics of 7.53,8.80,6.01 and 6.06 respectively. 
The US book-to-market effect is statistically insignificant for most of the CEFA 
sectors. As an example, Global Equity has an insignificant t-statistic of -1.44. The US 
size effect is statistically significant at the I% level for all sectors. Global Equity, 
Equity Income and Growth and Income have t-statistics of 3.32,3.26 and 3.28. 
Similarly, the market effect is highly statistically significant for all sectors. Equity 
Income, Global Equity and Growth and Income have t-statistics, of 7.95,9.70, and 
11.19 respectively. 
8.4.4 GuirLyuis six-factor model (11) 
In this section, we amend the six-factor model by changing the sentiment factor from 
retail flows to an investor sentiment index. The only behavioural data available was 
for the US market. Investors are said to be confident when the news about the future 
is good and stock prices are relatively high. According to the Yale Management 
School, a sample of US individual investors from 1989 to 1998 was purchased from 
W. S. Ponton Inc, a list of "High-Grade Multi-Investors. " Starting in 1999, the sample 
was a random sample of high-income Americans purchased from Survey Sampling, 
Inc. We use the US investor sentiment index constructed by the Yale School of 
Management as it is the most suitable one to represent investor sentiment in the US 
--I - rt rt view. marKet. It is measured as the percentage of respondents who suppo a pa 
icular 
It is derived from the responses to a single question that has been asked consistently 
through time since 1989 to a consistent sample of respondents. 
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Equation (21) enables us to test the significance of these Six factors in relation to 
excess discount return. 
d, =a+A(Ri,, - Rf 'I) 
+, 82(Rs', - 
Rbj ) +, 83(R -RA- RNA Vt) + 91t v, t 
)+ #4(RN Vfd, t 
ISII )+ 86Exp, + c, (21) 
where: d, is the excess discount return of each sector at time t 
(Rm', Rf'j is the excess market return 
bj 
)is 
the size E (Rs, t R actor (small minus big), i. e the difference between 
the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of 
large stocks. 
(Rg, t - 
Rj) is the book to market factor (high minus low), i. e the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market 
stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to- market stocks 
(RNAVfd, t - 
RNAVse, t) is the momentum factor 
(ISIt ) is the investor sentiment index obtained from the Yale School of 
Management 
(Expt) is the expense factor. 
c, is the distrurbance term 
As usual, we test the significance of the estimated coefficients using t-statistics and F- 
tests. We also use Durbin/Watson statistic to check for autocorrelation. 
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Table 69 Guirguis six-factor model (11) of US excess discount return 
The regressions by sector are estimated over the period October 1996 to January 2003 by 
using monthly observations. The sample covers 30 funds for US Closed-end funds. The t- 
statistic of each factor is displayed in parentheses. In addition, we provide tests of 
autocorrelation. 
- - 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
Name 
75 
/W F/ratio 2 Adj R Market Size Book to Momentum Sentiment Expense 
)y (Rm l- Rf t) (Rs ,- 
Rb 
t 
market (RNAVfd, t - (IsIt (Exp, ) 
IFA , , ' 
, (R g" - Rv, t 
RNAVse, 
t) 
pry 
1.97 2.83 0.32 0.06 -0.11 -0.22 -0.49 0.63 3.75 
e (0.66) (-0.98) (-0.56) (-8.35)** (2.3 7) (1.7-3))* 
1 Equity 2.07 2.38 0.26 0.25 -0.13 0.12 -0.20 0.03 2.37 
(2.28)* (-0.99) (0.55) (-2.08)* (0.39) (1.44) 
,h and 
2.04 3.18 0.36 0.35 0.13 -0.21 -3.10 0.29 -1.19 
le (2.65)** (1.46) (-1.09) (-1.36) (1.9-3)* (-0.87) 
1 2.03 3.50 0.39 0.33 -0.04 -0.19 -1.26 0.21 1.11 
stic (3.5 2) (-0.43) (-1.05) (-1.63) 1.34) (0.52) 
. ge 
2.03 0.33 
Source : author calculation 
* Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
** Statistically significant at 1% significance level 
Table 69 shows that, on average, the six-factor model can explain just 33% of the 
variation in the excess discount return by taking into consideration market effect,, size,, 
book-to-market, momentum, sentiment and expenses. This is not directly comparable 
with the previous models because of the much smaller sample size. The coefficients 
for US market are statistically significant for 3 out of four sectors at the 1% and 5% 
levels in one-tailed tests. There is no autocorrelation in the time-series of our 
26 
monthly observations from October 1996 to January 2003. On average the 
Durbin/Watson statistic is 2.03. Overall, all the sectors show a significant 
F-ratio. As 
an example, the Equity Income sector has an F-ratio of 2.83 which exceeds 
the 
tabulated value of F 2.27 at the 5% significance level with 
degrees of freedom of 5 
and 152. The US size, book-to-market effect, momentum and expenses are 
statistically insignificant for most of the sectors of CEFA. 
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on the other hand, the results for the sentiment factor are mixed. In more detail, 
Equity Income, Growth and Income show a statistically significant sentiment effect, 
with t-statistics of 2.37 and 1.93 respectively. A possible explanation of this mixed 
picture is that the sample is small and surveys were initially conducted at six-month 
intervals from October 1996 to April 2001. Then surveys were conducted at a 
monthly basis. Our sample includes only 26 observations, and this small sample 
reduces the explanatory power of the model. Thus, a possible area of future research 
is to include a larger sample measured on a daily basis and try to isolate the 
interaction of arbitrageurs and noise traders to identify shifts in the discounts of 
closed end funds. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have attempted to extend the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993) and the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) in order to explain the 
excess discount return. We added two more factors to the four risk measures included 
in the Carhart model,, namely sentiment and expenses. 
On average, the six-factor model can explain 67% of the variation in the excess 
discount return in the UK market by taking into consideration market, size, book-to- 
market effect, momentum, sentiment and expenses. In contrast, Fama and French's 
(1993) three-factor and four-factor model can explain only 42% of the variation of the 
excess discount return. The coefficients of the six-factor model for the UK are 
statistically significant for the market, size effect and sentiment, but mainly 
statistically insignificant for the book-to-market effect, momentum and expenses. 
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For the US market, on average, the six-factor model can explain 66 % of the variation 
of the excess discount return by taking into consideration the market effect, size, 
book-to-market, momentum, sentiment and expenses. In contrast, Fama and French 
(1993), three-factor model can explain 59% of the excess discount return variation 
and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model can explain 65% of the variation. 
The other version of my six-factor model applied in the US market can explain only 
33% of the variation in the excess discount returns by changing the sentiment factor 
from retail flows to an investor sentiment index. The only behavioural data available 
was for the US market from the Yale Management School, but our sample includes 
only 26 observations, so reducing the explanatory power of the model. Thus, a 
possible area of future research is to include a larger sample measured on a daily basis 
and try to isolate the interaction of arbitrageurs and noise traders to identify shifts in 
the discount returns of closed end funds. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 Attempts to reduce the discount 
The persistence of the discount is a problem that may discourage and confuse 
investors. They may be uncertain whether to invest in closed-end funds or alternative 
investments. After conducting our study we find that the excess discount return is 
influenced by several factors, the most important being: 
e Investor sentiment 
9 Size factor 
9 Market factor 
Although the above factors are important, the excess discount return on some funds is 
also influenced negatively by the book-to-market value and momentum. While large 
discounts may provide an investment opportunity for arbitrageurs, the widening and 
persistence of discounts is likely to discourage investors. Arbitrageurs only become 
active during open ending as the share price increases and the discount disappears. 
Nowadays, a number of potential solutions have been suggested to eliminate the 
discount. The variety of approaches can be interpreted as a sign that no-one knows 
how to solve this problem fully. The proposed measures are as follows: 
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9 Share buybacks 
o Treasury shares 
o Redeemable shares 
* Continuation votes 
9.1.1 Share buybacks 
Share buybacks are an investment scheme that aims to repurchase or buy back the 
shares of the fund. It is a very effective way for managers to increase their company's 
share price when they expect a rising or bullish market. Without buybacks a lot of 
funds will continue to be on a wider discount and they would have disappeared. With 
this technique, fund managers try to keep the discount within certain limits. However, 
according to Close Wins professional brokers "Edinburgh Dragon and ISIS UK Select 
have both announced discount targets in the past which were not met. So the question 
is how effective is this plan. " (Close Wins, 2004, p. 11). There are several reasons why 
trusts may wish to buy back shares. The main ones are listed in a report for the AITC 
by Kershaw (2002). They include: 
* Discount reduction 
* Reduction in discount volatility 
9 Balancing supply and demand 
We use the results of Andy et al (2004) to present their findings concerning 
buying 
back shares and propose further study of this effect. Kershaw "states that trusts which 
use share buybacks have lower discounts than those which do not". 
(Kershaw, 2002, 
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appendix 6). On the other hand, Andy et al (2004) found that any discount reduction 
through buying back shares is weak, but there are significant differences between 
sectors. They looked at average discounts within sectors to compare companies with 
share buyback schemes with those that do not have such schemes. Their data were 
split over the AITC sector classifications (e. g. Global Growth, UK Growth, UK 
Growth and Income, etc), and included: 
9 Date of the buyback 
* Method of buyback (e. g. repurchase or tender) 
o Price paid 
* Percentage of outstanding shares bought back 
Their data was supplied for the two-year period starting 1 January 1999 and ending on 
31 December 2000. The start date of 1 January 1999 was chosen as there were very 
few buybacks before that date. They found that over short periods of time the average 
discount of investment trusts with buybacks was less volatile compared to those 
without. However, over the whole period of investigation, only within the Global and 
UK Growth sectors were trust discounts with buybacks less volatile. They proposed 
that future work should investigate whether these results are a function of the 
incidence of the buybacks or simply an observation that these sectors had a larger 
number of trusts with buybacks than without buybacks. 
Further, they carried out an event study of the discount in various sectors. 
They found 
that the Global Growth sector showed a small reduction of the discount after a share 
buyback, limited to approximately 14 days. This empirical finding supports 
the 
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argument that one of the benefits of buybacks is to offset and reduce temporary 
imbalances in supply and demand. 
9.1.2 Treasury shares 
In 2003, companies were able for the first time to hold shares in treasury. Thus 
instead of having to cancel shares that are repurchased through share buybacks a 
company can sell these shares back to the market at a later date. The key potential 
benefits of treasury shares are as follows: 
* Investment trusts can increase control over their share capital structure by 
buying shares temporarily into treasury in order to sell them later instead of 
buying then cancelling them. 
9 Investment trusts could sell treasury shares without the imposition of stamp 
duty. 
* Investment trusts have the ability to raise funds for new investment 
opportunities other than through gearing or the sales of other investments. 
Treasury shares allow the equity base of the trust to be changed as easily as its 
debt level, which gives greater operational flexibility in the way managers use 
their investments. 
The key features of treasury shares are the following: 
* Treasury shares permit an investment trust, having carried out a share 
buy- 
back,, to hold up to 10% of its share capital in treasury. 
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* An investment trust can hold treasury shares for as long as they wish or cancel 
them at a later date. Moreover, it can sell them for cash at a price generally no 
less than 10% below the mid-market price. 
e For regulatory and management accounting purposes, shares acquired into 
treasury are treated as tax free on any profits. Finally, no stamp duty is payable 
by investors buying treasury shares 
According to Close Wins (2004), only three funds have taken the decisions, to re-sell 
treasury shares at a discount (Close Finsbury Eurotech, Finsbury Growth and Scottish 
Value). According to Close Wins, fund managers should be cautious towards treasury 
shares until there is enough evidence of their pros and cons. For example, according 
to them, "by offering treasury shares, will they make a fund more liquid as far as most 
investors are concerned? Will they have the ability to exit the stock when they wish? 
Or will treasury shares act as an overhang depressing a company's share price". (Close 
Wins, 2004, p 12). 
9.1.3 Redeemable shares 
According to Close Wins (2004), a number of closed-end funds have adopted a 
measure where shares can be redeemed periodically. Many of these are 
domiciled in 
the Channel Islands due to the greater flexibility that is available on the distribution of 
capital. According to them "two funds, Martin Currie European and 
Henderson 
European Micro, have stated that they will offer shareholders an exit at 
NAV if they 
do not outperform a target return over a specified period of time. 
For MC European, 
this is an on-going commitment to be measured over rolling 
three year periods, 
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whereas for Henderson European Micro it is a one-off target to 30 June 2004. " (Close 
Wins, 2004, p. 13) 
9.1.4 Continuation votes 
According to Close Wins (2004), several investment trusts have annual votes,, 
including Edinburgh US Tracker, Merrill Lynch World Mining and 3i European 
Technology. This gives a hope to investors that the board in the future will review the 
fund. On the other -hand, several funds prefer to use the right of continuation vote if 
their shares trade at a wider discount. In some cases, this is measured over the whole 
year. 
9.2 Split capital investment trusts 
Split capital investment trusts were first introduced in 1965. The first split, Dualvest, 
was launched in May 1965. Splits are collective companies with a portfolio of 
investments just like conventional trusts but issue two or more different types of share 
classes. Income shareholders are entitled to all the income generated from the 
investments held by the trust during its life, whilst capital shareholders receive, at 
wind-up, the capital value of the trust, including any capital growth achieved by the 
trust over its life. A more aggressive structure was created by the inclusion of zero 
dividend preference shares (ZDPs). This was the first time ZDPs had been issued 
by 
an investment trust. Zero shares pay a pre-determined capital sum when the trust is 
wound up before any distribution of capital can be made to other lower-r ing 
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shareholders. They have no entitlement to income, so there is no liability to income 
tax for the investor. 
According to AITC, an important concept to understand is limited life. At least one 
class of share in a split is likely to have a limited life. This means that at a specified 
date the trust will need to realise a specific value from the underlying investments to 
distribute to specific shareholders. If the whole trust has a limited life, this means that 
the company will be terminated at the specified date. This includes realising its assets, 
paying off holders of loan. capital (if any) and other creditors, and distributing the 
remaining assets among shareholders according to the correct order of priority and the 
various share class entitlements. For example, if the company has prior charges such 
as bank loans, these rank ahead of equity shareholders. Then ZDP shares are paid 
next. They offer a predetennined capital return at a specific date dependent on 
sufficient assets being available at wind-up. The next category of shares paid to 
investors is income shares. They are concerned with an income flow with an 
entitlement to a predetermined capital return on wind-up. The following class of 
shares to be repaid is ordinary income shares. They include a combination of the 
potential for high and rising income and potential for capital growth at a higher 
relative risk to other classes of share. Finally, capital shares are repaid to investors. 
Capital shares are the lowest ranking security in a split capital company. Usually, 
capital shareholders are entitled to all the assets remaining once the prior charges 
have 
been repaid in full. This makes them the highest risk security, which means that they 
can offer a high reward. 
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This bias towards income rather than capital has made it difficult to persuade 
investors to invest in new issues of capital shares. On the other hand, new trends in 
split capital investment trusts such as the barbell approach have decreased the 
popularity of capital shares trusts. The fund manager simply divides the assets of the 
company into two parts. The first part is invested in a portfolio of very high yielding 
securities, such as corporate bonds or income shares of other split capital investment 
trusts. The other part of the portfolio is invested in a low yielding growth portfolio to 
provide the asset growth for the company. 
Further, investment trusts are able to borrow money to invest in shares of other 
companies so that the returns on the additional investments will exceed the costs of 
borrowing. This is known as financial gearing. If a trust gears up, the market rises and 
the return exceeds the costs of borrowing, the return of the investor will be increased. 
However,, if the opposite happens, then losses incurred by the investor may be 
substantial due to the effect of gearing. If a trust has financial gearing, it is important 
to establish what the "characteristics of the borrowings are, such as the costs and the 
type of borrowing. According to the Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2002), there 
are 134 Splits in issue, having a combined market capitalisation of f 13.2 billion at 31 
March 2002. Between 1990 and 1999,55 Splits were launched on the LSE and 
between 1999 and 2001 ý 34 were 
launched. According to the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA, 2002), the recent problems in the Splits sector have been widely 
covered and are well known. A number of Splits have invested a portion of their 
portfolio in the shares of other Splits. Some have also borrowed funds 
from banks for 
leverage. According to FSA (2002), Table 70 illustrates a number of Splits that have 
invested a portion of their portfolio in the shares of other Splits. 
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Table 70 Number of Splits that have invested a portion of their portfolio in the shares of 
other splits 
31 March 2002 
Number Market capitalisation 
(f million) 
Splits in issue 134 13,200 
Splits with no cross holdings 51 6,300 
Splits with cross holdings 83 61900 
% of portfolio held in other Splits 32 31.200 
_ Under 20 % 24 2! ý 100 
21 - 40% 16 19000 
41 - 70% 11 600 
Over 70% 
Source: Financial Services Authority, 2002, p5 
According to Table 70, reported under the FSA, "16 splits have cross holdings in 
other splits of between 21% and 40%. 11 have cross holdings between the range of 
41% and 70%. Of these, 10 have total borrowings of 74% of gross assets. So, many of 
these splits have both high gearing and high cross holdings, which in some cases are 
holdings in splits which have the sarne characteristics. This exposes investors to 
exponential risk as the gearing effect is multiplied. These factors have caused a 
dramatic fall in the price of some Splits over the last 3 years. .. ." 
(FSA, 2002, p 5). 
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Table 71 Market changes during period 31 March 1999 to -11 maý,, -h win-) FTSE 100 
-16.2% 
FTSE All - Share -11.7% 
Example of share price movements of Splits 
No cross holdings -39.1% 
Cross holdings of 
Under 20% 
-82.21% 
21-40% -88.23% 
41-70% -97.85% 
Over 70% -97.97% 
; ý, ource: rinanciai z! )erviceS AUtnority, 2UU2, p6 
According to FSA during 200 1, a number of Splits announced that they had breached 
their banking agreements. These are summarised in Table 72. 
Table 72 Splits announced that they have breached their banking covenants 
Announcement Number of Splits 
Dividend suspensions I 
Dividend cuts 7 
Restructurings 5 
Debt repayment 12 
Conversion of bank debt and new money 
injected by manager 
I 
Insolvency I 
Source: Financial Services Authority, 2002, p6 
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When a new split is launched it is required to publish a prospectus that is in 
accordance with the UK authority rules. It is also important for firms who advice to 
explain clearly the risks that investor will face. 
Another problem faced by split investment trusts is the use of treasury shares. It is 
more difficult for split capital investment trusts than conventional trusts to use 
treasury shares due to the various share classes and their interaction. On the other 
hand, a company may not hold more than 10% of the value of its share capital in 
treasury. If the company has more than one class of share capital, the -10% limit is 
applied to each share class separately. 
9.3 Opportunities for future research 
The selected research topic is very wide and there are many sub-areas in which future 
research could be directed. Here we outline some of the areas for future research. 
Alternative approach to measure performance persistence 
e It would be interesting to divide the funds into subgroups measured by their 
market capitalisation. Then by using a rolling methodology to test for 
significance in ranking. For example, Volkman and Wohar (1995) considered 
332 funds. They found a significantly positive relationship between the 
performance of a fund and deciles that are composed of medium sized funds. 
They also found negative persistence in performance for both small and large 
funds. 
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Performance measurement of "dead" funds 
* The average discount of the funds under management is significantly higher 
than the discount of the industry. The question that arises is whether the 
management group tends to affect the discount or whether other factors can 
explain this persistence. The evidence suggests that future research should 
focus on the management group and analyse the factors and problems that lead 
to open-ending. A possibility would be to investigate the management 
contracts and the management ownership structure. The performance of the 
sample of "dead" funds suggests that funds disappear after periods of poor 
NAV performance and wide discounts. At open-ending, we find evidence that 
share prices increase toward NAV. Future research could also attempt to 
identify the benchmark that managers actually aim to beat when they are in a 
critical position, for example during a merger. 
Split capital trusts and asymmetric information 
e The present study has omitted split capital trusts as they invest in more than 
one share. Future research could develop and employ better models for 
transforming qualitative data, such as asymmetric information, into 
quantitative data. Other problems were related to the governance of Splits. For 
example, one individual was responsible for the board of 15 different splits. 
Another problem faced by split investment trusts is the use of treasury shares. 
It is more difficult for split capital investment trusts than conventional trusts to 
use treasury shares due to the various share classes and their 
interaction. On 
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the other hand, a company may not hold more than 10% of the value of its 
share capital in treasury. If the company has more than one class of share 
capital, the 10% limit is applied to each share class separately. 
Interaction of the various mechanisms to eliminate the discount 
9 Another area that needs deeper investigation is the interaction of share 
buybacks, treasury shares, redeemable shares, and continuation votes (all 
discussed above) throughout the life of the funds. What effects will these 
mechanisms have in each sector by AITC or- CEFA? 
Investor sentiment indices 
e Investor sentiment indices are a relatively new branch in behavioural finance 
that measure psychological factors related to investors' attitudes towards the 
stock market. This area of research covers many problems. For example, how 
to find an accurate index that incorporates investor surveys and is not out of 
date by the time it is released. In the UK, we were not able to find a 
representative index that measures sentiment or the mood of investors. Of 
course, fundamentals are still important, such as rising productivity, 
investment activity, and rising industrial production but they are not closely 
related to investor sentiment. 
, 
9.4 Concludina remarks 
Investment trusts or closed-end funds are known and described by the existence of the 
discount. We have seen that closed-end fund shares are issued at up to a 10 per 
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cent premium to NAV. This premium represents the underwriting fees and start-up 
costs. Within months, the shares trade at a discount which persists and fluctuates. 
Upon termination of the fund, share prices rise and discounts disappear. 
The main aims of the empirical studies presented in the thesis were (a) to use 
multifactor models to investigate managerial performance persistence in the UK 
investment trust industry and the US closed-end fund industry and (b) to investigate 
the determinants of the excess discount return in the UK and US. 
To these-ends, the main purpose of Chapter 7 was to test whether management 
performance is persistent among closed-end funds. By applying Fama and French's 
three factor-model we came to the conclusion that for the UK and the US the results 
are mixed and therefore managerial performance is a factor that needs more 
investigation. According to the extended Fama and French model that incorporates 
market timing ability we again found mixed results. Finally, by calculating rank 
correlation coefficient of performance persistence by using deciles over one, three, five 
and nine year periods, we found no evidence of performance persistence in the UK but 
weak evidence of performance persistence in the US. Our findings for the US market 
are consistent with Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavha 
(1993), and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Blake (I 996a), who document mutual 
fund return 
predictability over longer periods of five to ten years. 
The main purpose of Chapter 8, was to extend the multifactor model of 
Fama and 
French's (1993) three-factor model and the model of Carhart (1997) in order to 
explain the excess discount return in the UK and the US, using the 
Guirguis six-factor 
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model. On average, the Guirguis six-factor model can explain 67% of the variation of 
the excess discount return in the UK market by taking into consideration the market 
effect, size, the book-to-market effect, momentum, sentiment and expenses. In 
contrast, Fama and French's (1993) three-factor and Carhart's four-factor model can 
explain only 42% of the variation of the excess discount return. 
Furthermore, the six-factor model can explain 66 % of the variation of the excess 
discount returns in the US market. In contrast, Fama and French's (1993), three- 
factor model can explain 59% of the US excess discount return variation and 
Carhart's (1997) four-factor model can explain 65% of the variation. 
The other version of the Guirguis six-factor model, with an investor sentiment index 
used as a proxy for sentiment, was applied to the US market (but with a reduced 
sample size). This model was able to explain only 33 % of the variation of the excess 
discount returns. A possible explanation of this reduction in explanatory power is that 
the sample is small and the surveys were initially conducted from Yale Management 
School at six-month intervals from October 1996 to August 2001. Then surveys were 
conducted on a monthly basis. Our sample therefore includes only 26 observations. 
Thus, a possible area of future research is to include a larger sample measured on a 
daily basis and try to isolate the interaction of arbitrageurs and noise traders to 
identify shifts in the discounts of closed end funds. 
Our study might be affected by data limitations and therefore the results need to be 
interpreted with caution. For example, we report a small sample of US funds by sector 
and they do not include any dead funds, so maybe there is survivorship bias. Thomson 
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Investment View does not provide any data for US dead funds. As a result, further 
research could incorporate the US dead funds by sector. 
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Appendix A 
Table 73 Details the various funds of UK trusts and their management group 
_AITC 
Category Management Group 
_Global 
Growth 
_ALLIANCE 
TRUST 
-- 
n ep ndent 
- ANGLO & OVERSEAS 
- 
-n Morg Grenfell 
BANKERS INV. TRUST 
- 
Edinburgh Fund Managers 
BRITISH EMPIRE SECS 
- 
Ivory&Sime 
BRUNNER INV. TST Kleinwort Benson 
FOREIGN & COLONIAL Foreign & Colonial 
GARTMORE GLOBAL TST Gartmore 
_HENDERSON 
ELEC. &GEN Henderson Investors 
JUPITER PRIMADONA GROWTH 
_ _Jupiter LAW DEBENTURE Independent 
_LONDON 
& ST. LAVVRENCE Independent 
MAJEDIE INV S. Independent 
MONKS INV. TRUST Independent 
PERSONAL ASSETS Independent 
RIT CAPITAL PARTNERS Rothschild (J) Capital 
SCOTTISH AMERICAN Stewart Ivory 
SCOTTISH INV. Independent 
SCOTTISH MORTGAGE Baillie Gifford 
SECOND ALLIANCE Independent 
TRIBUNE TRUST Independent 
WITAN INV. TRUST Henderson Investors 
JUP. INTL. GREEN ORD. DELISTED 
19/03/01 
Jupiter 
MCIT CAPITAL. DELISTED 25/06/98 Martin Currie 
BARING STRATTON UNITISED 
05/05/98 
Baring Private 
Turkey Trust Delisted 25/11/99 Henderson Investors 
TR Technology Delisted 22/10/99 Henderson Investors 
Global Growth & Income 
BRITISH ASSETS Ivory & Sime 
MURRAY INTL. Murray Johnstone 
Global Smaller Companies 
_ F&C SMALLER COS. Foreign & Colonial 
_ HENDERSON STRATA Henderson Investors 
_ GENERAL CONS. CAP. DELISTED 
06/01/98 
Henderson Investors 
_ HENDERSON AMERICAN CAP. 
_DELISTED 
26/02/99 
Gartmore American Small Secs 
Henderson Investors 
Gartmore 
UK Growth 
_ ALBANY INV. TRUST Independent 
CAPITAL GEARING TST. Independent 
13 
_EDINBURGH 
INV. TRUST 
_EDINBURGH 
UK TRACKER 
_FINSBURY 
GROWTH TST. 
Edinburgh Fund Managers 
Edinburgh Fund Managers 
Finsbury 
_FLEMING 
MERCANTILE Fleming 
_HANSA 
TRUST Independent 
jPMF. CLAV1F, RH0USE 
_JPMF 
MID CAP IT. 7 
_KEYSTONE 
IT. 
_UK 
SELECT TRUST 
Group Trust Delisted 17/08/01 Legal and General Ventures 
British Inv-Trust dead 19/05/97 Edinburgh Fund Managers 
Brit. AM& General Ivory & Sime 
Sphere Inc & Resi. Cap Glasgow Investment Managers 
Radiotrust Lombard Odier 
UK Growth & Income 
CITY OF LONDON Indep ndent 
DUNEDIN INCGROWTH Edinburgh Fund Managers 
LOWLAND INV. Henderson Investors 
MURRAY INCOME Murray Johnstone 
SECURITIES TST. OLIM 
SHIRES INCO1\4E TST. Glasgow Investment Managers 
TEMPLE BAR Guinness Flight 
VALUE & INCOME OLIM 
JUP. EXTRA INCORD. DELISTED 
28/09/00 
Jupiter 
FLEM. INTL. DELISTED 31/10/96 Fleming 
Gartmore Value Gartmore 
UK Smaller Companies 
- ALLIANZ DRESDNER SMCOS. Abtrust Fund Managers 
DUNEDIN SMALLER COS. Edinburgh Fund Managers 
GARTMORE SMALLER COS. Gartmore 
HENDERSON SMALLER COS Henderson Investors 
I&S. UK SMALLER COS. Ivory&Sime 
INVESCO ENGLISH & 
INTERNATIONAL 
INVESCO 
INVESCO PERP. UK SMCOS. INVESCO 
_ PLATINUM INV. TST. _ Frarnlington 
SCHRODER UK MID & SMALL Schroder 
SMALLER COMPANIES IT. Abtrust 
THROGMORTON TRUST Frarnlington 
31 SM. QUOTED COS. TRUST 3i 
Throgrnorton USM Frarnlington 
North America 
AMERICAN OPPOR. TST. Harnbro (J 0) 
EDINBURGH US TRACKER TST. Edinburgh Fund Managers 
US INV. TST. DEAD 
/Unitised(0 1/0 1/2000) 
Wellington 
North America Smaller Companies 
_ JPMF US DISCOVERY Fleming 
- NORTH ATLANTIC SMCOS. Hambro (J 0) 
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_Far 
East (Including Japan) 
_F&C 
PACIFIC Foreign & Colonial 
MARTIN CURRIE PACIFIC Martin Curr-ie 
_ 
Far East (Excluding Japan) 
_ 
ABERDEEN NEW DAWN IT. Aberdeen Fund Managers 
EDINBURGH DRAGON TST. Edinburgh Fund Managers 
HENDERSON FAR EAST INC. Henderson Investors 
HENDERSON TR PAC. IT Henderson Investors 
PACIFIC ASSETS Ivo &Sime 
PACIFIC HORIZON Baillie Gifford 
SIAM SELECTIVE GW. DELISTED 
23/07/01 
Management International (Guernsey) 
Trio Trust dead 12/1/93 Henderson Investors 
Pacific Property Ivo and Sime 
Gartmore Emerg. Pacific delisted 04/10/99 Gartmore 
First Philippine delisted 26/06/97 -Jupiter 
Japanese Smaller Companies 
BAILLIE SHIN NIPPON Baillie Gifford 
JPMF JAPANESE SMCOS. Fleming 
Japan 
BAILLIE GIFF. JAPAN Baillie Gifford 
FLEMING JAPANESE Fleming 
JF JAPAN OTC DELISTED 27/07/98 Jardine Fleming 
THORNTON ASIAN EMRG. 'DELISTED 
26/03/97' 
Thornton Asset Management 
PERPETUAL JAPAN - N. A. V. (PAR) Perpetual 
Europe 
F&C EUROTRUST Foreign & Colonial 
FLEMING CONT. EUROPE Fleming 
GARTMORE EUROPEAN Gartmore 
INVESCO PERP. EUR. IT. Invesco 
MARTIN CURRIE EUR. Martin Currie 
JUP. EUROPEAN ORD. DELISTED 
20/11/00 
Jupiter 
CHARTER EUROPEAN DELISTED 
22/04/02 
Charter Asset Management 
GERMAN INV. TST. DEAD - ACQ. Hill Samuel 
Schroder Mediterranean Delisted 06/08/96 Schroder 
Paribas French Inv Dead 31/08/97 Paribas 
MERRILL LYNCH EUROPEAN Merrill Lynch 
HEND. EUROTR. ORD. Henderson Investors 
Country Specialists - Far East _ ABERDEEN NEW THAI Aberdeen Fund Managers 
NEW ZEALAND INV. Exeter Asset Management 
STOCKS CONVERTIBLE TST. Framlington 
Sector Specialists - Property 
215 
TR PROPERTY fNV. Thornton 
TRUST OF PROPERTY Thornton 
European Smaller Companies 
EUROPEAN ASSETS TST. Ivory&Sime 
JPMF EUROPEAN FLEDGELING Fleming 
TR EUROPEAN GROWTH 
A lrlrlr-I 
Henderson Investors 
30 Ul UC. Pki I ký 
Table 74 Details the various US funds and their corresponding management group 
CEFA Category Management Group 
Equity Income 
Adams Express Company Adam Express/Petroleum & Resources 
Boulder Growth and Income Fund Boulder Investment Advisers 
Cornerstone strategic value Fund Cornerstone Advisers 
Cornerstone total return fund Cornerstone Advisers 
J Hancock Patriot Prern Div Fd I John Hancock Advisers 
Liberty all star equity fund Liberty Asset Management 
Source Capital First Pacific Advisors 
Tri-continental corporation Seligman, J. W, Advisors 
Global Equity 
Aberdeen Australia Equity Fund Aberdeen Asset Management Limited 
z-seven fund Top Fund Management 
J Hancock Global Trends Fund Top Fund Management 
Growth and Income 
Bancroft Convertible Fund Davis/Dinsmore Management 
Blue Chip Value Fund Denver Investment Advisors 
Castle convertible Fund Fred Alger Management 
Ellsworth convertible growth Davis/Dinsmore Management 
Franklin Multi Income Trust Templeton Investment Management 
Lincoln National Convertible Lincoln Investment Mgmt 
TCW Convertible Securities Fund TCW Funds Management 
Zweig Total Return Fund Zweig Advisors 
Growth Domestic 
Central Securities Central Securities Corporation 
Engex American Investors Advisors 
Gabelli Equity Trust Gabelli Funds 
General American Investors General American Investors Management 
Liberty All-star growth Fund Liberty Asset Management 
NAIC Growth Fund National Assoc of investors CoEp 
Royce Focus Trust Royce & Associates 
Royce Value Trust Royce & Associates 
Salomon Brothers Fund Salmon Brothers Asset Management 
Zweig Fund Zweig Advisors 
First Financial Fund Salmon Brothers Asset Management 
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Appendix B 
Table 75 Autocorrelation results of UK excess NAV return by sectors 
We define the excess NAV return as the difference between the NAV return and the return on 
one month risk free rate. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. The 
abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: European 
Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East Including Japan, GGI: 
Global Growth and Income,, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller Companies, J: Japan, 
JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North America Smaller 
Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGI: UK Growth and 
Income,, UKSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
Categories of AITC Lag ACF t-statistic 
CFE 1 0.146 1.84 
2 0.191 2.42 
3 0.182 2.30 
4 0.038 0.47 
5 0.025 0.31 
6 0.051 0.64 
7 -0.046 -0.57 
8 0.026 0.32 
9 0.093 1.16 
10 -0.015 -0.19 
11 0.02 0.25 
12 0.035 0.44 
EU 1 0.001 0.01 
2 0.16 2.02 
3 0.05 0.62 
4 0.014 0.17 
5 -0.012 -0.15 
6 0.05 0.62 
7 -0.095 -1.19 
8 0.126 1.58 
9 -0.016 -0.20 
10 0.133 1.67 
-0.042 -0.52 
12 0.047 0.59 
EUS 1 0.027 0.34 
2 0.053 0.66 
3 -0.003 -0.04 
4 0 0.00 
5 -0.053 -0.66 
6 -0.091 -1.14 
7 -0.111 -1.39 
8 0.043 0.54 
9 0.013 0.16 
10 -0.025 -0.31 
11 -0.022 -0.27 
12 0.095 1.19 
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FEXJ 1 0.118 1.48 
2 0.175 2.21 
3 0.121 1.52 
4 0.053 0.66 
5 
_0.102 
1.28 
6 0.025 0.31 
7 0.003 0.04 
8 0.081 1.01 
9 0.054 0.67 
10 
-0.023 -0.29 I1 
-0.028 -0.35 12 0.023 0.29 
FEIJ 1 0.131 1.65 
2 0.164 2.07 
3 0.166 2.10 
4 0.064 0.80 
5 0.044 0.55 
6 0.05 0.62 
7 -0.102 -1.28 
8 0.073 0.91 
9 0.034 0.42 
10 -0.009 -0.11 
11 -0.06 -0.75 
12 0.013 0.16 
GGI 1 0.089 1.11 
2 0.131 1.65 
3 0.075 0.94 
4 0.056 0.70 
5 -0.059 -0.74 
6 -0.004 -0.05 
7 -0.157 -1.98 
8 0.015 0.19 
9 -0.045 -0.56 
10 0.023 0.29 
11 -0.101 -1.26 
12 0.031 0.39 
GG 1 0.025 0.31 
2 0.182 2.30 
3 0.075 0.94 
4 0.09 1.13 
5 0.041 0.51 
6 -0.021 -0.26 
7 -0.002 -0.02 
8 -0.004 -0.05 
9 0.06 0.75 
10 0.093 1.16 
11 -0.077 -0.96 
12 -0.004 -0.05 
_GSC 
1 0.182 2.30 
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2 0.12 1 50 
3 0.004 . 0.05 
4 0.026 0 32 
5 
-0.084 
. 
-1 05 6 _ 0.077 . 0 96 
7 
-0.089 
. 
-1 11 8 0.068 . 0.85 
9 
-0.007 -0.09 10 
_ 
0.048 0.60 
11 
-0.049 -0.61 12 0.018 0.22 
1 0.476 -6.74 2 
-0.035 -0.44 
3 0.009 0.11 
4 0.055 0.69 
5 
-0.05 -0.62 
6 0.144 1.81 
7 -0.242 -3.11 
8 0.205 2.61 
9 -0.074 -0.92 
10 -0.038 -0.47 
11 0.071 0.89 
12 0.004 0.05 
isc 1 0.284 3.69 
2 0.131 1.65 
3 0.08 1.00 
4 0.128 1.61 
5 0.041 0.51 
6 0.019 0.24 
7 -0.075 -0.94 
8 0.006 0.07 
9 -0.032 -0.40 
10 -0.015 -0.19 
11 -0.007 -0.09 
12 -0.061 -0.76 
NA 1 0.097 1.21 
2 0.152 1.91 
3 0.067 0.84 
4 0.011 0.14 
5 -0.112 -1.40 
6 -0.059 -0.74 
7 -0.189 -2.40 
8 -0.071 -0.89 
9 0.001 0.01 
10 0.034 0.42 
11 -0.092 -1.15 
12 0.059 0.74 
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NASC 1 0.298 3.89 
- 
2 O-155 1 95- 
- 
3 _ 0.051 . 0 64 
4 0.059 . 0 74 
5 
-0-099 
. 
-1 24 6 
-0.065 
. 
-0.81 7 
-0.14 -1.76 8 -0-058 -0.72 9 
-0.055 -0.69 10 0.002 0.02 
11 -0.089 -1.11 12 -0.019 -0.24 
SSP 1 0.159 2.01 
2 0.128 1.61 
3 0.112. 1.40 
4 0.152 1.91 
5 0.061 0.76 
6 0.037 0.46 
7 -0.074 -0.92 
8 -0.087 -1.09 
9 0.05 0.62 
10 -0.112 -1.40 
11 -0.1 -1.25 
12 -0.097 -1.21 
UKG 1 0.061 0.76 
2 0.131 1.65 
3 0.088 1.10 
4 0.122 1.53 
5 -0.041 -0.51 
6 -0.004 -0.05 
7 -0.108 -1.35 
8 -0.051 -0.64 
9 -0.037 -0.46 
10 0.03 0.37 
11 -0.134 -1.68 
12 0.032 0.40 
UKGI 1 0.096 1.20 
2 0.112 1.40 
3 0.059 0.74 
4 0.131 1.65 
5 -0.068 -0.85 
6 0.074 0.92 
7 0.053 0.66 
8 -0.074 -0.92 
9 -0.102 -1.28 
10 -0.103 -1.29 
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-0.149 -1 88 - . 12 
-0-097 -1 21- . 
UKSC 1 0.203 2.58- 
- 
2 0.097 1 21 
- 
3 
-0.002 
. 
-0.02 
- 
4 0 0.00 
5 
-0.125 -1.57 
- 
6 
- 
0.043 0.54 
7 -0.048 -0.60 
- 
8 0.01 0.12 
9 - 0.011 0.14 
10 0.036 0.45 
11 -0.06 -0.75 12 0.029 0.36 
ý)ource: caicuiatea oy ine autnor 
Table 76 Autocorrelation results of US excess NAV return by sectors 
We define the excess NAV return as the difference between the NAV return and the return on 
one month risk free rate. We use monthly data from January 1990 to January 2003. The 
abbreviations used are the following: El: Equity Income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: Global 
Equity, GI: Growth and Income. 
Categories of CEFA Lag ACF t-statistic 
El 1 0.189 2.40 
2 0.051 0.64 
3 -0.031 -0.39 
4 -0.084 -1.05 
5 -0.008 -0.10 
6 0.096 1.20 
7 0.057 0.71 
8 0.104 1.30 
9 0.017 0.21 
10 0.04 0.50 
11 0.062 0.77 
12 -0.009 -0.11 
GD 1 0.208 2.65 
2 0.068 0.85 
3 -0.059 -0.74 
4 -0.078 -0.97 
5 -0.04 -0.50 
6 0.031 0.39 
7 0.101 1.26 
8 0.015 0.18 
9 0.015 0.19 
10 0.125 1.57 
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-0.12 -1 50 . 12 
-0-197 -2 50 . 
GE 0.198 2 51 . 2 0.085 1 06 . 3 0.159 2 01 
4 0.057 . 0 71 
5 0.049 . 0.61 
6 0.0134 0.17 
7 0.0189 0.24 
8 0.014 0.17 
9 0.0209 0.26 
10 0.06 0.75 
1ý 0.015 0.19 
12 -0.013 -0.16 
GI 1 0.261 3.37 
-2 0.11 1.38 
3 0.047 0.59 
4 0.089 1.11 
5 0.034 0.42 
6 0.095 1.19 
7 0.102 1.28 
8 0.0146 0.18 
9 0.0182 0.23 
10 0.083 1.04 
11 0.06 0.75 
12 0.002 0.02 
Source: calculated by the author 
Table 77 Autocorrelation results of UK excess discount return by sectors 
We define the excess discount return as the difference between the discount first difference 
and the return on one month risk free rate. We use monthly data from January 1990 to 
January 2003. The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, 
EUS: European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East 
Including Japan, GGI: Global Growth and Income, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller 
Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North 
America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGL UK 
Growth and Income,, URSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
Categories of AITC Lag ACF t-statistic 
CFE 1 -0.267 -3.45 
2 -0.048 -0.60 
3 -0.065 -0.81 
4 0.045 0.56 
5 -0.038 --0.47 6 0.036 0.45 
7 -0.034 -0.42 
8 0.025 0.31 
9 -0.002 -0.02 
10 -0.006 -0.07 
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I1 
-0-072 -0 90 12 0.04 . 0 50 _ . 
EU 1 
-0.267 -3.45 2 
-0.061 -0.76 3 
-0.012 -0.15 4 
-0.004 -0.05 5 -0.089 -1.11 6 0.067 0.84 
7 0.003 0.04 
8 0.041 0.51 
9 0.038 0.47 
10 0.015 0.19 
11 -0.051 -- -0.64 12 _ -0.106 
_ 
-1.33 
EUS 1 -0.248 -3.19 
2 -0.022 -0.27 
3 -0.026 -0.32 
4 -0.051 -0.64 
5 0.025 0.31 
6 0.18 2.28 
7 -0.122 -1.53 
8 0.036 0.45 
9 -0.016 -0.20 
10 -0.089 -1.11 
11 0.096 1.20 
12 -0.098 -1.23 
FEXJ 1 -0.221 -2.82 
2 -0.097 -1.21 
3 0.031 0.39 
4 -0.007 -0.09 
5 -0.022 -0.27 
6 0.058 0.72 
7 0.042 0.52 
8 -0.111 -1.39 
9 -0.017 -0.21 
10 0.064 0.80 
11 -0.074 -0.92 
12 -0.051 -0.64 
FEIJ 1 -0.22 -2.81 
2 -0.086 -1.07 
3 -0.034 -0.42 
4 -0.053 - 0.66 
5 0.113 1.42 
6 0.032 0.40 
7 -0.041 -0.51 
8 -0.15 -1.89 
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9 
- 
0.059 0.74 
10 0.067 O. 84 
11 -0.078 
_ 
-0.97 12_ 
-0.184 
- 
-2.33 
GGI 1 
- 
--0.61 
-9.58 
2 0.186 2.36 
3 0.063 0.79 
4 
-0.238 3.05 
5 0.0247 0.31 
6 
-0.289 -3.76 
7 0.219 -2.79 
8 
-0.063 -0.79 
9 
-0.042 -0.52 
10 0.104 1.30 
11 
-0.116 -1.45 
12 0.075 -0.94 
GG 1 -0.192 -2.44 
2 -0.275 -3.56 
3 0.073 0.91 
4 -0.083 -1.04 
5 -0.065 -0.81 
6 0.028 0.35 
7 0.063 0.79 
8 -0.074 -0.92 
9 0.094 1.18 
10 -0.02 -0.25 
11 -0.101 -1.26 
12 0.114 1.43 
GSC 1 
-0.094 -1.18 
2 -0.175 -2.21 
3 0.021 0.26 
4 0.025 0.31 
5 -0.087 -1.09 
6 -0.003 -0.04 
7 0.104 1.30 
8 0.018 0.22 
9 0.127 1.59 
10 -0.123 -1.54 
11 -0.078 -0.97 
12 0.004 0.05 
1 -0.298 -3.89 
2 -0.122 -1.53 
3 0.006 
_O. 
07 
4 0.03 0.37 
5 0.111 1.39 
6 -0.208 -1. 
Aý 
7 -0.001 -0.01 
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8 0.101 1.26 
9 0.034 0.42 
10 0.009 0.11 11 
-0.147 - -1.85 12 0.041 0.51 
isc 1 -0.376 -5.05 2 
-0.024 -0 30 3 0.042 . 0 52 
4 
-0.01 
. 
-0.12 5 0.105 1.31 
6 
-0.171 -2.16 7 0.073 _ 0.91 
8 
-0.037 -0.46 9 0.129 1.62 
10 0.011 0.14 
11 
-0.192 -2.44 
12 0.059 0.74 
NA 1 -0.202 -2.57 2 
-0.128 -1.61 
3 0.013 0.16 
4 -0.041 -0.51 
5 -0.029 -0.36 
6 0 0.00 
7 -0.009 -0.11 
8 -0.001 -0.01 
9 0.128 1.61 
10 -0.016 -0.20 
11 0.065 0.81 
12 -0.092 -1.15 
NASC 1 -0.194 -2.46 
2 -0.022 -0.27 
3 -0.075 -0.94 
4 -0.09 -1.13 
5 -0.093 -1.16 
6 0.029 0.36 
7 -0.05 -0.62 
8 0.121 1.52 
9 -0.12 -1.50 
10 0.195 2.48 
11 -0.145 -1.82 
12 0.035 0.44 
SSP 1 -0.227 -2.90 
2 -0.046 -0.57 
3 -0.073 -0.91 
4 -0.113 -1.42 
5 0.134 1.68 
- 6 -0.03 
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7 
-0.076 -0.95 8 
-0-015 -0 19 9 
-0.035 
. 
-0 44 10 0.017 . 0.21 
11 0.021 0.26 
12 
-0.025 -0.31 
UKG 1 
-0.537 -7.93 2 0.138 1.73 
3 
-0.046 -0.57 4 
-0.006 -0.07 5 
-0.005 -0.06 6 
-0.091 
- 
-1.14 
7 0.179 2.27 
8 
-0.156 -1.97 
9 0.087 1.09 
10 
-0.006 -0.07 
11 
-0.016 -0.20 
12 -0.025 -0.31 
UKGI 1 -0.243 -3.12 
2 0.06 0.75 
3 -0.164 -2.07 
4 -0.027 -0.34 
5 0.041 0.51 
6 -0.07 -0.87 
7 0.14 1.76 
8 -0.05 -0.62 
9 0.044 0.55 
10 0.001 0.01 
11 0.038 0.47 
12 0.058 0.72 
UKSC 1 -0.127 -1.59 
2 -0.097 -1.21 
3 -0.151 -1.90 
4 0.008 0.10 
5 0.011 0.14 
6 0.051 0.64 
7 0.093 1.16 
8 -0.097 -1.21 
9 -0.019 -0.24 
10 -0.044 -0.55 
11 0.006 0.07 
12 -0.014 -0.17 
Source: calculated by the author 
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Table 78 Autocorrelation results of US excess discount return by sectors 
We define the excess discount return as the difference between the discount first difference 
and the return on one month risk free rate. We use monthly data from January 1990 to 
January 2003. The abbreviations used are the following: El: Equity Income, GD: Growth 
Domestic, GE: Global Equity, GI: Growth and Income. 
_Categories 
of CEFA Lag ACF t-statistic 
El 1 -0.471 -6.65 _ 2 0.03 0.37 
3 0.029 0.36 
4 -0.126 -1.58 
5 0.119 1.49 
6 -0.158 -1.99 
7 0.041 0.51 
8 0.115 1.44 
9 -0.112 -1.40 
10 0.073 0.91 
11 -0.001 -0.01 
12 0.045 0.56 
GD 1 -0.519 -7.56 
2 0.059 0.74 
3 -0.084 -1.05 
4 0.099 1.24 
5 -0.019 -0.24 
6 -0.024 -0.30 
7 -0.016 -0.20 
8 0.038 0.47 
9 0.049 0.61 
10 -0.125 -1.57 
11 0.123 1.54 
12 -0.207 -2.63 
GE 1 
_-0.505 
-7.28 
2 -0.066 -0.82 
3 0.177 2.24 
4 -0.062 -0.77 
5 -0.201 -2.55 
6 0.318 4.18 
7 -0.188 -2.38 
8 -0.014 -0.17 
9 
E 
0.091 1.14 
10 -0.056 -0.70 
I1 -0.113 -1.42 
12 0.0269 0.34 
GI 1 -0.674 -11.36 
2 0.239 0.30 
3 
4 
-0.053 -0.66 
0.002 0.02 
6 0 9ý3 1.1 
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6 
-0-196 -2.49 7 0.0191 0.24 
8 
-0.058 -0.72 9 
-0.084 -1.05 10 0.0166 0.21 
11 
-0.164 -2.07 12 0.077 0.96 
3UUlkX. %, aAUlaLUU UY LIIC auLnor 
Table 79 ADF tests of UK excess NAV return of the different sectors by excluding a 
constant and a linear time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: 
European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East Including 
Japan, GGI: Global Growth and Income, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller 
Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North 
America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGI: UK 
Growth and Income, UKSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
CFE 
ADF Test Statistic -4.189303 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
EU 
ADF Test Statistic -4.452763 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
EUS 
ADF Test Statistic -5.225734 1% Critical Value* -2.5792 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
IVV 11 
ADF Test Statistic -3.996819 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
FEXJ 
ADF Test Statistic -3.693897 1% Critical 
Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
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GG 
ADF Test Statistic -3.371151 1% Critical Value*- -2.5798 5% Critical Value -1.9420 10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GGI 
ADF Test Statistic -4.598956 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GSC 
I 
ADF Test Statistic -4.984926 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
i 
ADF Test Statistic -8.790439 1% Critical Value* -2.5800 
5% Critical Value -1.9421 
10% Critical Value -1.6169 
isc 
ADF Test Statistic -4.283911 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
NA 
ADF Test Statistic -5.139920 1% Critical Value* -2.5792 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
NASC 
ADF Test Statistic - 4.830835 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
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SSP 
ADF Test Statistic -3.866981 1% Critical Value*- -2.5798 5% Critical alue -1.9420 10% Critical Value -1.6168 
UKG 
ADF Test Statistic -4.355694 1% Critical Value*- -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
UKGI 
ADF Test Statistic -5.963518 1% Critical Value* -2.5792 
5ý/-o -Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
UKSC 
ADF Test Statistic -5.404235 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
Table 80 ADF tests of US excess NAV return of the various sectors by excluding a 
constant and a linear time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: El: Equity Income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: Global 
Equity, GI: Growth and Income. 
EI 
ADF Test Statistic -5.646683 1% Critical Value* -2.5798 
5% Critical Value -1.9420 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GD 
ADF Test Statistic -5.611391 1% Critical Value* -2.5792 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GE 
ADF Test Statistic -4.430277 1% Critical Value* -2.5792 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
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GI 
ADF Test Statistic -4.333997 1o Critical Value* -2.5792 5% Critical Value -1.9419 10% Critical Value -1.6168 
Table 81 ADF tests of UK excess discount return of the various sectors by excluding a 
constant and a linear time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: 
European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FED: Far East Including 
Japan, GGI: Global Growth and Income, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller 
Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North 
America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGL UK 
Growth and Income, UKSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
CFE 
ADF Test Statistic -6.774598 1% Critical Value* -2.5792 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
EU 
ADF Test Statistic -16.25458 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
EUS 
ADF Test Statistic -16.00377 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
FEIJ 
ADF Test Statistic -15.53550 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
FEXJ 
ADF Test Statistic -15.51270 1% Critical Value* - - 
-2.5789 
critical Value o 5ý/ -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GG 
ADF Test Statistic -15.06163 1% Critical Value* -2.578 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
231 
Critical Value 
GGI 
ADF Test Statistic -17.46657 1% Critical Value*- -2.5789 ý% Critical Value --1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GSC 
ADF Test Statistic -13.68541 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5TIo -Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
i 
ADF Test Statistic -16.85341 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
isc 
ADF Test Statistic -18.41904 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
NASC 
ADF Test Statistic -15.19528 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
NA 
ADF Test Statistic -15.23343 1% Critical Value* -2.57891 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
SSP 
ADF Test Statistic -15.63579 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical-Value -1.6168 
UKG 
ADF Test Statistic -22.61499 1% Critical 
Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
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UKGI 
ADF Test Statistic 1 -15.87911 1% Critical Value* -2.5789 5% Critical Value -1.9419 % Critical Value -1.616q8 
UKSC 
ADF Test Statistic 
_ -14.14880 
1% Critical Value* -2.5789 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
1 01ýo Critical Value -1.6168 
Table 82 ADF tests of US excess discount return of the various sectors by excluding a 
constant and a linear time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: EI: Equity Income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: Global 
Equity, GI: Growth and Income 
EI 
ADF Test Statistic -6.078711 1% Critical Value* 1 -2.57881 
5% Critical Value -1.9419ý 
10% Critical Value+ -1.61681 
GD 
ADF Test Statistic -4.185023 1% Critical Value* -2.5788 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GE 
ADF Test Statistic -5.533921 1% Critical Value* -2.5788 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
GI 
ADF Test Statistic -10.09430 1% Critical Value* -2.5788 
5% Critical Value -1.9419 
10% Critical Value -1.6168 
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Table 83 ADF tests of UK excess NAV return of the various sectors by including a constant and a linear time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: 
European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East Including 
Japan, GGL Global Growth and Income, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller 
Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North 
America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGL UK 
Growth and Income, UKSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
CFE 
ADF Test Statistic -4.330685 1% Critical Value* -4.0237 
5% Critical Value -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
EU 
ADF Test Statistic ý4.672812 1% Critical Value* -4.0237 
5% Critical Value -3.4413 
10% Critical Value 
+ 
-3.1449 
EUS 
ADF Test Statistic -5.438150 1% Critical Value* -4.0212 
5% Critical Value -3.4401 
10% Critical Value -3.1442 
FEIJ 
ADF Test Statistic -4.187331 1% Critical Value* -4.0237 
5% Critical Value -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
FEXJ 
ADF Test Statistic -4.099588 1% Critical Value* -4.0237 
5% Critical Value -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
GG 
ADF Test Statistic -4.079016 1% Critical Value* - - 
-4.0237 
,, critical Value 5ý1 -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
GGI 
ADF Test Statistic -5.019078 1% Critical 
Value* 
- - 
-4.0237 
Critical Value 5ý/ o -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
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GSC 
ADF Test Statistic -5.510069 1% Critical Value* -4 
:::. 0237 
5% Critical Value _ 413 3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
i 
ADF Test Statistic -8.728475 1% Critical Value* -4.0245 
5% Critical Value -3.4417 
10% Critical Value -3.1452 
isc 
ADF Test Statistic 1 -7.933984 
1 1% Critical Value* -4.0245 
5% Critical Value -3.44171 
10% Critical Value -3.1452 
NA 
ADF Test Statistic -5.647342 1% Critical Value* -4.0212 
5% Critical Value -3.4401 
10% Critical Value -3.1442 
NASC 
ADF Test Statistic -5.296372 1% Critical Value* 
1 -4.02371 
5% Critical Value -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
SSP 
ADF Test Statistic -4.068640 1% Critical 
Value* 
- 
-4.0237 
3% Critical Value -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
UKG 
ADF Test Statistic -4.971897 1-% 
Critical Value* -4.0237 
5% Critical_Value -3.4413 
10% Critical_Value -3.1449 
UKGI 
ADF Test Statistic -4.964147 1% 
Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value 
-4.0237 
-3.4413 
-3.1449 
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UKSC 
ADF Test Statistic -5.678516 1% Critical Value* -4.0237 5% Critical Value -3.4413 10% Critical Value -3.1449 
Table 84 ADF tests of US excess NAV return of the various sectors by including a 
constant and a linear time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: El: Equity income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: Global 
Equity, GI: Growth and Income 
EI 
ADF Test Statistic -5.101777 1% Critical Value* -4.0237 
5% Critical Value -3.4413 
10% Critical Value -3.1449 
GD 
ADF Test Statistic -5.290851 1% Critical Value* -4.0212 
5% Critical Value -3.4401 
10% Critical Value -3.1442 
GE 
ADF Test Statistic -4.511445 1% Critical Value* -4.0212 
5% Critical Value -3.4401 
10% Critical Value -3.1442 
GI 
ADF Test Statistic -4.670510 1% Critical Value* -4.0212 
5% Critical Value -3.4401 
10% Critical Value -3.1442 
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Table 85 ADF tests of UK excess discount return of the various sectors by including a constant and a linear time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East Including Japan, GGI: Global Growth and Income, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGI: UK 
Growth and Income, UKSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
CFE 
ADF Test Statistic -6.759249 1% Critical Value* -4.0212 
5ý/o Critical Value -3.4401 
10% Critical Value -3.1442 
EU 
ADF Test Statistic -16.23645 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
EUS 
ADF Test Statistic -15.94421 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
FEIJ 
ADF Test Statistic -15.43511 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
FEXJ 
ADF Test Statistic -15.49666 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
GG 
ADF Test Statistic -14.97722 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
GGI 
ADF Test Statistic -25.19130 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
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10% Critical Value 1 -4-. 14-3 8 
GSC 
ADF Test Statistic -13.68909 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 5% Critical Value -3.4394 10% Critical Value -3.1438 
i 
ADF Test Statistic -16.77980 1% Critical Value*- 4-0197 
5% Critical Value - -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
isc 
ADF Test Statistic 1-18.32526 1% Critical Value* 1 -4.01971 
5"/o Critical Value 1 -3.43941 
10% Critical Yalue I 
NASC 
ADF Test Statistic 15.09517 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
NA 
ADF Test Statistic -15-14007 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
SSP 
ADF Test Statistic -15.54161 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
UKG 
ADF Test Statistic -22.54893 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
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UKGI 
ADF Test Statistic -15.82948 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% 'ritical Value -3.4394 
10% Critical Value -3.1438 
UKSC 
ADF Test Statistic -14.12298 1% Critical Value* -4.0197 
5% Critical Value- - -3.4394 
10% Critical V-alue -3.143 8' 
Table 86 ADF tests of US excess discount return by including a constant and a linear 
time trend 
The abbreviations used are the following: El: Equity Income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: 
Global Equity, GI: Growth and Income 
EI 
ADF Test Statistic -9.314841 1% Critical Value* -4.0193 
5% Critical Value -3.4392 
10% Critical Value -3.1437 
GD 
ADF Test Statistic -10.69767 1% Critical Value* -4.0193 
5% Critical Value -3.4392 
10% Critical Value -3.1437 
GE 
ADF Test Statistic 1 -12.18057 
1 1% Critical Value* 1 -4.01931 
1 5% Critical Value 1 -3.4392 
1 10% Critical Value -3.1437 
GI 
ADF Test Statistic -10.56032 1% Critical Value* -4.0193 
5% Critical Value -3.4392 
10% Critical Value -3.1437 
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Table 87 Normality tests of UK excess NAV return by sectors 
The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: 
European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East Including 
Japan, GGI: Global Growth and Income, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller 
Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North 
America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGI: UK 
Growth and Income, UKSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
Categories of AITC Jarque Bera Normality tests 
CFE 2.35 
EU 4.48 
EUS 4.05 
FEXJ 2.52 
FEIJ 1.74 
GGI 4.69 
GG 1.16 
GSC 2.42 
1 4.23 
isc 3.30 
NA 0.41 
NASC 3.12 
SSP 0.88 
UKG 3.62 
UKGI 3.92 
UKSC 0.35 
Table 88 Normality tests of US excess NAV return by sectors 
The abbreviations used are the following: El: Equity Income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: Global 
Equity, GI: Growth and Income. 
Categories of CEFA Normality tests 
El 3.91 
GD 4.74 
GE 3.67 
GI 0.88 
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Table 89 Normality tests of UK excess discount return by sectors 
The abbreviations used are the following: CFE: Country Far East, EU: Europe, EUS: European Smaller Companies, FEXJ: Far East Excluding Japan, FEIJ: Far East Including 
Japan, GGI: Global Growth and Income, GG: Global Growth, GSC: Global Smaller 
Companies, J: Japan, JSC: Japan Smaller Companies, NA: North America, NASC: North 
America Smaller Companies, SSP: Sector Specialist Property, UKG: UK Growth, UKGL UK 
Growth and Income, UKSC: UK Smaller Companies. 
Categories of AITC Jarque Bera Normality tests 
CFE 2.97 
EU 4.37 
EUS 3.84 
FEXJ 3.38 
FEIJ 4.70 
GGI 4.61 
GG 2.88 
GSC 4.51 
1 2.94 
isc 4.81 
NA 1.43 
NASC 2.98 
SSP 4.60 
UKG 3.88 
UKGI 4.84 
UKSC 4.08 
Table 90 Normality tests of US excess discount return by sectors 
The abbreviations used are the following: El: Equity Income, GD: Growth Domestic, GE: Global 
Equity, GI: Growth and Income. 
Categories of CEFA Jarque Bera / Normality tests 
El 4.78 
GD 3.75 
GE 3.10 
GI 3.98 
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